JANIS INDULIS UBELIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant was convicted of both manslaughter (DUI) and vehicular homicide for a single fatal collision. The court held that a defendant cannot be convicted of both offenses when they arise from a single homicide, and reversed, ordering entry of a single conviction and sentence.
Only one judgment and sentence can be imposed for one homicide, even though the information charges two separate statutory violations. The appellant cannot be convicted of both offenses arising from a single death.
[1] A single death resulting from a defendant's actions can only support one conviction for homicide, even if the information charges multiple statutory violations arising fr…
[2] A defendant cannot be convicted of both manslaughter and vehicular homicide when a single death results from the defendant's conduct.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Only one judgment and sentence can be imposed for one homicide even though the information charges two separate statutory violations.”
Establishes the core holding that multiple convictions cannot arise from a single homicide.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant was driving a motor vehicle and struck another vehicle, causing the driver's death. He was charged with both manslaughter (driving while…
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DANAHY, Judge.
The appellant was driving a motor vehicle when he struck another vehicle causing the driver’s death. He was charged by a two count information with (1) manslaughter, causing another’s death when driving while intoxicated, in violation of Section 860.01(2), Florida Statutes (1977); and (2) vehicular homicide, operating a motor vehicle in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of another, in violation of Section 782.071, Florida Statutes (1977). A jury found him guilty on both counts and the court sentenced him to three years on each count, to run concurrently. The appellant contends he may not be convicted of both manslaughter and vehicular homicide when there was a single death. We agree.
Only one judgment and sentence can be imposed for one homicide even though the information charges two separate statutory violations. In Miller v. State, 339 So. 2d 1129 (Fla.2d DCA 1976), the appellant was charged with manslaughter while intoxicated and manslaughter by culpable negligence. A jury found him guilty as charged on both counts and the trial court sentenced him to a term of ten years on count I to run concurrently with a one-year term on count II.
This court reversed reasoning that the separate counts in the information charged only a single offense by different acts for which only one sentence is appropriate. The same result is found in the cases of Carr v. State, 338 So. 2d 267 (Fla.lst DCA 1976), Phillips v. State, 289 So. 2d 769 (Fla.2d DCA 1974), and Thomas v. State, 380 So. 2d 1299 (Fla.4th DCA 1980). In Brown v. State, 371 So. 2d 161 (Fla.2d DCA 1979), the appellant, like the appellant in the case at bar, was charged with vehicular homicide and manslaughter.
The trial court entered a judgment and sentence only on the conviction for manslaughter. This court stated “the trial judge correctly recognized that only one sentence can be imposed for the homicide although the information charged two separate offenses.” Id. at 162. In a case involving the same offenses, our sister court came to the same conclusion. Stridden v. State, 332 So. 2d 119 (Fla.lst DCA 1976).
Because the appellant’s act of driving a vehicle caused a single death, he could not be convicted of both of the offenses charged. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court for the entry of but one judgment adjudicating appellant guilty of manslaughter and the imposition of one sentence therefor. It is not necessary for appellant to appear in court for resentencing.
GRIMES, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
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Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985)…Carr v. State, 338 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Stricklen v. State, 332 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Phillips v. State, 289 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). And the rule has been utilized in the express situation now before us. Ubelis v. State, 384 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Brown v. State, 371 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), affirmed, 386 So. 2d 549 (Fla.1980).5 We therefore answer the second certified question in the negative: an offender may not be punished for both DWI manslaughter and vehicular…
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Kurtz v. State, 564 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…lenity. § 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988). If Mr. Kurtz had committed the homicide one month earlier, he clearly could have been convicted of only one offense for an act of manslaughter resulting in a single death. See Houser; Ubelis v. State, 384 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Further, the separate convictions for DUI manslaughter and manslaughter with culpable negligence clearly would have- been improper, even though Mr. Kurtz was sentenced on only one of the charges. Deatrich v. State, 534 So. 2d 903…1 / 2
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Vela v. State, 450 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…th Vela, however, that he could only be convicted and sentenced for DWI/Manslaughter or vehicular homicide, and not both.2 See Goss v. State, 398 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Muszynski v. State, 392 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Ubelis v. State, 384 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). We reverse the conviction and sentence on vehicular homicide. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part. COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur. . We recognize there is authority for the view that when the first three Barker factors are heavily…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Phillips v. State, 289 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Thomas v. State, 380 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Miller v. State, 339 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Brown v. State, 371 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Brickell Constr. Co. v. Hartman, 332 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Carr v. State, 338 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)