JAMES WARREN NICHOLS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant James Warren Nichols was convicted of possession and sale of cocaine, but the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed because the state failed to present sufficient evidence connecting him to the crime. The conviction rested on inadmissible hearsay statements from co-defendant Knox that could not be used to establish the alleged conspiracy itself.
The conviction is reversed because the state failed to establish the alleged conspiracy through independent evidence before introducing Knox's hearsay statements. The only connection between Nichols and the cocaine sale came from Knox's out-of-court statements, which were inadmissible hearsay that could not be used to prove the conspiracy itself. The court declined to address the admissibility of the prior marijuana conviction evidence in light of this holding.
[1] Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to establish the requisite knowledge and intent to participate in the commission of an offense.
[2] A defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted when the state fails to present sufficient evidence to establish the elements of the charged offense.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Knox' out-of-court statements were obviously hearsay. The state attempted to avoid that obstacle by casting appellant and Knox as the principals of a conspiracy, thus rendering admissible the hearsay statements of co-conspirator Knox under that exception to the hearsay rule.”
Establishes the state's improper attempt to use the co-conspirator hearsay exception
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn undercover agent arranged to purchase cocaine from Knox. While the transaction occurred at a motel, police observed a red pickup truck (registered …
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OTT, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of the possession and sale of cocaine. We reverse because the state failed to present proper evidence connecting appellant with the crime.
An undercover agent arranged to buy cocaine from one Knox. They proceeded to a motel and waited in a room until some unidentified person knocked and handed Knox a package of cocaine. Police officers staked out at the motel saw a red pickup truck drive in and park in back of the motel before the delivery took place. Shortly after the sale, officers observed appellant entering a bar a few doors up the street from the motel. They arrested him and a subsequent check revealed that the red pickup truck was registered in his name. In Knox’ car the police found a letter addressed to him at appellant’s residence on the south side of St. Petersburg.
At the trial, the state endeavored to close the obvious gaps in its case by introducing certain statements made by Knox. Knox himself did not appear to testify, but the undercover agent testified that Knox had told him that “his man,” who would be bringing the cocaine from the south side of St. Petersburg, had been arrested three years earlier for selling 85 pounds of marijuana. Another officer then took the stand and testified that he had arrested appellant three years earlier for selling 85 pounds of marijuana.
Knox’ out-of-court statements were obviously hearsay. The state attempted to avoid that obstacle by casting appellant and Knox as the principals of a conspiracy, thus rendering admissible the hearsay statements of co-conspirator Knox under that exception to the hearsay rule. The difficulty is that before any such statements are admissible, the alleged conspiracy itself must first be established by independent evidence, and the hearsay statements may not be used for that purpose. Briklod v. State, 365 So. 2d 1023, 1026 (Fla.1979). In the case before us, only the statements of Knox connect appellant with the crime or with any conspiracy to commit it.
Appellant also attacks the admission of testimony concerning a previous crime-the sale of marijuana three years earlier. In view of our holding on the hearsay point we need not address that issue.
The judgment is reversed with instructions to the trial court to enter a judgment of acquittal. Briklod v. State, supra.
BOARDMAN, Acting C. J., and RYDER, J., concur.
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Tresvant v. State, 396 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…efs were filed, and we now address the undecided question. The admissibility of hearsay statements of co-conspirators is not dependent upon the existence of a count charging a conspiracy. Damon v. State, 289 So. 2d 720 (Fla.1974); Nichols v. State, 390 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Boyd v. State, 389 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Farnell v. State, 214 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968); United States v. Spencer, 415 F. 2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Rinaldi, 393 F. 2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968); United States…
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State v. Edwards, 536 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…ndants and the police officers to a nearby house. At the house, they encountered Velunza who pointed to a bag containing the drugs. The. Third District correctly held that the evidence failed to prove Velunza guilty of conspiracy. Nichols v. State, 390 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1980), cited by appellees, is likewise distinguishable as can readily be seen from a cursory review of the case. In Nichols, there was no evidence independent of Knox’s hearsay statements implicating Nichols in a conspiracy. An underco…
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Garcia v. State, 492 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…given of the conspiracy itself. However, this is conditional on the prosecutor subsequently furnishing adequate proof of the conspiracy itself. Id. at 890 n. 1. See Briklod, 365 So. 2d at 1026. Contrary to Garcia’s perception of Nichols v. State, 390 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), and State v. Morales, 460 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), we have not pronounced a rule to be operative in a matter of this kind calling for a bifurcation of the proof first disclosing the independent evidence, vel non, of the exi…
Authorities Cited
- Jules Briklod v. State, 365 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 1978)