STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
GERHARD S. BERGMAN ET AL., APPELLEES
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State Farm appealed a judgment in an insurance case involving the set-off of personal injury protection (PIP) and medical payment benefits against uninsured motorist coverage, and the requirement to reject uninsured motorist coverage anew upon vehicle replacement. The court reversed the judgment, holding that PIP and medical benefits cannot be set off against uninsured motorist benefits, and that an insured need not re-reject uninsured motorist coverage when replacing a vehicle.
The court held that PIP and medical payment benefits cannot be set off against uninsured motorist coverage because the insured paid for all three coverages and should receive their benefits. The court also held that an insured who initially rejected full uninsured motorist coverage need not re-reject that coverage when replacing a vehicle on the policy, absent evidence of additional premium or new agreement.
[1] An insurance carrier is not entitled to set off personal injury protection (PIP) benefits and medical payment benefits against uninsured motorist insurance benefits paid…
[2] The Legislature's enactment of clarifying legislation regarding set-offs for uninsured motorist coverage is intended to prevent such set-offs for PIP and medical payments…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“After all, the insured paid for all three coverages: PIP, medical payments and uninsured motor vehicle coverage. Why should he not receive the benefits?”
Establishes the court's rationale for disallowing set-offs—the insured paid for all coverages and is entitled to receive their benefits
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn insured purchased an insurance policy from State Farm that included PIP coverage, medical payment benefits, and uninsured motorist coverage. The in…
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DAUKSCH, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment in an insurance case. There are two questions on appeal. First is whether the appellant insurance carrier was entitled to set off personal injury protection (PIP) benefits and medical payment benefits which that carrier had paid. The set-off would be against uninsured motorist insurance benefits paid to appellee by appellant. This case is quite similar to Carter v. Government Emp. Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
Section 627.727(1), Florida Statutes (1977), is the applicable statute and it has been interpreted to allow a set-off. Carter v. Government Emp. Ins. Co.; Masters v. Lester, 366 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Evans v. Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 355 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). See also Gaines v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 378 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Co. v. Andrews, 369 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 764 and 766 (Fla.1980); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ilmonen, 360 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
In Carter, the court held Chapter 79-241, Laws of Florida, effective October 1, 1979,1 cannot be applied “retroactively” because that would result in an unconstitutional impairment of contract.
We disagree with Carter for the reasons Judge Ervin stated in his dissent and because we interpret section 627.727(1), Florida Statutes (1977), not to allow a set-off for PIP and medical benefits. When the Legislature in Chapter 79-241 enacted its clarifying statute, it did so in order to make it clear PIP and medical payments are not to be set-off.
We agree with the Legislature that the 1977 statute could have been clearer, and the statute might have been ambiguous but the most logical and the fairest interpretation is to disallow a set-off for PIP and medical payment benefits. After all, the insured paid for all three coverages: PIP, medical payments and uninsured motor vehicle coverage. Why should he not receive the benefits? Further, it is quite reasonable and proper for this court to interpret the statute as it existed before the clarifying legislation in Chapter 79-241 in a way to harmonize that prior statute with the current statute. This gives the credence to the Legislature which it is due, as well as preventing a wrong which would occur if we failed to interpret the statute in a just fashion. See Williams v. Hartford Cas. & Indem. Co., 382 So. 2d 1216 (Fla.1980).. That portion of the judgment for declaratory relief which allows the set-off is reversed.
The second question is whether an insured who has once rejected full coverage under the uninsured motorist portion of the policy must again reject that full coverage when he buys a replacement vehicle.
The evidence in this case is quite clear the replacement vehicle was no more than that, and there is no evidence of any additional premium being paid for full uninsured motorist coverage. Nor is there any evidence or law to support the insured’s assertion that whenever an insured replaces a vehicle on his policy that the carrier must go through the full rejection routine regarding full PIP coverage, full uninsured motorist coverage or any other requirements which the statutes compel when the policy is first written.
We reverse that portion of the judgment of the trial court which requires an uninsured motorist claim payment in any amount in excess of the initially agreed upon amount, which amount is reflected in the rejection when the policy was initially written.
The final summary judgment is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion and for the assessment of appropriate attorney’s fees.
This decision conflicts with the Carter decision in the first point discussed above.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and SHARP, JJ., concur. . This enactment is entitled clarifying legislation and essentially adds the sentence: “Only the underinsured motorist’s automobile liability insurance shall be set-off against underinsured motorist coverage.”
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Citator
Cited By (24 total)
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Judges OF the Dist. Court OF Appeal, 405 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1981)…heard the proceeding, or by any judge in regular active [*982] service on the court. Judges who did not sit on the panel are under no obligation to consider the motion unless a vote is requested. . State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Bergman, 387 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), cert. granted, No. 59,706 (Fla. Feb. 16, 1981). . January 1, 1980. . The Committee Note reads in part: This rule is patterned after the en banc rule of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and should be us…
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Sentry Ins. A Mut. Co. v. McGOWAN, 425 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…not constitute a material variation in the policy requiring a new rejection of uninsured motorist coverage to be made. Kenilworth Insurance Co. v. McCormick, 394 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Bergman, 387 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). We hold that the addition of new vehicles to an existing policy does not constitute a variation in the terms of the policy material enough to require a new rejection of uninsured motorist coverage each time an additional vehicle…
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Maxwell v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 399 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…hat presented by the “replacement” of a vehicle and requires no different interpretation of this statute. See Kennilworth Insurance Company v. McCormick, 394 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Bergman, 387 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Waln, 395 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). As previously noted, the trial judge found that the policy covered from 40-50 vehicles, that vehicles would be from time to time added or…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 24 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carter v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. & Eual T. Berry, 377 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Williams v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 382 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1980)
- Morgan v. State, 355 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ilmonen, 360 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Co. v. Suetta L. Andrews, 369 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Masters v. Latona Lester, 366 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Gaines v. Indus. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 378 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)