TOYOTA MOTOR COMPANY, LTD., PETITIONER,
v.
BETTY J. MOLL, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATES OF WENDY JANE MOLL, DECEASED, PAMELA MAY MOLL, DECEASED, AND DENISE ANN MOLL, DECEASED, RESPONDENT

Fla. 4th DCA | 1980-12-03
No. 80-1412
DOWNEY and HURLEY, JJ., and UP-CHURCH, JOHN J., IV, Associate Judge, concur.
391 So. 2d 282 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1980) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Toyota sought review of a trial court's denial of its motion for a protective order to restrict dissemination of proprietary design information about its 1973 Toyota Corolla. The court denied the petition but imposed a stay on dissemination pending resolution of Toyota's pending motion for a protective order.


Holding

The court denied the petition for certiorari challenging the denial of the protective order, as Toyota failed to prove that the information constituted trade secrets or establish good cause for the protective order. However, the court imposed a temporary stay on dissemination of the information and materials until December 22, 1980, or until the trial court ruled on Toyota's pending motion for protective order as to specific items produced.


Headnotes

[1] A party seeking a protective order must demonstrate good cause by proving the allegations supporting the need for protection.

[2] Failure to prove trade secret status or other proprietary harm can result in the denial of a motion for a protective order.

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Key Quotes

“At the trial court hearing on the motion for protective order petitioner failed to prove the allegations of the motion regarding trade secrets, and thus petitioner failed to show good cause for the issuance of a protective order.”

Establishes that Toyota bore the burden of proving trade secret status and failed to do so, which was the basis for denying the protective order.

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Facts & Procedural History

Respondent sought production of materials and information concerning the design of petitioner's 1973 Toyota Corolla. Petitioner filed a motion for a p…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks review of the denial of its motion for a protective order. Respondent sought production of certain materials and information relative to the design of petitioner’s 1973 Toyota Corolla. Petitioner’s motion for a protective order requested the trial court to (a) prohibit respondent from disseminating said materials and information to anyone other than the respondent’s attorneys and expert witnesses; (b) limit any such dissemination to the purposes of this lawsuit; (c) and have any such materials produced returned to petitioner at the conclusion of the suit. Petitioner alleged that the information and material in question is “proprietary in nature and constitutes ‘trade secrets’ and that dissemination of such material and information would be detrimental to petitioner.”

At the trial court hearing on the motion for protective order petitioner failed to prove the allegations of the motion regarding trade secrets, and thus petitioner failed to show good cause for the issuance of a protective order. However, at oral argument counsel for respondent agreed to a stay of the dissemination of said information and material, pursuant to a suggestion for such a stay at oral argument, until the trial court rules on petitioner’s further motion for protective order (as to specific items produced) presently pending in the trial court.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for certiorari, but direct that any dissemination of the information and material be stayed until December 22, 1980, or until such time as the trial court has ruled upon petitioner’s pending motion for a protective order. DOWNEY and HURLEY, JJ., and UP-CHURCH, JOHN J., IV, Associate Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Toyota Motor Co. v. Moll, 438 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
  • Gray v. Alexander Proudfoot Co., 555 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
    …etitioner has not shown that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law. See First City Development of Florida, Inc. v. Hallmark of Hollywood Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 545 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Toyota Motor Co. v. Moll, 391 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Petitioner also contends that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in compelling production of his personal financial information because there is no basis for awarding punitive damages. First, the h…

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