PETER JAMES CLEMONS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1980-09-26
No. 80-606
SCHEB, C. J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
388 So. 2d 639 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1980) Positive Treatment
Cited by 36 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Appellant's probation was revoked based on alleged violations of multiple conditions, but the appellate court found that the revocation order referenced violations that were not actually found by the trial court, and that at least one violation was based solely on inadmissible hearsay evidence. The court reversed and remanded for reconsideration.


Holding

The revocation order must be corrected to remove references to violations of conditions 2 and 9 that were not found. A finding of violation of a separate condition of probation cannot be based entirely on hearsay, so the violation of condition 3 cannot serve as a basis for revocation. The case is remanded to permit the trial court to consider whether the violation of condition 1 alone warrants revocation.


Headnotes

[1] A probation revocation hearing cannot be based solely on hearsay evidence.

[2] Hearsay testimony from a probation supervisor, repeating statements made by a third party, is insufficient to support a probation revocation order.

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Key Quotes

“although hearsay evidence is admissible during a probation revocation hearing, a court may not base the revocation of probation solely on hearsay”

Establishes the fundamental rule that hearsay alone cannot support probation revocation

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant's probation supervisor filed an affidavit charging him with violating four conditions of his probation. At the hearing, the trial court foun…

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Opinion of the Court
GRIMES, Judge.

GRIMES, Judge.

Appellant's probation supervisor filed an affidavit charging appellant with violating conditions 1, 2, 3 and 9 of his probation. At the hearing on the affidavit the court revoked appellant’s probation for violating conditions 1 and 3, but declined to find that he had violated conditions 2 and 9. Because the order revoking probation recites that appellant violated not only conditions 1 and 3 but also conditions 2 and 9, the court must correct the order by removing any reference to violations of conditions 2 and 9. Brouilett v. State, 373 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Brewster v. State, 352 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

The only evidence introduced covering appellant’s alleged violation of condition 3 (termination of employment without permission of supervisor) was the hearsay testimony of the probation supervisor about what appellant’s employer had said in a telephone conversation. It is well established that although hearsay evidence is admissible during a probation revocation hearing, a court may not base the revocation of probation solely on hearsay. Reeves v. State, 366 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). We believe it follows from this that a finding of a violation of a separate condition of probation cannot be based entirely upon hearsay. Hence the alleged violation of condition 3 also cannot serve as a basis for revocation.

While there was competent evidence at the revocation hearing that appellant had violated condition 1 (failure to file monthly reports), we are uncertain whether the trial court would have revoked probation and imposed the sentence it did solely on that ground. Accordingly, we reverse the order of revocation and remand the cause to permit the court to consider whether the violation of condition 1 warrants revocation. Shanklin v. State, 369 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Tuff v. State, 338 So. 2d 1335 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). In this connection, we note that since reversal of an order of revocation of probation on the ground that it was based solely on hearsay does not bar a second revocation hearing based on another affidavit alleging the same violation, the state may seek a second hearing on revocation based upon violation of condition 3. Tuff v. State; Hampton v. State, 276 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SCHEB, C. J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (18 total)

  • Albritton v. State, 476 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1985)
    …trial judge would have revoked probation in the absence of an improper ground. Watts v. State, 410 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Aaron v. State, 400 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 408 So. 2d 1095 (Fla.1981); Clemons v. State, 388 So. 2d 639, 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Peterson v. State, 384 So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Page v. State, 363 So. 2d 621, 622 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); McKeever v. State, 359 So. 2d 905, 906 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). Respondent urges the contrary and would have a re…
  • LEE v. State, 67 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
    …cannot determine from the record whether the trial court would have revoked the defendant’s probation based solely on the proper grounds will this court reverse and remand [*1202] for reconsideration by the trial court. See, e.g., Clemons v. State, 388 So. 2d 639, 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Here, the trial court’s finding that Lee violated his probation by committing the new offenses of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, sale and/or delivery of cocaine, and possession of cocaine is fully supporte…
  • THE Florida BAR v. Stalnaker, 485 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1986)
    …evidence presented before the referee boils down to a credibility contest between Stalnaker and Jones. The referee listened to and observed both of them, and, as our fact finder, resolved the conflicts in the evidence. See The Florida Bar v. Hoffer, 388 So. 2d 639 (Fla.1980). Our review of the record discloses support for the referee’s findings, and, therefore, we will not disturb them. Despite our approval of the referee’s findings of fact, however, we view the recommended twelve month suspension as excessi…

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