JOHN K. PEPPER, APPELLANT,
v.
CAROLYN R. PEPPER, APPELLEE
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In this Florida divorce appeal, Pepper challenged the financial obligations imposed upon him in the dissolution judgment, including alimony, responsibility for his ex-wife's medical expenses, and attorney's fees. The court affirmed most of the trial court's awards but reversed the requirements that Pepper pay his ex-wife's attorney's fees and the 1978 real estate taxes on the family home.
The court affirmed the awards of permanent alimony, the obligation to pay for the wife's medical expenses, and the award of the family home to the wife, finding no abuse of discretion given the wife's mental illness and the husband's continuing earning ability. However, the court reversed and struck the requirements that the husband pay the wife's attorney's fees and the 1978 real estate taxes on the home.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in fixing permanent alimony when considering the wife's debilitating mental illness and the husband's continuing wage-earning…
[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in requiring a husband to continue responsibility for the "required and needed" expenses of a wife's illness.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Particularly because, however, of the evidence concerning the serious and debilitating mental illness of the wife, as contrasted with the continuing wage-earning ability of the husband, we are unable to find that the trial court abused its discretion”
Establishes the basis for affirming the alimony and medical expense obligations despite their substantial nature
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for 31 years. The wife suffered from serious and debilitating mental illness, while the husband maintained continuing wage-ea…
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
Pepper contends that excessive and unjustified financial obligations were imposed upon him in the final judgment which dissolved the 31 year marriage of the parties. It is true that these requirements are heavy, indeed. Particularly because, however, of the evidence concerning the serious and debilitating mental illness of the wife, as contrasted with the continuing wage-earning ability of the husband, we are unable to find that the trial court abused its discretion (a) in fixing the amount of permanent alimony, Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980); Herzog v. Herzog, 346 So. 2d 56 (Fla.1977); compare, Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) and (b) in requiring Mr. Pepper to continue to be responsible for the “required and needed” expenses of the appel-lee’s illness. Thompson v. Thompson, 325 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Lyons v. Lyons, 208 So. 2d 137, 139 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
Nor, in the light of these facts, was there error in the award to the wife of Pepper’s entireties interest in the family domicile, especially since the record also shows that the funds for its purchase were ultimately derived from the sale of the parties’ first marital home which Mrs. Pepper inherited from her mother. Canakaris v. Canakaris, supra; Rosen v. Rosen, 386 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); see Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1976); Griffin v. Griffin, 375 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); compare, Parham v. Parham, 385 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
We do find merit in the appellant’s remaining contentions. As a result of the terms of the final judgment which we have approved, Mrs. Pepper’s financial situation is markedly superior to the appellant’s. She will receive almost half his net income in alimony and owns the entire interest in the home which was the Peppers’ only real capital asset. Under these circumstances, there was no basis to require the appellant to pay Mrs. Pepper’s attorney’s fees. Pusey v. Pusey, 386 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Bullard v. Bullard, 380 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Finally, we hold that it was improper to impose upon the appellant the burden of paying the 1978 real estate taxes upon the home which now belongs entirely to his ex-wife. Cf., Smith v. Smith, 378 So. 2d 11, 17-18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
The award of attorney’s fees and the provision for the payment of the 1978 taxes are stricken from the final judgment, which is otherwise entirely affirmed..
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Halberg v. Halberg, 519 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…inancial success, wife must be restored to the standard of living she experienced during the marriage); Black v. Black, 490 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (dissolution award in excess of 40% justified where wife is seriously ill); Pepper v. Pepper, 388 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (trial court did not abuse discretion in fixing amount of permanent alimony at almost half of husband’s net income and in requiring husband to continue to be responsible for expenses of wife’s illness). Accordingly, we reverse the…
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Poppe v. Poppe, 412 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…porting. Her husband is responsible for one son’s college expenses along with custody of the minor child. Since Mrs. Poppe is in a financial position equal to that of her husband, she is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. Pepper v. Pepper, 388 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 383 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Mertz v. Mertz, supra; see Bucci v. Bucci, 350 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 737 (Fla.1975).…
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Golden v. Zina Golden, 410 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…s v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). Because, however, the result of these determinations is to place the wife in a financial status at least equal to the husband’s, we set aside the order awarding her attorneys’ fees. E.g., Pepper v. Pepper, 388 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Pusey v. Pusey, 386 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). With the exceptions, then, of the failure to credit Mr. Golden with 50% of the home expenses, and the $15,000 special equity and attorneys’ fee awards, all of which are reverse…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)
- Herzog v. Herzog, 346 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1977)
- Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Rosen v. Rosen, 386 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Helene Leslie Lyons v. Lyons, 208 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Earlene P. Bullard v. Bullard, 380 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Smith v. Smith, 378 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Adams v. Division OF Administration, 378 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Parham v. Parham, 385 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)