ROY CHARLES RINER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Affirmed conviction for leaving the scene of an accident but struck restitution condition because it covered all accident damages rather than only damages arising from the criminal act of leaving the scene.
A trial court may impose restitution as a probation condition only for damages caused by the criminal offense itself, not all damages resulting from the underlying incident.
[1] A restitution condition imposed as part of probation must be limited to damages caused by the criminal offense itself, not all damages resulting from the underlying incid…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial judge may require, as a condition of probation, that a defendant make restitution for "damage or loss caused by his offense."”
Discussing the statutory authority for restitution conditions under Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1977)
Riner's car struck Rafael Garcia's vehicle, injuring Garcia. Riner left the accident scene without stopping and was charged with leaving the scene of …
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HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.
Riner appeals from his sentence of probation with the special condition that he pay restitution.
Riner’s car struck a car occupied by Rafael Garcia, injuring Garcia. Riner then left the accident scene without stopping. The state charged Riner with leaving the scene of an accident involving an injury, in violation of Section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1977). Riner pled guilty and was placed on probation with the condition that he pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $4,626.95 for damages caused by the accident.
Riner was adjudicated guilty of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident. Section 948.03(l)(g), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that a trial judge may require, as a condition of probation, that a defendant make restitution for “damage or loss caused by his offense.” See Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.1977); DiOrio v. State, 359 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The trial court, in the instant ease, imposed restitution for all damages resulting from the accident, not just those damages arising from the criminal act of leaving the scene. The imposition of this condition was therefore improper. Consequently, the judgment of guilt is affirmed and the condition of probation requiring that Riner make restitution is stricken from the probation order. OTT and DANAHY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Williams v. State, 505 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…ondition has no relation to her crime, nor was there evidence that any damage occurred or flowed from the conduct for which she was convicted, i.e., leaving the scene of an accident. See Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.1977); Riner v. State, 389 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). In Fresneda,, the defendant left the scene of an accident involving three automobiles, one of which was his. He was charged with leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injuries. As a condition of his probation, the…
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Onel Montalvo v. State, 705 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…a. 1st DCA 1981) (in determining amount of restitution, trial court may not “ ‘require payment in excess of the amount of damage the criminal conduct caused the victim’”) (quoting Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla.1977)); Riner v. State, 389 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (probationary order requiring defendant to pay restitution for all damages resulting from auto accident, and not just those damages arising from the criminal act of leaving the scene, was improper). Ill The restitution stat…
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G. H. v. State, 414 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…he crime of leaving the scene of an accident, an act from which no damages flow, we find that he may not be subjected to any requirement of restitution for damages caused by his act of colliding with the victim’s carport. See Riner v. [*1137] State, 389 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1980). See also Hamm v. State, 403 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Our analysis does not end here. We note the State’s argument that this point has been waived since the condition of restitution was part of a negotiated plea whereby…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1977)
- DiORIO v. State, 359 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)