GOLDIE TOPPER, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF SARAH LIPTZEN, APPELLANT,
v.
JOYCE STEWART, PHYLLIS STONE, SHIRLEY ZION, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Goldie Topper, as personal representative of Sarah Liptzen's estate, appealed the trial court's validation of an antenuptial agreement between Sarah and Sam Liptzen. The court affirmed, holding that no fair disclosure was required for an antenuptial agreement executed before marriage under Florida Statute 732.702.
The antenuptial agreement is valid. Florida Statute 732.702(2) provides that no disclosure is required for an agreement executed before marriage; disclosure is only required for agreements executed after marriage. The trial court correctly found no evidence of nondisclosure and properly upheld the agreement.
[1] An antenuptial agreement executed before marriage requires no disclosure of estate information between the spouses.
[2] A statute requiring fair disclosure of estates for agreements between spouses applies only to agreements executed after marriage, not before.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“No disclosure shall be required for an agreement, contract, or waiver executed before marriage.”
This statute provision directly addressed and resolved the appellant's central argument that Sam Liptzen should have made fair disclosure of his assets to Sarah before they executed the antenuptial agreement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSarah Gross and Sam Liptzen married on July 7, 1963, after executing an antenuptial agreement on June 26, 1963. Both were of mature age with grown chi…
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PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Goldie Topper as personal representative of the Estate of Sarah Liptzen, appeals a final judgment upholding the validity of an antenuptial agreement.
Sarah and Sam Liptzen were married on July 7,1963. Both parties, being of mature age with grown children from previous marriages and having acquired certain real estate assets and other property, entered into an antenuptial agreement on June 26 prior to their marriage. The agreement provided in pertinent part:
“NOW THEREFORE, IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
“1. In case SAM LIPTZEN shall predecease SARAH GROSS, then and in such case, she is to receive from his estate, the sum of $10,000.00. This provision is made especially contingent upon SARAH GROSS being the wife and not separated from SAM LIPTZEN at the time of his death.
* * * * * *
“6. The said SARAH GROSS, agrees that she has no rights, including the right of dower, in any real estate now owned by SAM LIPTZEN. However, said SAM LIPTZEN agrees that any property he purchases after the marriage of said parties, that the same be placed jointly in the names of the said parties as tenants by the entirety, subject to all the incidents of ownership as such tenants by the entirety.”
Sam died on October 26, 1976 and Sarah passed away shortly thereafter on November 16. Subsequently, Goldie Topper as personal representative of Sarah’s estate filed in circuit court the present action seeking an interpretation of the estate’s rights under the antenuptial agreement, or, in the alternative, a voiding of the agreement for Sam’s alleged failure to make full and fair disclosure to Sarah. Following a nonjury trial, the court found no evidence to support the allegation of nondisclosure and entered a final judgment upholding the validity of the agreement. Goldie Topper appeals therefrom.
Sam Liptzen having died in October 1976, we find that Section 732.702, Florida Statutes (1975, effective January 1, 1976)1 is controlling and, therefore, disposi-tive of this appeal. See Reed v. Reed, 354 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla.1978). Specifically, subsection 2 of the statute clearly states:
“732.702 Waiver of right to elect and of other rights-
* * * * * *
“(2) Each spouse shall make a fair disclosure to the other of his or her estate if the agreement, contract, or waiver is executed after marriage. No disclosure shall be required for an agreement, contract, or waiver executed before marriage.” [Emphasis Supplied]
Accordingly, we affirm the determination of the trial court that the antenuptial agreement is valid. (Nevertheless, we hasten to point out that Section 732.702, Florida Statutes (1975) is part of the Probate Code and, therefore, would not be applicable to antenuptial agreements which are involved in dissolution of marriage actions.)
With respect to the contention that Sam Liptzen failed to place certain real and personal property acquired during his marriage to Sarah in joint names as required by the agreement, we believe that question should be determined by the probate division of the circuit court.
In light of our disposition of the disclosure issue, we need not consider the remaining points on appeal. Thus, we affirm the final judgment of the court below.
Affirmed.
. See Roberts v. Roberts, 388 So. 2d 216 (Fla.1980), upholding the constitutionality of the statute.
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Darrel Carnell v. Carnell, 398 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…court pointed out that the standards established in Del Vecchio and its progeny have been supplanted by section 732.-702, Florida Statutes (1975). While it can be argued that the statute is only applicable to probate matters, see Topper v. Stewart, 388 So. 2d 1270 (Fla.3d DCA 1980), it is difficult to comprehend a rule which would hold the standard applicable to probate provisions of the agreement and inapplicable as to the other provisions. In the instant case, however, the trial court did not base its decis…
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Goldie Topper v. Stewart, 449 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…death. Sam died October 26, 1976 and Sarah died November 16, 1976. A declaratory judgment action regarding the parties’ agreement resulted in a final judgment upholding the validity of the agreement, which was affirmed on appeal. Topper v. Stewart, 388 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), rev. denied, 397 So. 2d 779 (Fla.1981) (Topper I). This court’s opinion stated that the question of whether Sam failed to place certain real and personal property acquired during the marriage in joint names as required by the agr…
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Est. OF H. Ransley Sage v. Sage, 515 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…s, 474 So. 2d 206 (Fla.1985); Flagship National Bank of Miami v. King, 418 So. 2d 275, 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Estate of Garcia v. Garcia, 399 So. 2d 486, 489, (Fla. 3d DCA), petition for review denied, 407 So. 2d 1103 (Fla.1981); Topper v, Stewart, 388 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), petition for review denied, 397 So. 2d 779 (Fla.1981). The Supreme Court of Florida has looked to the date of death to determine whether to apply section 732.702, Florida Statutes (1975). In re Estate of Reed, 354 So. 2d 864, 865…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- In re Est. of Howard W. Reed v. Reed, 354 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1978)
- Est. of Wendell L. Roberts v. Roberts, 388 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1980)