ROMMIE HOWARD MILLS, A/K/A LONNIE H. MILLS, APPELLANT,
v.
TRUDY MAE HOLCOMB, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1980-09-17
No. 79-400
DAUKSCH, C. J., and COBB, J., concur.
389 So. 2d 223 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1980) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

A Florida appellate court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a constructive trust claim, holding that the defendant's laches defense failed because the plaintiff demonstrated no prejudice from the delay and in fact benefited from the plaintiff's continued property payments.


Holding

The court held that laches is inapplicable as a defense in the absence of prejudice attributable to the delay, and because appellee suffered no prejudice from appellant's delay—in fact benefiting from appellant's continued property payments—the trial court erred in dismissing the constructive trust claim.


Headnotes

[1] A claim for imposition of a constructive or resulting trust may be established by evidence that property was conveyed with the understanding that the grantor would retain…

[2] The defense of laches is inapplicable in the absence of prejudice attributable to the delay.

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Key Quotes

“There was no prejudice demonstrated by the delay. In fact, the delay was to appellee's benefit because appellant continued to make payments on the property.”

Establishes that the laches defense failed because appellee suffered no prejudice and actually benefited from the delay

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant Mills allowed appellee Holcomb and her husband to reside with him. In 1964, Mills conveyed his house to the Holcombs with the understanding …

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Opinion of the Court
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.

FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.

Appellant Rommie Howard Mills appeals a final judgment from the Circuit Court for Orange County which partitioned property jointly owned with appellee Trudy Mae Holcomb, claiming that the trial court erred in dismissing his countersuit for imposition of a constructive or resulting trust upon the property.

Appellant permitted appellee and her husband to reside with him. In 1964, appellant conveyed his house to appellee and her husband. He testified that this was done with the understanding that he would retain control during his lifetime and thereafter the property would go to Mr. and Mrs. Holcomb’s children.

Other lots were transferred to the Hol-combs by third parties. Appellant testified that he negotiated these sales and paid the consideration. Mr. Holcomb corroborated appellant’s testimony. Appellant also testified that in 1966 he put up the money for two more lots which also were conveyed to the Holcombs by a third party. Mr. Holcomb testified that these payments were paid from his checking account but that appellant had furnished the funds. Appel-lee denied that any of the payments were made by appellant.

In 1970, the Holcombs divorced and appellant became aware there might be a problem with the status of title to the property and consulted an attorney. Upon request, Mr. Holcomb conveyed his one-half interest to appellant. Appellee, however, considered herself the fee owner and refused to convey her interest or to be bound by the agreement. Appellant did nothing because he lacked the money to institute suit but continued to make the payments in the hope that the Holcombs’ children might still derive some benefit from the property.

The record reflects that the trial court was satisfied that the agreement claimed by appellant existed but was concerned that he was guilty of laches because appellant did nothing to enforce his claim.

We disagree. There was no prejudice demonstrated by the delay.1 In fact, the delay was to appellee’s benefit because appellant continued to make payments on the property.

We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court for imposition of the trust.

DAUKSCH, C. J., and COBB, J., concur. . See State ex rel. Clendinen v. Dekle, 173 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1965), holding that the defense of laches is inapplicable in the absence of prejudice attributable to the delay.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Provence v. Palm Beach Taverns, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
    …medy, the enforcement of a constructive trust is tempered by equitable defenses, including laches and estoppel. See generally Steinhardt v. Steinhardt, 445 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied sub nom., 456 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1984); Mills v. Holcomb, 389 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), rev. denied, 399 So. 2d 1143 (Fla.1981). In the instant case, Provence sufficiently alleged the existence of a constructive trust in his amended complaint. Assuming the truth of the trust’s existence, as we must do, Provence wo…

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