CLAIRE WEISS, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
MAX WEISS, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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The court held that the husband had a special equity in the marital home because the funds used for its purchase originated from his separate property and he did not intend to make a gift to the wife.
[1] A spouse may establish a special equity in marital property when the funds used for its purchase originate from a source unconnected with the marital relationship and no…
[2] A trial court's findings of fact in a dissolution proceeding will be affirmed if supported by substantial competent evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties divorced after a marriage of over ten years. The husband, aged 86, and the wife, aged 62, disputed ownership of the marital home. The husb…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the wife and a cross-appeal by the husband from a final judgment in a dissolution proceeding. At the time he filed the petition for dissolution, the husband was 86 years of age, and the wife was 62. The parties were married in December, 1970. It was the second marriage for the husband and the third for the wife, both having survived their previous spouses.
Since the only point worthy of discussion is the award of the wife’s interest in the home and furnishings of the parties to the husband as a special equity, we shall discuss only those facts relevant to that determination. When the parties were first married, they lived in the house in Hillside, New Jersey, where the husband had lived with his first wife. Thereafter they purchased a house in Palm Springs, California, sold the Hillside house and purchased a condominium in Freehold, New Jersey. Ultimately they sold the Freehold condominium and Palm Springs house and bought the house in Boca Raton, which is the subject matter hereof. Titles to the Palm Springs, Freehold and Boca Raton homes were in both parties’ names.
The trial court found and held, inter alia:
1. The funds used to purchase the marital homeplace in Boca Raton came solely from the Husband as a result of the sale of previous homes including the sale of the marital homeplace of the Husband and his deceased first wife. While the home was titled in the names of both the Husband and Wife, the evidence is clear that the Husband did not intend to make a gift to the Wife, and it was admitted that the Wife made no monetary contributions toward the purchase of the home. Since the funds for the purchase of the home originated from a source unconnected with the marital relationship and there was no gift intended by the Husband, the Court finds that the Husband has a special equity in the Boca Raton home equal to the total ownership of said home....
The record contains substantial competent evidence to sustain these findings. Consequently the trial court correctly concluded that the husband had a special equity in the Boca Raton home. Kaylor v. Kaylor, 390 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Kellner v. Kellner, 388 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Aguiar v. Aguiar, 386 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.1980).
Accordingly, the final judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
BERANEK, HERSEY and GLICK-STEIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Starcher v. Starcher, 430 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…formula.1 Thereby the husband would receive a 61.8 percent interest in the property and the wife a 38.2 percent interest. Upon remand this finding should be implemented. From the record it appears that the husband urged the case of Weiss v. Weiss, 390 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), upon the trial court as authority for determining that the wife had no ownership in the marital home. Assuming that this was the basis for the trial court deciding that the husband’s special equity was equal to the total one-hal…
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In re the Marriage of Laurel J. Ising Marsh v. Marsh, 399 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…ft could either be absolute upon dissolution for any reason or, perhaps only if the dissolution is by, or with the consent of, the donee. . See, e. g., Kaylor v. Kaylor, 390 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) [1980 F.L.W. 2034] (stock); Weiss v. Weiss, 390 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Pepper v. Pepper, 388 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 368 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (certificate of deposit); Merrill v. Merrill, 357 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (real property and common stock trea…
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DIX v. DIX, 400 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…MED. We think the evidence, although in conflict, was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s finding that the wife was entitled to a special equity in the marital homeplace. Cf. Landay v. Landay, 400 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) and Weiss v. Weiss, 390 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). In so doing, we reject the appellant’s contention that such special equity must be proven to exist “beyond a reasonable doubt” and we recede from any statements to that effect contained in our opinion in Hanzelik v. Hanzelik, 29…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)
- Kaylor v. Kaylor, 390 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Idali M. Aguiar v. Aguiar, 386 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Kellner v. Kellner, 388 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)