JOHN EDWARD SOULE, APPELLANT,
v.
ADELIA ROSASCO-SOULE, APPELLEE
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John Edward Soule appeals from denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in his wife's action for alimony and property division in Florida. The court reverses, holding that Florida's long-arm statute requires not only that the defendant previously resided in Florida, but also that the cause of action arise from acts or omissions occurring during that Florida residency.
Florida courts lack personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute when the defendant previously resided in Florida but the cause of action does not arise from acts or omissions that occurred during that Florida residency. Both the prior residency and causation from that residency are required under sections 48.193(1)(e) and 48.193(3).
[1] Personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute requires that the cause of action arise from the defendant's acts or omissions enumerated in the statute.
[2] Florida's long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction in actions for alimony, child support, or division of property if the defendant maintained a matrimonial dom…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[w]ith respect to proceedings for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, [the defendant] maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not.”
The relevant long-arm statute provision allowing jurisdiction based on prior Florida residency
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSoule and his wife Adelia Rosasco-Soule lived together in Florida from 1934 to 1938 during his military service. When they separated in 1971, both wer…
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MILLS, Chief Judge.
John Edward Soule appeals from the denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse.
Soule and his wife, Adelia Rosasco-Soule, lived in Florida during their marriage from 1934 to 1938 while he was on military duty. When the parties separated in 1971, they were residents of Virginia. Rosasco-Soule returned to Escambia County, Florida, and has lived there since.
She filed a petition for determination of rights of parties unconnected with dissolution, asking the court to determine the rights, duties, and obligations of the parties, including an award of alimony, an equitable distribution of the property between the parties, payment of attorney’s fees and costs, and other relief.
Soule, a resident of Virginia, was served by the Sheriff of Fairfax County, Virginia. He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his person. The trial court denied the motion.
Section 48.193(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1977), the long arm statute, provides for personal jurisdiction when:
[w]ith respect to proceedings for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, [the defendant] maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not.
Also relevant to the determination of personal jurisdiction in this case is Section 48.-193(3), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides in pertinent part: “[o]nly causes of action arising from acts or omissions enumerated in this section may be asserted against the defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this section . .
Soule urges that a reading of the above subsections in pari materia establishes that only causes of action which arise from the acts or omissions occurring in Florida may be asserted under Chapter 48. We agree. Rosasco-Soule’s reading of subsection (l)(e) to require only that the defendant has resided in Florida at some time prior to the commencement of this action fails to note the requirement of subsection (3) that that residency is sufficient to give this state personal jurisdiction only if the cause of action arises from that residency. There is nothing in the allegations of the complaint in this case that indicates that there were any acts or omissions arising out of the Florida residency on which the action of Rosasco-Soule is based. For instance, if Soule had ceased to provide support for his wife while he was residing in the state, an action for separate maintenance could arise out of his acts or omissions while a resident and the courts of this state would have personal jurisdiction.
REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LARRY G. SMITH and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
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Mouzon v. Mouzon, 458 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…iction is based on the long-arm statute. This statutory provision is based on constitutional necessity and means that there must be a nexus between the acts relied oh as a minimum contact and the cause of action asserted. See Soule v. Rosasco-Soule, 386 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). As to the award of a money judgment for child support the attempted use of the long-arm statute to acquire jurisdiction was ineffectual in this case because the complaint failed to allege, as is essential, that the defendant di…
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Emir Shammay v. Shammay, 491 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…sidency in Florida preceding the commencement of this action. Therefore, this petition seeking dissolution of marriage and a determination of rights should have been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Emir.1 See Soule v. Rosasco-Soule, 386 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (the mere fact that defendant resided in Florida sometime pri- or to the commencement of action is not sufficient to invoke jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute). Reversed. Before HUBBART, NESBITT and PEARSON, DAN…
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Schroeder v. Rolf H. Schroeder, 430 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…363 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), an ex-wife residing in Florida sought to enforce a foreign alimony decree. The first district held it did not have personal jurisdiction over the ex-husband who lived outside the state. In Soule v. Rosasco-Soule, 386 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), the court dismissed an alimony claim, unconnected with dissolution, against an out-of-state spouse. These results are in accord with our conclusion that Section 48.193(1)(e) provides for personal service in suits for alimony on…
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