LOUIS PHILLIP AYENDES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant escaped from prison, armed himself, and confined occupants of a dwelling while attempting to secure transportation to flee to Mexico. The court affirmed his conviction for attempted kidnapping, holding that the confinement was substantial enough and intended to facilitate his continuing escape under Florida's kidnapping statute.
The court held that the confinement was substantial enough to fall within the statutory prohibition of attempted kidnapping because of its intended temporal duration, the degree of control maintained, and the confinement lasted over one hour. Additionally, the confinement was intended to facilitate appellant's continuing escape, which was not yet complete when he was still in geographical proximity to the prison and actively seeking transportation.
[1] Confinement of another person against their will and without lawful authority, with the intent to facilitate the commission of a felony, constitutes kidnapping under Flor…
[2] The duration and degree of control exercised over victims can be sufficient to establish the substantiality of confinement required for a kidnapping charge, even if the c…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the intended temporal duration of appellant's conduct (for the apparent purpose of taking one victim with him for an extended time, and actual confinement of over one hour), with the degree of control maintained over the victims, constitutes confinement sufficiently substantial to be within the statutory prohibition of an attempt to kidnap”
Establishes the court's standard for determining whether confinement is substantial enough to constitute kidnapping under the statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant escaped from Union Correctional Institution on November 27, 1978, and after evading authorities for approximately 24 hours, entered a dwelli…
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
This case is before us upon appeal from a conviction and sentence on two counts of attempted kidnapping. We find that appellant’s conduct was within the intended purview of § 787.01, Florida Statutes, and affirm the judgment appealed. Appellant was incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution, near Raiford, Florida, until his escape on November 27, 1978. After evading authorities for approximately 24 hours, appellant armed himself with a wooden fence picket and entered a dwelling, occupied by an elderly female and her adult son, in the town of Raiford. Appellant commanded that the occupants not “get up” or move, and secured possession of a firearm which was on the premises. After making a phone call in an attempt to obtain transportation away from Raiford, with the eventual purpose of fleeing to Mexico, appellant waited on the outside porch with the male occupant. This witness testified that he never consented for the appellant to be in his dwelling and that he was required to always remain in the appellant’s presence. After approximately one hour, appellant was apprehended by local law enforcement officials.
The charge in this case was attempted kidnapping with the intent to facilitate the commission of escape from prison. Kidnapping, as defined in § 787.01, Florida Statutes, includes “confining ... or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to . facilitate commission of any felony.” § 787.01(l)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Appellant argues that the circumstances of this case involve an insubstantial confinement not within the intended purview of § 787.01. We conclude, however, that the intended temporal duration of appellant’s conduct (for the apparent purpose of taking one victim with him for an extended time, and actual confinement of over one hour), with the degree of control maintained over the victims, constitutes confinement sufficiently substantial to be within the statutory prohibition of an attempt to kidnap as defined by § 787.01.
Appellant also argues that at the time of the confinement in question his escape had been completed, and therefore he was not facilitating the commission of the escape. While an escape is technically completed upon an inmate’s intentional act of leaving the established area of custody, Watford v. State, 353 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the appellant in the present case was still in geographical proximity to the prison, had not abandoned his flight, and was attempting to secure transportation from the area. Those facts support a conclusion that the victims’ confinement was intended to facilitate the continuing escape within the statutory prohibition of § 787.01(l)(a)2. We note that this case is unlike Friend v. State, 385 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), in that the present case involves confinement which was of more than minimal duration, was not inherent in the nature of the felony of escape, and was clearly intended to lessen the risk of detection for an extended time, thus having significance independent of the related felony.
The judgment appealed is accordingly affirmed.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983)…kins v. State, 395 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (kidnapping reversed, rape victim’s removal from bedroom to living room was without independent significance and not materially different from restraint involved in sexual battery); Ayendes v. State, 385 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1980), (attempted kidnapping affirmed, confinement in victim’s own home with further detention during escape threatened); Friend v. State, 385 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (kidnapping reversed,…
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Autley Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1982)…al battery. Appellants cite three district court of appeal cases which have resolved this dilemma by construing this subsection not to include confinement that is inconsequential or inherent in the nature of the related felony. See Ayendes v. State, 385 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Friend v. State, 385 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Harkins v. State, 380 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); See also Bass v. State, 380 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The prevalent view nationwide is that kidnapping statutes,…
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Sorey v. State, 419 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…onfinement consisted of ordering the employees into a bathroom, telling them to stay there, and shutting but not locking the door. Presumably, Friend would have been decided differently if the bathroom door had been locked. Compare Ayendes v. State, 385 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The confinement in Simpkins was not for the purpose of lessening the risk of detection or facilitating escape. . Where, however, fingerprints are not the sole evidence to establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrat…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Friend v. State, 385 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Watford v. State, 353 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)