JOHNNY DARRELL EZELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1980-06-06
No. 79-675
GRIMES, C. J., and HOBSON and SCHEB, JJ., concur.
384 So. 2d 1309 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1980) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Appellant Ezell challenged his sentencing as a habitual felony offender under Florida law. The court affirmed the sentence, holding that a prior felony conviction counts as the equivalent of one of the two first-degree misdemeanors required under the habitual felony offender statute.


Holding

The court held that a prior felony conviction counts as the equivalent of one of the two first-degree misdemeanors required under the habitual felony offender statute, and therefore appellant qualified for such sentencing.


Headnotes

[1] A prior felony conviction is the equivalent of one of the two first-degree misdemeanor convictions required for sentencing as an habitual felony offender.

[2] The definition of habitual felony offender requires that the felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed within five years of the conviction of the la…

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Key Quotes

“Surely the legislature did not intend to punish a defendant who has committed two misdemeanors more severely than one who has committed a felony and a misdemeanor.”

The court's rationale for construing the statute to allow a prior felony to count as equivalent to a first-degree misdemeanor.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant had three felony convictions in 1971, a second-degree misdemeanor in 1971, and a first-degree misdemeanor in 1977, all in Florida. At senten…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

[*1310] PER CURIAM.

The only issue on this appeal which warrants discussion is appellant’s contention that the court should not have sentenced him as an habitual felony offender. At sentencing, the state introduced evidence that appellant had committed three felonies in 1971, a second degree misdemeanor in 1971 and a first degree misdemeanor in 1977, all of which occurred in this state. The portion of the definition of habitual felony offender pertinent to this appeal is set forth in Section 775.084(1), Florida Statutes (1977):

(a) “Habitual felony offender” means a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in this section, if it finds that:

1. The defendant has:

a. Previously been convicted of a felony in this state;

b. Twice previously been convicted of a misdemeanor of the first degree in this state or of another qualified offense for which the defendant was convicted after the defendant’s 18th birthday;

2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the last prior felony, misdemeanor, or other qualified offense of which he was convicted, or within 5 years of the defendant’s release, on parole or otherwise, from a prison sentence or other commitment imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, whichever is later;

Appellant argues that he cannot be considered as an habitual felony offender under Section (l)(a)l.a. because his felony conviction occurred more than five years ago and because there was no showing that he was in prison as a result of the felony during the last five years. With respect to Section (l)(a)l.b., he points out that he has only been convicted of one first degree misdemeanor. It is significant to note that because the word “misdemeanor” is stated in the singular, Section (l)(a)2. only requires the last of the two first degree misdemeanors to have been adjudicated within five years of the subject conviction. Therefore, if one of appellant’s 1971 felonies had been a first degree misdemeanor, he would clearly fall within the language of Section (lXa)l.b. Surely the legislature did not intend to punish a defendant who has committed two misdemeanors more severely than one who has committed a felony and a misdemeanor. Thus, we construe Section 775.084(1) to mean that a prior felony conviction is at least the equivalent of one of the two first degree misdemeanors required for sentencing as an habitual felony offender. AFFIRMED.

GRIMES, C. J., and HOBSON and SCHEB, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Jackson, 526 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1988)
    …d longer sentences because of their offenses, but this is irrelevant to the determination of how they should be punished for their new crime. I would reverse the decision of the district court of appeal and affirm the conviction. See Ezell v. State, 384 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (construing a prior felony conviction as the equivalent of one of the two first-degree misdemeanors required for sentencing as a habitual felony offender).…
  • Jackson v. State, 515 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
    …onvicted of the more severe crime of grand theft would have already been punished more severely therefor. We must also disagree with the rationale expressed by our sister court in Hall for the further reason that we feel the case of Ezell v. State, 384 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1980), upon which the court relied in Hall, does not control the issue faced in this case, and by the court in Hall. In Ezell, the court held that a prior felony conviction which occurred more than five years in the past was at least t…
  • Hall v. State, 469 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
    …conviction for a felony. We disagree with defendant and affirm. While our attention has been directed to no case law directly in point, nor have we found any, we believe rationales in State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d 315 (Fla.1978), and Ezell v. State, 384 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), support the conviction of defendant for felony petit theft. In Harris the Florida Supreme Court analogized section 812.-021(3), Florida Statutes (1977), the predecessor of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1983), with section 77…

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