FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, APPELLANT,
v.
LINDA SUE KIMMICK, APPELLEE
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The Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services appealed a trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss for improper venue in an adoption records disclosure case. The appellate court held that HRS is not a party to the proceeding under Florida Statute 63.162(2) and therefore cannot assert the state agency venue privilege, affirming the trial court's order.
HRS does not have party status in proceedings under Section 63.162(2). The statute permits HRS only to present a report on the advisability of disclosing adoption information, similar to its role in other adoption proceedings, but does not grant it party status. Therefore, HRS cannot assert the state agency venue privilege, and venue properly remains in the court that entered the original adoption judgment.
[1] A state agency is not automatically granted party status in adoption record disclosure proceedings by a statute allowing it to present a report on the advisability of dis…
[2] A state agency's venue privilege, which allows it to be sued in the county of its headquarters, does not apply to proceedings where the agency is not the defendant.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The statute does not treat HRS as a party in these proceedings. It allows that agency to present its position concerning opening the adoption records much in the same way that HRS makes recommendations and reports in adoption proceedings.”
Establishes that HRS lacks party status and can only submit reports, not assert party privileges like venue rights.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLinda Sue Kimmick petitioned the Circuit Court in Columbia County to open her adoption records. HRS was notified of the petition and moved to dismiss …
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JOANOS, Judge.
Appellee, Kimmick, petitioned the Circuit Court in Columbia County to open her adoption records. She notified appellant, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), by filing a copy of the petition with counsel for the department. HRS responded to the petition by moving to dismiss the action for improper venue, arguing that as an affected party it could assert the state agency venue privilege recognized in Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Commission, 354 So. 2d 362 (Fla.1978). HRS sought to have venue transferred to Leon County. In the order appealed from, the trial judge denied HRS’s motion.
HRS asserts that Florida Statutes (1979), Section 63.162(2) which states in pertinent part “. .. the Department shall be permitted to present to the court a report on the advisability of disclosing or not disclosing information pertaining to the adoption”, grants party status to HRS for the purpose of asserting a venue privilege. We disagree. The statute does not treat HRS as a party in these proceedings. It allows that agency to present its position concerning opening the adoption records much in the same way that HRS makes recommendations and reports in adoption proceedings. See Fla.Stat. (1979) §§ 63.-112(2)(b) and 63.122(6). Furthermore, the issue of whether or not to disclose information from the file is under the continuing authority of the court in which the judgment of adoption was entered as it is that court which has custody of the case file. That court is obviously the court referred to throughout Section 63.162 of the Florida Statutes. It would be unreasonable to construe it otherwise. The complexity that would occur in having an adoption judgment entered in the Columbia County Circuit Court but having further issues involved in the same file considered only by the Leon County Circuit Court is unnecessary and not the intent of the statute.
We note that nothing prevents HRS from entering these proceedings at the trial or appellate level as a permissible party. However, since the proceeding is not brought against HRS, the right of a state agency to be sued in the county of its headquarters as discussed in the Carlile case, supra, is not applicable to a proceeding under Section 63.162(2).
The order appealed from is AFFIRMED.
WENTWORTH, J., and WOODIE A. LILES (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Dixon v. Melton, 515 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…formation from the file of an adoption lies with the court in which the adoption was entered, and remains under the continuing authority of that court after the final judgment of adoption is entered. Department of Rehabilitative Services v. Kimmick, 390 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Although technically all circuit courts of this state have subject matter jurisdiction over adoption proceedings, once one court has exercised its jurisdiction over a particular case, another court lacks authority to determine t…
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Dep't of Health v. The Adoption OF Baby Gilli, 746 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…in the Columbia County Circuit Court but having further issues involved in the same file considered only by the Leon County Circuit Court is unnecessary and not the intent of the statute. Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services v. Kimmick, 390 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In Dixon v. Melton, 515 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the district court indicated that the question of whether to disclose adoption file information lies with the court in which the adoption was entered and “remains under t…
Authorities Cited
- Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n of the State of Fla., 354 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1977)