JOHNNYE MAE WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD AND INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, APPELLEES
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Johnnye Mae Williams appealed from a workers' compensation denial, claiming that emotional distress and resulting mental injury from workplace harassment should be compensable even absent physical trauma. The Florida appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Florida law requires physical injury as a prerequisite to compensation for neurosis or mental injury.
Mental or nervous injuries due to fright or excitement alone are not compensable under the Florida Workers' Compensation Act. Florida law requires an actual physical injury as a predicate for compensation for neurosis or mental injury arising from employment.
[1] Mental or nervous injuries resulting solely from emotional causes, without physical trauma, are not compensable under the Florida Workers' Compensation Act.
[2] The Florida Workers' Compensation Act defines "injury" as personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only, . . . shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of the employment”
This is the statutory language from Section 440.02(18) that directly bars compensation for mental injuries without physical trauma.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams taught hairdressing and cosmetology for approximately 25 years in the Hillsborough County School System. After returning from a two-week illn…
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PER CURIAM.
Johnnye Mae Williams appeals from an order of the Judge of Industrial Claims urging the judge erred in holding that mental injuries resulting only from emotional causes, without physical trauma, are not compensable under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act. We find no error. At a hearing, appellant made an offer of proof. The offer included the following alleged facts. Ms. Williams taught hairdressing and cosmetology for approximately 25 years in the Hillsborough County School System. In the summer of 1974, she left her employment for about two weeks with a non-industrial illness. When she returned to her class she noticed a change in the attitude of her students. She alleges that the students were abusive and resentful. According to the offer, this attitude was eventually expressed by fellow students, administrators and by Ms. Williams’ supervisors. Ms. Williams alleges these individuals conspired to intentionally embarrass and humiliate her in an effort to obtain her resignation. Ms. Williams withstood the stress of this abuse until August of 1975 when she was dismissed. After a civil service hearing, in April 1976, Ms. Williams was reinstated with full back pay. Upon her return to work she said that the alleged conspiracy of her employers to force her to resign continued. After she had been back at work for three weeks Ms. Williams suffered a nervous breakdown. Ms. Williams is presently totally disabled, suffering from a psychoneurotic depressive reaction with conversion features.
A claim for compensation was filed with the Bureau of Workmen’s Compensation on November 22, 1978. Ms. Williams contends her disability is compensable even though she suffered no physical trauma. The employer/carrier moved to dismiss the claim on the ground no accident, as defined in the act, had occurred. The judge of industrial claims dismissed the claim stating it failed to show a compensable injury under the Workmen’s Compensation Law. We agree.
Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law, Section 440.09, Florida Statutes, limits compensation coverage to disability or death resulting from an “injury arising out of and in the course of employment”. Section 440.02(6) defines “injury” as “. . . personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. . .. The term “accident” is defined in Section 440.-02(18) as “. . . only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly”. That section goes on to state that a “. . . mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only, .. . shall be deemed not to be an injury by accident arising out of the employment”.
It has long been recognized in Florida that there must be an actual physical injury upon which to predicate compensation for neurosis. Superior Mili Work v. Gabel, 89 So. 2d 794 (Fla.1956); Watson v. Melman, Inc., 106 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1958), Arosa Knitting Corp., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Martinez, IRC Order 2-3444 (1978); Osceola County Board v. Gagnon, IRC Order 2-2874 (1974), cert. denied 338 So. 2d 842 (Fla.1976); Cf. Tintera v. Armour and Company, 362 So. 2d 1344 (Fla.1978); General Telephone Co., American Motorists Inc. Co. v. Bass, IRC Order 2-3643 (1978). While the alleged injuries are not encompassed within the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act, those injured under such circumstances or other situations not covered by the act are free to pursue common-law remedies. Grice v. Suwannee Lumber Manufacturing Company, 113 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959).
The order appealed is AFFIRMED.
WENTWORTH and JOANOS, JJ., and WOODIE A. LILES (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.
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Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989)…atute by its own terms excludes such matters. E.g., Superior Mill Work v. Gabel, 89 So. 2d 794 (Fla.1956); Davis v. Sun Banks, 412 So. 2d 937, 937 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 419 So. 2d 1196 (Fla.1982); Williams v. Hillsborough County School Bd., 389 So. 2d 1218, 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), review denied, 397 So. 2d 780 (Fla.1981). Indeed, the statute expressly prohibits a workers’ compensation award for “[a] mental or nervous injury due to fright or excitement only.” § 440.02(1), Fla.Stat. (1987). Similarly…
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Prahl Bros., Inc. v. Phillips, 429 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…icated upon an underlying physical injury or trauma. See e.g., Superior Millwork v. Gabel, 89 So. 2d 794 (Fla.1956); Indian River County Sheriffs Department v. Roske, 417 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Williams v. Hillsborough County School Board, 389 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), pet. for rev. denied, 397 So. 2d 780 (Fla.1981). However, the underlying physical injury or trauma need not be itself disabling for the ensuing mental or nervous injury to be compensable. See Watson v. Melman Inc., 106 So. 2d 43…
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Schwartz v. Zippy Mart, Inc., 470 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…’ Compensation Law and are free to pursue their common law remedies for damages against Zippy Mart. Appellants would be free to pursue common law remedies for injuries not encompassed within the act. See Williams v. Hillsborough County School Board, 389 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). However, if the injury is one encompassed within the act, as here, the fact that their injuries are not compensable ones does not destroy the immunity provisions of the act. It is not a prerequisite to an injury being within the…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Therber v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 89 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1956)
- Grice v. Suwannee Lumber Mfg. Co., 113 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- Tintera v. Armour & Co., 362 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1978)
- Vennie M. Watson v. Melman, Inc., 106 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)