WILLIAM HENRY BENNETT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Bennett, a criminal appellant represented by court-appointed counsel, moved to discharge his appellate attorney and represent himself, claiming the attorney failed to adequately brief his appeal. The Fifth District Court of Appeal denied the motion, holding that an appellant does not have an absolute right to self-representation on appeal, particularly when he had already accepted appointed counsel and made the request only after seeing little prospect of success.
An appellant does not have an absolute right to represent himself on appeal. While Faretta establishes a right to self-representation, that right is not unlimited in the appellate context, particularly when an appellant has accepted appointed counsel, made the request late in the process after the appellate work is substantially complete, and appears motivated by dissatisfaction with the outcome rather than a principled commitment to self-representation.
[1] An appellant does not have an absolute right to represent himself on appeal after accepting court-appointed counsel.
[2] A criminal appellant cannot discharge appointed counsel at whim, particularly after counsel's work has been completed and the case is nearing disposition.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the question for us to decide is whether an appellant always has an absolute right to represent himself on appeal. We answer the question by saying he does not.”
The court's direct answer to the central legal question, establishing that Faretta rights are not absolute in the appellate context.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBennett was a criminal appellant who had been provided court-appointed counsel at trial and on appeal. After his appellate attorney filed a brief on h…
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DAUKSCH, Chief Justice.
Appellant has filed a motion allegedly on his own to have this court discharge his court-appointed attorney on the alleged grounds his attorney did not file an adequate brief and thus was not presenting his case fully. He also asks that we strike the brief filed by the attorney and allow him to file his own brief, after we order his court-appointed trial counsel and appellate counsel to furnish him with the record of the proceedings at the trial level.
Upon receipt of appellant’s motion, we requested his lawyer to respond to the motion! The response was that counsel has no objection to being removed and that appellant “has an absolute right to represent himself,” citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The attorney did not respond to the allegations that he did not properly present all the issues to be raised on appeal. We have no way of knowing at this point whether the attorney has adequately represented appellant in this appeal and will not be able to determine that question until this case is decided upon full review. However, we do know that abilities of appellate counsel, Mr. Jon May, from other appeals in this court and have never found him to present a case in an incompetent fashion.
The question for us to decide is whether an appellant always has an absolute right to represent himself on appeal. We answer the question by saying he does not. Here, the appellant requested and accepted the public’s gracious, albeit constitutionally mandated, dole for many professional services, including his trial lawyer and all the attendant costs there, as well as on appeal. Presumably, once the brief in his behalf was filed, where he perhaps thought a loophole would be found to extricate him from his predicament, he found instead there was little chance of his victory, so he decided to attack on a different course. We cannot allow this tactic to succeed lest the orderly administration of this court and the integrity of appellate proceedings be disrupted. See Chapman v. United States, 553 F. 2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977).
See also United States v. Lawrence, 605 F. 2d 1321 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1084, 100 S.Ct. 1041, 62 L.Ed.2d 720 (1980).
Had appellant requested the right to represent himself from the outset and demonstrated himself at least limitedly capable of doing so, we would have decided otherwise. Faretta; Lawrence; United States v. Dunlop, 577 F. 2d 867 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 858, 99 S.Ct. 174, 58 L.Ed.2d 166 (1978); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F. 2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977).
Although not determinative, it is not unnoticed the appellant’s motion was prepared by something entitled “Avon Park Correctional Institution’s Law Library, A.P.C.I. Law Clinic.” If we were to inquire into appellant’s ability to represent himself as was discussed in Faretta in the context of an intelligent waiver of counsel, we might be forced to look further into the background. All of this would be too disruptive of the administration of justice, both for appellant and the other litigants before this court. This is not to say that incompetent counsel should not or could not be removed upon a clear showing of neglect or willful misrepresentation, but it is to say there is no substantial allegation of that in this case. A criminal appellant cannot have his appointed counsel discharged at his whim, especially after the appellant’s work has been done and the case is about ready for disposition.
MOTION DENIED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and CO-WART, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Bentley v. State, 415 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…presentation, he is not entitled to any assistance or advice from counsel. This principle is equally applicable to trial and appellate proceedings. The right of an accused to self-representation on appeal was recently addressed in Bennett v. State, 389 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The court determined that an appellant (criminal defendant) does not always have the absolute right to represent himself on appeal. As the court explained: Here, the appellant requested and accepted the public’s gracious, albei…
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Dagostino v. State, 675 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…s a matter that is within the discretion of the appellate court. Hooks v. State, 253 So. 2d 424, 427 (Fla.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1044, 92 S.Ct. 1330, 31 L.Ed.2d 587 (1972); Powell v. State, 206 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Bennett v. State, 389 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). In Bennett, the court denied the appellant’s motion to dismiss his court-appointed counsel. The public defender did not oppose the motion and contended that appellant had an absolute right to represent himself, citing Faretta v.…
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Grant v. State, 780 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…determined that the defendant/appellant’s decision to represent himself is intelligent and voluntary. The court did not refer to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), although the reference to Bennett v. State, 389 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) presumes that the court was considering the application of that case. Thus, our own case law is not clear as to the scope of the right to self-representation on appeal. Reviewing the file in this case, the appellant, on his own,…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977)
- Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977)
- Briscoe v. United States, 439 U.S. 858 (U.S. 1978)
- Jerry v. United States, 439 U.S. 858 (U.S. 1978)
- Mayfield v. Mohn, 444 U.S. 1084 (U.S. 1980)
- Morel v. United States, 444 U.S. 1084 (U.S. 1980)
- United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321 (4th Cir. 1979)
- United States v. Lenear Charles Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1978)