JOHN E. LERRO, PETITIONER,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, RESPONDENT
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Harbor pilot John Lerro challenges the Department of Professional Regulation's temporary suspension of his pilot's license following the Summit Venture's collision with the Sunshine Skyway Bridge. The court affirms the emergency suspension, holding that the DPR properly complied with statutory requirements for emergency orders and that the suspension remains in effect pending formal disciplinary proceedings.
The court holds that the DPR's emergency suspension order complies with Florida Statutes Section 120.54(9) because it recites specific facts and reasons for finding immediate danger to public health, safety, or welfare. The court further holds that Section 120.54(9)(c) does not apply to emergency license suspension orders, and therefore the suspension remains in effect pending formal suspension or revocation proceedings and final disposition.
[1] An agency issuing an emergency order suspending a license must recite specific facts and reasons demonstrating an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfar…
[2] A formal hearing is not required prior to the entry of an emergency license suspension order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The DPR did not purport to rely solely on the evidence adduced at that hearing, nor was it required to. It was merely required under Section 120.60(7), Florida Statutes (1979), to show compliance in its order with the requirements imposed by Section 120.-54(9) on agencies making emergency rules.”
Establishes that the DPR's emergency order need not rely solely on probable cause hearing evidence but must comply with statutory requirements for emergency orders.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn May 9, 1980, the vessel Summit Venture, under the command of harbor pilot John Lerro, collided with the Sunshine Skyway Bridge in Tampa Bay. On Jun…
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BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
John E. Lerro, the harbor pilot in command of the vessel Summit Venture at the time of its tragic collision with the Sunshine Skyway Bridge in Tampa Bay on May 9 of this year, petitions for review of the temporary suspension of his harbor pilot’s license on June 17 by the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR).
We affirm the suspension order. Lerro apparently assumes that the DPR’s action was predicated upon the results of a probable cause hearing held by the State Board of Pilot Commissioners Marine Casualty and Probable Cause Panel on June 10, for he claims that this hearing was unlawfully initiated and that the panel’s recommendation of probable cause was not supported by competent, substantial evidence.
However, the propriety of the probable cause hearing is not before us. The DPR did not purport to rely solely on the evidence adduced at that hearing, nor was it required to. It was merely required under Section 120.60(7), Florida Statutes (1979), to show compliance in its order with the requirements imposed by Section 120.-54(9) on agencies making emergency rules. The order recited specific facts and reasons for finding an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare necessitating the emergency suspension of Lerro’s license, as required by Section 120.54(9)(a)3, and we believe those reasons are sufficient to support the DPR’s order.1 We have found no statutory requirement for a formal hearing of any kind prior to the entry of an emergency order such as this.
At the oral argument before this court, the issue of whether under Section 120.54(9)(c) the DPR’s emergency order would expire at the end of ninety days absent earlier formal suspension or revocation of Lerro’s license was raised, and the parties were subsequently requested to submit memoranda of law addressing this question by 5:00 p. m. on Thursday, September 11. Having received and reviewed the memoranda submitted by both parties, we conclude that Section 120.54(9)(c) is not applicable to emergency license suspension orders, since it does not pertain to the making of an emergency rule or order, but only to the period of time that an emergency rule remains effective. We therefore hold that the order remains in effect pending the formal suspension or revocation hearing and final disposition thereof.2 See Saviak v. Gunter, 375 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), and Tauber v. State Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, 362 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.1979).
Accordingly, the DPR’s order temporarily suspending Lerro’s license is AFFIRMED.
OTT and RYDER, JJ., concur. . We do not, of course, express any view on whether Lerro’s actions leading up to the collision in fact constituted negligence or whether the evidence that is ultimately presented at the formal hearing will be sufficient to support any formal disciplinary action that then may be taken.
. The formal proceedings were promptly instituted, as required by Section 120.60(7), Florida Statutes (1979), and as the order itself stated that they would be, and the formal hearing is presently scheduled for October 20 of this year.
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Lash, Inc. v. State, 411 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…nd other challenges to the previous order. We do note, however, that there is no statutory requirement for formal hearing of any kind prior to entry of emergency orders temporarily suspending a license. See Lerro v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 388 So. 2d 47 (Fla.2d DCA 1980). But see Aurora Enterprises, Inc. v. State of Florida, Dept. of Business Regulation, 395 So. 2d 604 (Fla.3d DCA 1981), for a comprehensive discussion of due process requirements following temporary suspension. . See Meyer v. State…
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Witmer v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Reg., 631 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…all be judicially reviewable. If the facts alleged in the complaint and order are sufficient to demonstrate immediacy, necessity and fairness, no hearing is required prior to the emergency suspension. Lerro v. Department of Professional Regulation, 388 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). These procedures have been found to be sufficient to protect the licensee’s due process rights. Saviak v. Gunter, 375 So. 2d 1080, 1081-82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). In its amended response, the department alleges that it had offer…
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Aurora Enters., Inc. v. State, 395 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…utory provision inapplicable to emergency suspension); (b) that a pre-suspension hearing is constitutionally or statutorily required, Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979); Lerro v. Department of Professional Regulation, 388 So. 2d 47 (Fla.2d DCA 1980); West v. Board of County Commissioners, Monroe County, 373 So. 2d 83 (Fla.3d DCA 1979) and cases cited; City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Campbell, 362 So. 2d 716 (Fla.4th DCA 1978); and (c) that the findings recited in the order are neith…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Saviak v. Gunter, 375 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Tauber v. The State Bd. OF Osteopathic Med. Exam'rs, 362 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)