FREDERICK P. STONE, JR.,
v.
ANN STONE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Frederick Stone sought to annul his marriage to Ann Stone, which had been entered into solely to legitimize the birth of a child fathered by Stone's younger brother. The Florida Supreme Court held that such marriages entered into with no intention to perform marital duties are contrary to public policy and subject to annulment despite being undertaken for the sympathetic purpose of preventing illegitimacy.
A marriage entered into with mutual intention never to perform marital duties and never consummated is contrary to public policy and subject to annulment at the behest of either party upon clear and unequivocal proof, unless the reputed father of the child married the mother without fraud or deceit being practiced upon him.
“In the ease at bar the libellee went through the marriage ceremony with an intention never to perform any one of the duties of a wife. She went through the ceremony solely to secure a right to bear the name of a married woman and in that way to hide the shame of having had an illegitimate child, intending to leave her husband at the church door and not see him again.”
Establishes the standard for fraudulent marriage: entry into marriage with no intention of performing marital duties solely to achieve a collateral purpose.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFrederick Stone and Ann Stone, both minors (girl fourteen, boy seventeen), underwent a civil marriage ceremony with the express agreement and understa…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Cohabitation cases and more on FLexlaw
In a suit to annul a marriage it was alleged in effect that appellant’s younger brother had an affair with appellee which resulted in appellee becoming pregnant with child. Both parties were of tender years, the girl being only fourteen and the boy about seventeen years of age. The families were friendly with each other and were of equally good standing. The alleged father of the unborn child had become involved in other trouble and was not available to take on the responsibility of marriage.
To prevent the child from being born out of wedlock, it was agreed between appellant and appellee, and the respective families, that the appellant and appellee would go through a civil marriage ceremony for that and no other purpose and that appellant and appellee would not consummate the marriage by cohabitation. This agreement was kept and performed. There was no cohabitation between the parties. There was no consummation of a legal marriage. See 35 Am. Juris. 305-322.
The law applicable here is stated in 35 Am. Juris. 240, as follows:
“A man is entitled to annulment of the marriage where the woman goes through the ceremony merely to secure his name, with no intention of living with him, and leaves him immediately at its conclusion. But it has been held in an action for annulment on the ground of fraud that such annulment will not be granted upon evidence of denial of intercourse unless at the time of marriage there was intention not to. perform marital obligations.”
In Anders v. Anders, 225 Mass. 438, 113 N.E. 203, L.R.A. 1916E 1273; the Court said:
*626“In the ease at bar the libellee went through the marriage ceremony with an intention never to perform any one of the duties of a wife. She went through the ceremony solely to secure a right to bear the name of a married woman and in that way to hide the shame of having had an illegitimate child, intending to leave her husband at the church door and not see him again. That plan she carried into effect. It is settled that a contract for the sale of goods is induced by fraud and for that reason voidable where the purchaser had an intention when the contract was made not to perform his promise to pay for them. If any intention not to perform his promise renders a contract for purchase of property, voidable, a fortiori the same result must follow in case of a contract to enter into ‘the holy estate of matrimony’.”
Such pretended marriages as these, while they may be laudable when viewed from the standpoint of the participants, thinking of the the interest of the innocent unborn child, are contrary to public policy and are without the sacred elements on which the estate of matrimony is founded. The courts should not hesitate to annul such marriages at the behest of either party on clear and unequivocal proof that the purported marriage was so entered into and that the marriage status was never consummated by any cohabitation. This rule would not apply in cases where the reputed father of the child marries the mother without any fraud or deceit being practiced on him.
For the reasons stated, the decree is reversed with direction that same be vacated and a decree of the anulment of the marriage be entered.
So ordered.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, ADAMS, SEBRING and BARNS, JJ., concur.
CHAPMAN, J., dissents.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Williams v. Williams, 214 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)…ion that the cause must be remanded for further proceedings, we pretermit further discusssion upon that phase of the case. However, we are firmly of the opinion that annulment of the marriage is not warranted. In Stone v. Stone, 1947, 159 Fla. 624, 32 So. 2d 278, the Supreme Court, in holding that a marriage ceremony entered into between the younger brother of the putative father and the expectant mother was voidable, held: “The courts should not hesitate to annul such marriages at the behest of either par…
-
Jarzem v. Bierhaus, 415 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…re charade constituted a fraud upon the wife, which infected all of the property transfers and justified the court in returning the various properties to the wife. See, Cooper v. Cooper, 120 Fla. 607, 163 So. 35 (1935); Stone v. Stone, 159 Fla. 624, 32 So. 2d 278 (1947). In appellant’s second point it is contended that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance of the trial after having granted the petition of Alfred and Maxine Borah to intervene just a few days prior to the trial date. It app…