SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
JIMMIE ROBINSON, APPELLEE
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Southern Bell appeals a summary judgment awarding Robinson relief based on collateral estoppel from an earlier county court judgment. The court reverses, holding that collateral estoppel cannot apply because Robinson and Southern Bell were not adversaries in the prior litigation—they were both defendants aligned against the plaintiff Suarez.
Collateral estoppel does not apply because it is a prerequisite that the issue sought to be foreclosed was decided in an action "between" the parties—meaning they must have been adversaries. Robinson and Southern Bell were not adversaries in the county court; they were both aligned as defendants against Suarez.
[1] Collateral estoppel requires that the issue sought to be foreclosed has been decided in a prior action between the same parties.
[2] Estoppel by judgment must be predicated on a judgment between adversaries in the prior litigation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is a prerequisite to the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel or estoppel by judgment that the issue which is sought to be foreclosed by the result of earlier litigation has been decided in an action "between" the parties in the later case.”
Establishes the fundamental requirement that collateral estoppel requires the parties to have been adversaries in the prior proceeding.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSuarez's parked car was damaged in a collision involving vehicles operated by Jimmie Robinson and a Southern Bell employee. Suarez sued both Robinson …
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
A parked car owned by Suarez was damaged after a collision between vehicles operated by Jimmie Robinson and an employee of Southern Bell. Suarez sued Robinson and Southern Bell in the Dade County Court.1 After trial, the county court judge found Robinson not liable, and Southern Bell “solely liable” to Suarez for the $572.00 in damages to his vehicle. Robinson thereafter brought the present action against Southern Bell in the Dade County Circuit Court to recover for personal injuries he allegedly sustained in the same accident. In the order now under review2 the trial judge entered summary judgment on liability in favor of Robinson on the basis of the collateral estoppel effect of the county court judgment. We reverse.
It is a prerequisite to the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel or estoppel by judgment3 that the issue which is sought to be foreclosed by the result of earlier litigation has been decided in an action “between” the parties in the later case. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla.1977); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bartlett, 352 So. 2d 921, 922 (Fla.2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1210 (Fla.1978). This means, as the court said in Rader v. Otis Elevator Co., 327 So. 2d 857, 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 602 (Fla.1976), that “estoppel must be predicated on a judgment between adversaries.” [e.s.] It is obvious that this element did not exist under the facts of this case. While Robinson and Southern Bell were aligned together in the county court as adversaries of Suarez, they were in no sense adversaries of each other. Hence, we hold, in accordance with the overwhelming weight of authority on the identical question, that the outcome of the earlier case has no effect on the present one. Harper v. Hunt, 247 So. 2d 192 (La.App.1971) and Cook v. Kendrick, 16 Mich.App. 48, 167 N.W. 2d 483 (1969) are precisely on point. See also, cases collected, Annot., Res Judicata-Codefendants, 24 A.L. R.3d 318, 360-64 (1969).
Reversed.
. Robinson cross-claimed against Southern Bell but later dismissed the cross-claim without prejudice.
. Pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv).
. The terms are interchangeable. Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878, 73 S.Ct. 165, 97 L.Ed. 680 (1952).
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Delbert Hoskins and Martha Hoskins v. Midland Ins. Co. a/s/o Resolute Ins. Co., 395 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…ute is collaterally estopped to deny its fault in its action for indemnification. Appellee points to our recent decisions in Fuller v. General Motors Corp., 394 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Robinson, 389 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), in support of its proposition that it may not be collaterally estopped by the Iowa judgment, because appellant was not a party to the action in which it was rendered. Appellee argues that without identity of parties, or adversity…
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Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 413 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…alone is bound and that Stephen may claim in a court of competent jurisdiction that the government did cause Lawrence’s injuries. No such rule emerges from the cases cited by the majority. In Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Robinson, 389 So. 2d 1084 (Fla.3d DCA 1980), the plaintiff does not attempt to assert the determination of liability as between himself and a party who was adverse to himself and a co-plaintiff in a prior action. The plaintiff in Southern Bell, supra, could not on the ground…1 / 2
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Soares da Costa Contractor, Inc. v. Langer Elec. Co., 807 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…ior claim in bankruptcy court by broker for commission from seller’s estate not a bar to broker’s later action in state court for commission from buyer). See generally Collier, supra, ¶ 1141.02[4]. See also Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Robinson, 389 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)(collat-eral estoppel requires judgment between adversaries). Reversed and remanded.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sebastian v. THE City of Miami (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)
- Vallen James Trumps v. State, 354 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1977)
- Gordon v. Gordon, 344 U.S. 878 (U.S. 1952)
- Davena v. United States, 344 U.S. 878 (U.S. 1952)
- Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bartlett, 352 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Rader v. Otis Elevator Co., 327 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)