SPECIAL DISABILITY TRUST FUND OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF HIALEAH AND WESTCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1980-10-17
No. QQ-245
MILLS, C. J., and BOOTH, J., concur.
388 So. 2d 1372 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1980) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

The Special Disability Trust Fund appeals a workers' compensation ruling requiring it to reimburse an employer for a claimant's subsequent injury. The court reverses, holding that the employer failed to establish prior knowledge that the claimant had a permanent physical impairment that was likely to hinder employment, as required by statute for reimbursement eligibility.


Holding

The court held that the evidence was inadequate to establish that the employer had reached an informed conclusion prior to the subsequent injury that the claimant's pre-existing condition was permanent and likely to be a hindrance to employment. The court reversed, finding that the employer/carrier is not entitled to reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund.


Headnotes

[1] An employer seeking reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund for a subsequent injury must demonstrate that, prior to the subsequent injury, the employer had r…

[2] Knowledge of an employee's emotional problems by a non-supervisory employee without hiring or firing authority is insufficient to establish employer knowledge of a perman…

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Key Quotes

“The evidence is inadequate to establish that the employer had reached an informed conclusion prior to the occurrence of the subsequent injury that claimant's pre-existing physical condition was permanent and was, or was likely to be, a hindrance or obstacle to employment, as required by § 440.49(4)(f)l for recovery under the Special Disability Trust Fund.”

States the court's holding regarding the insufficient evidentiary basis for reimbursement eligibility

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Facts & Procedural History

In September 1974, a police sergeant inhaled chlorine gas at work and was reassigned to indoor jail work. A personnel supervisor observed emotional pr…

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Opinion of the Court
McCORD, Judge.

McCORD, Judge.

Appellant, Special Disability Trust Fund of the State of Florida, appeals from a workers’ compensation ruling that the Special Disability Trust Fund is liable pursuant to § 440.49, Florida Statutes, for reimbursement to the employer/carrier, appellee, for a claimant’s injuries. The evidence is inadequate to establish that the employer had reached an informed conclusion prior to the occurrence of the subsequent injury that claimant’s pre-existing physical condition was permanent and was, or was likely to be, a hindrance or obstacle to employment, as required by § 440.49(4)(f)l for recovery under the Special Disability Trust Fund. Therefore, we reverse.

In September 1974, the claimant sustained injuries when he inhaled chlorine gas while on duty as a sergeant with the Hialeah Police Department. Upon his return to work, the police chief assigned him to indoor work at the jail instead of his usual outdoor work. The personnel supervisor at the police department, Miss Burgin, who had no authority to hire or fire claimant, testified that after the 1974 accident, she observed that the claimant had emotional problems. She testified that she had discussed his emotional problems with the police chief and that she felt the chief’s decision to assign claimant to indoor work was a direct result of the information she gave him regarding the claimant’s emotional problems. She was unaware of any medical reports recommending that claimant be given inside work, and she was unaware that the police chief had received any medical reports concerning the claimant’s condition.

In February 1975, the claimant inhaled smoke as a result of a mattress fire in the jail where he was working and sustained temporary physical injuries again. He returned to work for about five months but was placed on long-term disability leave in September 1975 because he could not tolerate his work. He had begun to see a psychiatrist after his first accident and was found to have a permanent psychological disability which became progressively worse after the second accident, according to testimony of his psychiatrist. Appellant raises several points on appeal, asserting that the evidence does not support a finding that the facts of this case meet the criteria for employer/carrier to be reimbursed by the Special Disability Trust Fund pursuant to § 440.49, Florida Statutes. In one point, appellant contends that the employer did not have knowledge that, prior to the second injury, claimant was suffering from a permanent physical impairment which was likely to be a hindrance to his employment.

We agree. The only evidence of employer knowledge of any impairment is Miss Burgin’s testimony that she had noticed the claimant’s emotional problem and had related her observances of claimant’s behavior to the police chief. According to Allen United Enterprises v. Special Disability Trust Fund, 288 So. 2d 204 (Fla.1974), and § 440.40(4)(f)l, to receive reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund for a subsequent injury to an employee, the employer must have had knowledge prior to the subsequent accident that the employee had a pre-existing “permanent physical impairment.” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Special Disability Trust Fund v. Drive-In Cameras, Inc., IRC Order 2-2841 (1975).

Thus, even if Miss Burgin’s questionable awareness of the claimant’s psychiatric condition could be imputed to the employer in this case, there is no evidence that Miss Burgin or the employer were aware that the claimant’s emotional malfunctions constituted a permanent physical impairment.

Consequently, the criteria for Reimbursement have not been adequately met under the circumstances of this case and employer/carrier is not entitled to reimbursement.

Therefore, we reverse.

Appellant’s remaining points are rendered moot by this decision.

MILLS, C. J., and BOOTH, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Flor-A-Crete Indus., Inc. v. Benny A. Drake, 409 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
    …tatutes, Section 440.02(18) (1978 Supp.). On the other hand, lack of employer knowledge in merger cases will preclude an employer/carrier’s reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund, e.g., Special Disability Trust Fund v. City of Hialeah, 388 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). This does not mean, however, that a claimant is precluded from receiving compensation resulting from the merger of the preexisting condition and the accident because the employer had no knowledge of the preexisting condition. Cl…

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