JOHN P. MCCALL, APPELLANT,
v.
MARTHA C. MCCALL, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1980-05-28
No. 79-2020
SCHEB, Acting C. J., and OTT and DAN-AHY, JJ., concur.
386 So. 2d 275 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1980) Positive Treatment
Cited by 13 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SCHEB, Acting C. J., and OTT and DAN-AHY, JJ., concur.

Other
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is but another of the many cases decided without the benefit of the guidelines and nomenclature established by our supreme court in Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980) and Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). The trial court arrived at an eminently equitable and appropriate result under the facts and circumstances of this case — the recital of which would serve no useful purpose. The court’s only error (we now know) was in declaring that Mrs. McCall had a “special equity" in the family home, entitling her to a conveyance of the husband’s undivided one-half interest therein. The award, however, would have been quite proper had it been denominated “lump sum alimony.”

There may be cases where such an error would require reversal, but we can discern no prejudice from letting the present award stand. We are satisfied that no result more favorable to Mr. McCall could result from returning the case to the court below. The only possible consequence of reversal would be an unnecessary imposition on some court calendar already crowded with real controversies. We therefore affirm the award of the husband’s interest in the jointly titled real property as an appropriate lump sum alimony award although erroneously designated as a “special equity.”

The motion for rehearing is therefore denied.

SCHEB, C. J., and OTT and DANAHY, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Roffe v. Moises Roffe, 404 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
    …btedly be upheld if it had been referred to as one of lump sum alimony. See Duncan v. Duncan, supra. Since this is true, there is no purpose to be served by returning the case to the trial court merely for a change in nomenclature. McCall v. McCall, 386 So. 2d 275 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). Hence, this aspect of the judgment is sustained on this alternative ground as well. Both sides challenge the provision for the wife of $300 per week for five years in rehabilitative alimony. We reject the husband’s contention tha…
  • Walser v. Walser, 473 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
    …t be the basis for a special equity award, these items may justify an award of lump sum alimony to ensure an equitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla.1980); McCall v. McCall, 386 So. 2d 275 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). It is clear from the record that the trial court felt that the wife would be “short-changed” if she were not awarded the special equities. The record also supports some justification in awarding the wife lump sum alimony in that s…
  • Reid v. Compass Bank, 164 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
    …ity of a retrial. This was, in essence, the view of the trial court in allowing the appellee to present her claims to the jury. Obligated as we are not to place form over substance, the trial court’s decision should be affirmed.”); McCall v. McCall, 386 So. 2d 275, 276 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (noting that the trial court arrived at an “eminently equitable and appropriate result” under the facts of the case and that the court’s only error was declaring that one of the parties had a “special equity” in the family ho…

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