GEORGE H. BAKER, II, APPELLANT,
v.
ANNE TIMMONS BAKER, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1980-08-06
No. 79-391
DAUKSCH, C. J., and ORFINGER, J., concur.
388 So. 2d 233 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1980) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In a divorce case, the trial court awarded the wife the husband's interest in their jointly-owned property (valued at $100,000+) as lump sum alimony. The appellate court reversed, holding that this award was an abuse of discretion because it left the husband with virtually nothing while creating a substantial estate for the wife, and that permanent periodic alimony would better serve the wife's needs given her serious health condition.


Holding

The appellate court held that the award constituted an abuse of discretion. An award of lump sum alimony that leaves one spouse virtually without assets while creating a substantial estate for the other spouse is inequitable, particularly where the recipient's needs could be better addressed through permanent periodic alimony. The trial court must reconsider the award in light of applicable precedent regarding special equity and the equitable principles governing alimony awards.


Headnotes

[1] An award of lump sum alimony that leaves one spouse virtually without assets while creating a substantial estate for the other spouse may constitute an abuse of discretio…

[2] The needs of a spouse may be more appropriately addressed through permanent periodic alimony rather than a lump sum award that depletes the other spouse's assets.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“In granting lump sum alimony the trial court should be guided by all relevant circumstances to insure equity and justice between the parties as that principle is set forth in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980).”

Establishes the legal standard for awarding lump sum alimony requiring consideration of all relevant circumstances and equity between the parties.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The parties married in 1963 with no children and worked together pooling resources, including operating a charter business in Ponce Inlet. In 1967, th…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
EVANS, VERNON W, Jr, Associate Judge.

EVANS, VERNON W, Jr, Associate Judge.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage which awarded the wife, in satisfaction of her special equity and as lump sum alimony, the husband’s interest in the former marital residence property and surrounding land. The husband contends that this award was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

The parties were married in 1963, and no children were born of this marriage. They worked together first at Cape Kennedy in separate jobs pooling their economic resources, and later in the operation of a charter and booking service in Ponce Inlet. The income from the latter business went into a joint checking account. In 1977 the wife contracted a carcinoma which resulted in removal of the right breast. A subsequent malignancy was discovered which now afflicts the left breast. The wife is currently awaiting treatment for the latter malignancy. One of the wife’s physicians prognosticated that the probability of a complete remission is now less than 10%. Medical expenses incurred to date for the wife total approximately $2,376.05 and treatment of the present malignancy is expected to cost in excess of $10,000. The wife does not have the benefit of any medical insurance coverage.

The husband was last employed as a grocery clerk in a convenience market and the wife’s last income earning activity with the jointly run business terminated in 1977.

During 1967 the parties purchased in Ponce Inlet four adjoining lots, one of which contains the marital residence. The property was purchased for the sum of $32,-000 and an $8,000 down payment was made. Of that sum $2,500 was borrowed from the wife’s mother. The wife contends that the $2,500 was repaid with her funds, while the husband contends that it was repaid from joint funds. The balance of the purchase price was paid pursuant to a purchase money mortgage from the parties’ joint bank account, and there are no liens or encumbrances on the property. The fair market value of the property is $100,000, not including the value of the marital residence and is essentially the only asset of any real consequence acquired by the parties during their 16-year marriage.

In granting lump sum alimony the trial court should be guided by all relevant circumstances to insure equity and justice between the parties as that principle is set forth in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980).

We are of the opinion that an award of lump sum alimony that leaves the husband virtually without anything and creates an instant estate of the value of in excess of $100,000.00 in the wife was an abuse of discretion, particularly where the needs of the wife would be more properly provided for through an award of permanent periodic alimony.

It should be noted that this case was presented to the trial court on a record compiled by a special examiner (court reporter) who was neither empowered to make findings of fact or recommendations. Consequently, the final judgment under review does not come to us clothed with the full presumption of correctness that is accorded a final judgment where the chancel lor has heard the evidence. Conklin v. Pruitt, 182 So. 2d 644 (Fla.lst DCA 1966). It should also be pointed out that the trial court did not have the benefit of either the Canakaris decision or Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1980), and therefore the trial court should also reconsider the special equity award in the light of the latter case.

Final judgment herein is accordingly reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DAUKSCH, C. J., and ORFINGER, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Harris v. Romenita Harris, 498 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
    …e following authority. Rico v. Rico, 487 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Hiler v. Hiler, 442 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Bullard v. Bullard, 413 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Baker v. Baker, 388 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The record reveals that the wife has steady employment, earning more than the husband with insurance and pension benefits, etc., while the husband has no appreciable assets and earns a living from various jobs while pursuing his…
  • C.A. Hansen Corp. v. AETNA Ins. Co., 455 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
    …ere the trial court has seen and heard the witnesses testify. Sconyer v. Scheper, 119 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960). See also West Shore Restaurant Corp. v. Turk, 101 So. 2d 123 (Fla.1958); Harmon v. Harmon, 40 So. 2d 209 (Fla.1949); Baker v. Baker, 388 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Mills v. Ball, 380 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Mathews v. Kingsley, 100 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958). In view of the diminished presumption in favor of the trial court’s ruling, we hold the trial judge misconceived the le…
  • Bush v. Bush, 590 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
    …miner, per se, was error. Rather, his argument is simply that we should not afford the same presumption of correctness to the factual findings of the trial judge that would apply where the witnesses testify live before the court. See Baker v. Baker, 388 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The criterion espoused in Baker does not afford a basis for reversal in the instant case. There is ample testimony in the transcript submitted to the trial judge to support his judgment and, whatever the correct standard of rev…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw