STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JERRY L. WRIGHT, APPELLEE
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Florida's reversal of a trial court's dismissal of armed robbery charges because the state's traverse properly denied material facts alleged in the defendant's motion to dismiss, making denial of the motion mandatory under Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 3.190(d).
When material factual allegations in a motion to dismiss are specifically denied in the state's traverse, denial of the motion to dismiss is mandatory.
[1] When material factual allegations in a motion to dismiss are specifically denied in the state's traverse, denial of the motion to dismiss is mandatory under Florida Crimi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If material factual allegations of a (c)(4) motion are denied or disputed in the traverse, denial of the motion to dismiss is mandatory.”
Court citing State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), to establish the mandatory standard for denying motions to dismiss when material facts are disputed.
Appellee Wright was charged with armed robbery and filed a sworn motion to dismiss; the state filed a traverse specifically denying the material facts…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellee, charged with committing an armed robbery, filed a sworn motion to dismiss. The state filed the following traverse to the motion:
1. The State specifically denies that there are no material disputed facts in this case.
2. The State specifically denies paragraph two (2) of Defendant’s Sworn Motion to Dismiss and further states and alleges that paragraph two (2) is a self-serving statement and that the question of intent is a factual question for jury determination.
3. The State specifically denies paragraph three (3) and further states and alleges that Defendant was a participant in the robbery and did flee with the Co-Defendant after the robbery took place. The State further alleges that paragraph three (3) is a factual question for jury determination.
4. The State specifically denies paragraph four (4) of Defendant’s Sworn Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and this appeal ensued.
We reverse the order granting the motion to dismiss. Rule 3.190(d) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure requires only that the traverse deny, with specificity, the material facts alleged in the motion to dismiss. Here the material facts stated in the motion to dismiss are specifically denied. “If material factual allegations of a (c)(4) motion are denied or disputed in the traverse, denial of the motion to dismiss is mandatory.” State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
The order is therefore reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DOWNEY, BERANEK and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
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State v. Oberholtzer, 411 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…hold that the depiction of events prior to the crime in question, as contained in the State’s traverse, as well as its denial of appellee’s exculpating account of those events, was sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss. See, State v. Wright, 386 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). The State’s traverse contains abundant allegations which, if believed by a jury, are consistent with appellee’s guilt. Whether such proof will be sufficient to convict is not an issue properly resolved at this time. REVERSED.…
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State v. Horne, 399 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Evans, 394 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), and cases cited; State v. McCray, 387 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), and cases cited; State v. Lawler, 384 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). . State v. Wright, 386 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).…
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State v. Johnson, 398 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…this rule, when the material facts alleged in the defendant’s motion to dismiss are specifically denied by the state’s sworn traverse, as in the instant case, the trial court has no discretion in the matter and must deny the motion. State v. Wright, 386 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); State v. Power, 369 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. Huggins, 368 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); State v. Cook, 354 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. dismissed, 359 So. 2d…
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- State v. Fort, 380 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)