JOSEPH LAVONE MCDANIELS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Joseph McDaniels was convicted of possession of a short-barreled shotgun based on a shotgun presented at trial, but the state introduced no testimony or measurements proving the barrel or overall length met the statutory definition. The court reversed the conviction, holding that judicial notice cannot dispense with proof of essential statutory elements such as specific measurements.
The court held that proving the length of the shotgun and its barrel is an essential element of the crime that must be proved and cannot be established through judicial notice alone. The trial court abused its discretion in taking judicial notice of these unproved elements, and the judgment on the short-barreled shotgun count must be reversed with directions to enter a judgment of acquittal on that count.
[1] Proof of the specific length of a shotgun's barrel or its overall length is an essential element of the crime of possession of a short-barrelled shotgun.
[2] A trial court may not take judicial notice of essential factual elements of a crime that are not commonly known or judicially cognizable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Showing the length of the shotgun or its barrel is an essential element of possession of a short-barrelled shotgun and must be proved.”
Establishes that the statutory measurements are essential elements that cannot be proved by judicial notice alone.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcDaniels was charged with robbery, armed robbery, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun arising from three separate incidents. At trial, the sta…
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COBB, Judge.
Appellant was charged with robbery,1 armed robbery,2 and possession of a short-barrelled shotgun3 arising from three separate incidents. By statutory definition, a short-barrelled shotgun has a barrel length of less than 18 inches or an overall length of less than 26 inches.4
During the trial, the state introduced the shotgun into evidence. It has a barrel length of approximately 16 inches and an overall length of approximately 25 inches.5 At the close of the trial, the appellant moved to dismiss the possession of a short-barrelled shotgun charge on the ground that the state had failed to introduce any evidence as to either the length of the barrel of the shotgun or the overall length of the shotgun. The trial court denied the motion on the rationale that the jury had the actual gun to look at and that the trial court was taking judicial notice that it is a matter of common knowledge as to how long 18 inches is.
Appellant was convicted as charged on all three counts and sentenced to three consecutive sentences. Appellant appeals the judgment and sentence imposed for possession of a short-barrelled shotgun and contends that the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion to dismiss that charge.
Showing the length of the shotgun or its barrel is an essential element of possession of a short-barrelled shotgun and must be proved. Cf. Purifoy v. State, 359 So. 2d 446 (Fla.1978); McIntire v. State, 381 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
Judicial notice may be taken of matters that are commonly known, but may not be used to dispense with proof of essential facts that are not judicially cognizable. Amos v. Moseley, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619 (1917); Moore v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-Op, Inc., 196 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967). Without the assistance of testimony or a measuring device, we do not believe that the common person can look at a shotgun barrel that is about 16 inches in length and know to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt that the barrel is less than 18 inches. Nor do we believe that the common person can look at a shotgun that is approximately 25 inches in length and know to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt that it is less than 26 inches. Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in taking judicial notice of these unproved elements and we, therefore, reverse the judgment and sentence of the appellant for possession of a short-barrelled shotgun and remand this case with directions that the trial court order a judgment of acquittal as to this count only. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH and SHARP, JJ., concur. . Section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1977).
. Section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1977).
. Section 790.221, Florida Statutes (1977).
. Section 790.001(10), Florida Statutes (1977).
.Rather than sending this court the actual shotgun, the clerk of the trial court has sent us three poorly lit photographs of the shotgun that were taken after the trial. The photographs show the shotgun with a tape measure lying on the shotgun.
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Huff v. State, 495 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1986)…te and elsewhere, judicial notice is not intended to “fill the vacuum created by the failure of a party to prove an essential fact.” Moore v. Choctawhatchee Electric Co-operative, 196 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967). See also McDaniels v. State, 388 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Linscome v. State, 584 P. 2d 1349 (Okla.Crim.App.1978) (judges may not judicially notice evidence presented before the court in another proceeding absent a stipulation from the parties); James v. State, 546 S.W. 2d 306 (Tex.Crim…
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McKINNEY v. State, 640 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…ient predicate for entry of final decree). Likewise, a judge should not take judicial notice of evidence relating to an important issue in a criminal case merely because such evidence is accurate from the judge’s perspective. See McDaniels v. State, 388 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). In this case, however, the status of Lakeland Christian School is a mixed question of fact and law in which the legal issues predominate. Especially when the status of the school has been previously established in another case a…
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Cordova v. State, 675 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…e injunction is not “generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.” Id.; see Huff v. State, 495 So. 2d 145, 151 (Fla.1986) (holding that fact must be of “common notoriety” before it may be judicially noticed); McDaniels v. State, 388 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (stating “[j]udicial notice may be taken of matters that are commonly known, but may not be used to dispense with proof of essential facts that are not judicially cognizable”). Compare McKinney v. State, 640 So. 2d 1183 (Fla…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1978)
- Ernest Amos as Comptroller of the State of Fla. v. Burke and John Neel, 74 Fla. 555 (Fla. 1917)
- Purifoy v. State, 359 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1978)
- Moore v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-Operative, Inc., 196 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)
- McINTIRE v. State, 381 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)