EVERETT L. BURNSIDE, APPELLANT,
v.
JESSE MCCRARY AND WILKIE D. FERGUSON ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1980-05-27
No. 79-1518
Before HUBBART and BASKIN, JJ., and PEARSON, TILLMAN (Ret.), Associate Judge.
384 So. 2d 1292 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1980) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Affirming summary judgment for defendant Ferguson in a legal malpractice action, the court held that Ferguson could not be liable for alleged negligent acts occurring after he left his law firm to assume a judicial position, and that the plaintiff's proposed amended complaint failed to establish a causal connection between the alleged negligence and the dismissal of his federal court action.


Holding

Ferguson cannot be held liable for legal malpractice as a matter of law because the alleged negligent acts occurred after he had been elevated to the bench without retaining any financial interest in the subject litigation. Additionally, the trial court properly denied the motion to amend because the alleged additional acts of negligence in the proposed amended complaint did not cause the dismissal of the federal action, and therefore do not constitute actionable legal malpractice.


Headnotes

[1] A former attorney is not liable for legal malpractice for acts occurring after they have been elevated to the bench and have no financial interest in the litigation.

[2] A motion to amend a complaint may be denied if the proposed additional allegations of negligence did not cause the dismissal of the underlying action.

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Key Quotes

“the defendant Ferguson was, as a matter of law, not guilty of the legal malpractice charged in the plaintiff's complaint because the record affirmatively establishes that the alleged negligent acts occurred after the defendant had been elevated to the bench without having retained any financial interest in the subject litigation”

Establishes the primary holding that Ferguson cannot be liable for malpractice for acts committed after leaving his law firm to assume judicial office

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Facts & Procedural History

Plaintiff Burnside brought a legal malpractice action against defendants McCrary and Ferguson. Ferguson had been an attorney handling litigation for B…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The final summary judgment under review, which was entered in favor of the defendant Wilkie Ferguson in this legal malpractice action, is affirmed upon a holding that: (a) the defendant Ferguson was, as a matter of law, not guilty of the legal malpractice charged in the plaintiff’s complaint because the record affirmatively establishes that the alleged negligent acts occurred after the defendant had been elevated to the bench without having retained any financial interest in the subject litigation which was thereafter handled by the defendant’s former law firm, and (b) no reversible error appears in the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff Everett L. Burnside’s motion to amend his complaint because the record affirmatively establishes that the alleged additional acts of negligence in the proposed amended complaint in no way caused the dismissal of the plaintiff Burnside’s subject action in federal court, and, thus no actionable legal malpractice was on this record proposed by the plaintiff in the amended complaint.1

Affirmed.

. Our review of the federal district court order signed by Judge Peter T. Fay and dated January 18, 1974, indicates that the plaintiff Burnside’s subject federal action was dismissed as an individual action because “no response was filed by Plaintiff to Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss and to Strike the First Amended Complaint within the time limits established by this Court’s Local Rule 10(c),” (R 546) and as a class action because “no response was filed by Plaintiff to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Class Action, no response was made by Plaintiff or his counsel to this Court’s Order scheduling the hearing to determine whether this cause should be permitted to proceed as a class action, and no appearance was made at the January 3,1974 class action by either Plaintiff or his counsel” (R 546).

In short, the plaintiff Burnside’s federal court action was dismissed for failure of plaintiffs counsel to file proper responsive pleadings when required and to make necessary court appearances, acts which the record affirmatively establishes were committed after the defendant Ferguson had left his former law firm and assumed the bench. As such, the additional acts of alleged negligence charged in the proposed amended complaint are moot and cannot constitute actionable legal malpractice herein as they did not form the basis upon which the subject federal court action was dismissed.

In this connection, we do not read footnote 2 of the court’s order as stating additional grounds for the dismissal of the individual action as it is plain that the court hei<¿ was merely listing the various grounds of the motions to dismiss and strike, which motions the plaintiffs counsel never responded to; it was the failure to respond, however, that formed the basis for the dismissal of this portion of the plaintiffs lawsuit. We reject plaintiff’s contentions to the contrary on this appeal.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Huwer, 508 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
    …mative defense because FP & L was not entitled to the proposed defense as a matter of law. See Davis v. Sun First Nat’l Bank of Orlando, 408 So. 2d 608, 610 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), pet. for review denied, 413 So. 2d 875 (Fla.1982); Burnside v. McCrary, 384 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Wilisch v. Wilisch, 335 So. 2d 861, 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The final judgment under review is accordingly Affirmed.…

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