JOHN S. POLING AND NANCY POLING, APPELLANTS,
v.
PETER R. RYLANCE, INC., EGGLESTON & SONS PLUMBING, AND WILLIAM KEITH WHEELER, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court affirmed a lower court's decision, holding that an employer is not liable for injuries caused by an employee's dog brought to the worksite if the employer did not consent, benefit from, or know about the dog or its vicious propensities. This principle applies even if the dog attacks a third party.
No, an employer is not liable under these circumstances. The employer breaches no duty to a third party attacked by the employee's animal if the animal's presence was not consented to or encouraged by the employer, provided no benefit, was outside the scope of employment, and the employer lacked knowledge of the animal's vicious propensities.
[1] An employer is not liable for an employee's animal causing injury to a third party if the animal's presence at the worksite was not consented to or encouraged by the empl…
[2] To hold a corporation liable for an employee's keeping of a vicious animal, knowledge of the animal's keeping and knowledge of its viciousness must both be alleged.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An employer is not liable for injury caused to a third party by his employee’s German Shepherd dog if the bringing of that dog to the worksite is not consented to or encouraged by the employer, of no benefit to the employer, not within the scope of the employee’s duties, and the employer has no knowledge of the vicious propensities of the animal.”
This quote states the general rule for employer liability regarding an employee's animal.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Polings sued Peter R. Rylance, Inc., Eggleston & Sons Plumbing, and William Keith Wheeler after being attacked by an employee's German Shepherd do…
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LETTS, Chief Judge.
This cause is affirmed.
An employer is not liable for injury caused to a third party by his employee’s German Shepherd dog if the bringing of that dog to the worksite is not consented to or encouraged by the employer, of no benefit to the employer, not within the scope of the employee’s duties, and the employer has no knowledge of the vicious propensities of the animal. In such circumstances the employer breaches no duty to a third party who lives down the street from the worksite and is attacked. See Whetzel v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 266 So. 2d 89 (Fla.4th DCA 1972) and Dickinson v. Graham-Jones Paper Co., 84 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1955).
As to this latter cited case, which concerned a fighting cock, we quote the following language commencing on page 309 of this decision by our supreme court:
There is a wealth of authority on the question of keeping vicious dogs and other ferocious animals, the owner being held liable therefor, but a corporation is only responsible for the acts of its agents or employees while acting within the scope of their authority or while in the furtherance of its business. It is inconceivable to this Court how keeping a “fighting cock” is in the furtherance of the corporation business of a paper concern, nor is there any such allegation in the complaint. Certainly the corporation did not own the cock, nor was it engaged in such a business as promoting “fighting cocks”. Knowledge of such keeping AND knowledge of the viciousness of such animal are both necessary elements to be alleged in order to hold a corporation for the acts of its agents, servants, or employees.
**
Knowledge of the owner of the viciousness of an animal is not imputable to anyone else, especially his employer, unless the employer directed the employee to do the specific act of keeping the animal, or unless it was reasonably foreseeable as a result of his authority as the agent. To hold otherwise would be to make every corporation an insurer of the actions of its employees.
We .find no merit in the other point on appeal.
AFFIRMED.
BERANEK and HURLEY, JJ., concur.
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Roberts v. 219 S. Atl. Boulevard, Inc., 914 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…nted to or encouraged by the employer,” 2) is “of no benefit to the employer,” 3) is “not within the scope of the employee’s duties,” and 4) “the employer has no knowledge of the vicious propensities of the animal.” Poling v. Peter R. Rylance, Inc., 388 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); see Dickson v. Graham-Jones Paper Co., 84 So. 2d 309 (Fla.1955). In the light most favorable to Roberts, the non-moving party in the summary judgment, the evidence shows that while Atlantis had knowledge of Gretchen’s presence…
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Martin v. Gulfstream Metal Plating, Inc., 977 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…nted to or encouraged by the employer,’ 2) is ‘of no benefit to the employer,’ 3) is ‘not within the scope of the employee’s duties,’ and 4) ‘the employer has no knowledge of the vicious propensities of the animal.’ Poling v. Peter R. Rylance, Inc., 388 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); see Dickson v. Graham-Jones Paper Co., 84 So. 2d 309 (Fla.1955). Roberts, 914 So. 2d at 1109. In applying these factors, the court concluded that despite knowledge of the dog’s presence, the remaining factors weighed in favor o…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Whetzel v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 266 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Dickson v. Graham-Jones Paper Co., 84 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1955)