STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
KEVIN GROOMS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal of battery charges against Kevin Grooms for failure to comply with the 180-day speedy trial rule. The court held that notice of the trial date given to Grooms' attorney constitutes proper notice to the defendant, and since Grooms failed to appear on the original trial date, he was not continuously available for trial as required by the rule.
Notice to a defendant's attorney of the trial date is proper notice to the defendant when the attorney still represents the defendant and proceedings have not been terminated. A defendant who fails to appear on the original trial date is not continuously available for trial, and therefore is not entitled to discharge based on the expiration of the 180-day speedy trial period.
[1] Notice of a trial date sent to a defendant's attorney is legally imputed to the defendant.
[2] A defendant must be continuously available for trial to be entitled to discharge under speedy trial rules.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The issue before us simply stated is whether notice to a defendant's attorney of the date he is scheduled for trial is notice to the defendant. We answer this question in the affirmative.”
Establishes the core legal question and the court's affirmative answer that attorney notice constitutes notice to the defendant.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGrooms was arrested on September 8, 1979 and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer. At his October 16 arraignment, a public defender was a…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion For Discharge cases and more on FLexlaw
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Grooms was arrested on September 8, 1979, and released two days later. Subsequently, an information was filed charging him with battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of Section 784.07, Florida Statutes. Grooms did not appear at his arraignment on October 16, at which time a public defender was appointed to represent him, and his trial was set for January 17, 1980. Grooms’ appointed counsel was present when the trial date was announced in open court. A written notice of the January 17 trial date was sent to the public defender’s office and to Grooms on November 27. Grooms’ copy was apparently mailed to the jail from which he had been released earlier. Grooms evidently never received the written notice of trial.
On November 28, the public defender was allowed to withdraw because Grooms had retained private counsel. Grooms failed to appear in court on January 17, and a capias was issued for his arrest. He was arrested on January 23 and a new trial date was set for March 25. A motion for discharge was filed on March 21, alleging the state had failed to bring Grooms to trial within 180 days as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.
The circuit court granted the motion and the state appealed. The state urges that the motion should have been denied because Grooms failed to appear on the original trial date and was, therefore, not continuously available for trial.
We agree.
The issue before us simply stated is whether notice to a defendant’s attorney of the date he is scheduled for trial is notice to the defendant. We answer this question in the affirmative.
In Reizen v. Florida National Bank, 237 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970), Reizen was ordered to appear before the circuit court to be sentenced for contempt or to show cause why sentence should not be imposed. The order was not personally served upon Reizen, but was served upon his attorney. Reizen failed to appear at the show cause hearing and the court entered its order of contempt and sentenced him to ninety days. Reizen sought to set aside the sentence on the ground that he had not received personal notice of the hearing. The First District upheld the sentence upon finding that the proceedings against Reizen were still in progress and his attorney still represented him when the notice was sent. Under these circumstances, the court reasoned service of the notice upon the attorney was proper. Likewise, in the instant case, neither the proceedings nor the public defender’s representation of Grooms had been terminated when Grooms’ attorney was notified of the trial date.
Therefore, the notice to Grooms’ attorney was proper and the knowledge of its contents should have been imputed to Grooms.
Having determined Grooms was charged with notice of the trial date, the fallacy in the trial court’s dismissal of the charges for failure to timely prosecute is apparent. To be entitled to discharge because of the expiration of the 180 day speedy trial time a defendant must be continuously available for trial. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(3). Grooms was not, and accordingly the order dismissing the charge against him is quashed and the case is remanded.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and GRIMES, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
-
Sherrod v. The Honorable Arthur J. Franza, 427 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1983)…e timely appeal, and that jurisdiction was shifted back to the trial court by the mandate. During these proceedings defendant was represented by the public defender. At all times notice to defendant’s counsel was imputed to him. See State v. Grooms, 389 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Defendant contends that since the state did not request the trial court to keep him on bond, the necessary result of the order of dismissal and the order cancelling the bail bond was to release him from the jurisdiction of the t…
-
Sherrod v. The Honorable Arthur J. Franza, 396 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…urisdiction of the trial court until that jurisdiction was shifted to this court by virtue of the timely appeal and then back to the trial court by the mandate. At all times notice to his counsel was the equivalent of notice to him. State v. Grooms, 389 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). In addition, the record shows that no bond capiases were requested on both prospective trial dates. This is some evidence that the State made a good faith attempt to bring petitioner physically before the trial court. In summary…
-
State v. Martinez, 790 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…z’s behalf or waived formal arraignment. Even if Martinez did not personally know that the information had been filed, arraignment conducted and pretrial scheduled, his counsel did. Martinez’s attorney’s knowledge is imputed to him. State v. Grooms, 389 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (holding that when counsel was present when a trial date was announced and received written notice of the date, even though the client did not receive notice, the attorney’s knowledge was imputed to the client). Thus, as Martinez’…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Reizen v. Fla. Nat'l Bank AT Gainesville, 237 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970)