IN RE ESTATE OF ROBERT J. GRANGER, DECEASED

Fla. 4th DCA | 1980-12-10
No. 80-490
ANSTEAD and HERSEY, JJ., concur.
391 So. 2d 311 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1980) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Victory Construction, a creditor of Robert Granger's estate, appealed the probate court's denial of its petition to set aside an attorney's fee award and its petition for payment of a claim. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, upholding the trial court's award of 50% of a $103,634.63 recovery to the estate's attorney and the classification of Victory's claim as a lower-priority creditor.


Holding

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 50% of the recovery as reasonable attorney's fees, and the classification of Victory Construction's claim as class 7 priority (rather than class 1) was proper.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees based on factors including hours worked, complexity of litigation, absence of estate assets, and e…

[2] A trial court's determination of the priority of claims against an estate is subject to statutory provisions governing such priorities.

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Key Quotes

“The parties agree that counsel was entitled to be compensated for the reasonable value of his services to the estate. The issue on appeal is the amount of fees awarded.”

Establishes that the dispute concerned only the quantum of attorney's fees, not the right to compensation.

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Facts & Procedural History

Robert Granger hired attorney Howard Hirsch in 1974 to sue U.S. Home Corporation. Granger died in 1975, and his widow, as executrix, continued Hirsch'…

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Opinion of the Court
BERANEK, Judge.

BERANEK, Judge.

This is an appeal by Victory Construction, Inc., a creditor of the estate of Robert J. Granger, from an order entered in the probate proceeding below. The order in question denied Victory’s petition to set aside a previous order allowing attorney’s fees for services to the estate. The order also denied Victory’s petition for payment of a claim against the estate. We affirm.

In 1974, Attorney Howard Hirsch was hired by Robert Granger to sue U. S. Home Corporation. Suit was filed in 1974 and Robert Granger died in 1975. His widow, the executrix of his estate, continued Hirsch’s employment. The suit eventually terminated in favor of the plaintiff. The administratrix of the estate had been substituted as plaintiff in her representative capacity. The case involved complex litigation, two appeals to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, a proceeding before the Florida Supreme Court, and eventual collection of the sum of $103,634.63 on March 12, 1979. The litigation spanned almost six years.

The parties agree that counsel was entitled to be compensated for the reasonable value of his services to the estate. The issue on appeal is the amount of fees awarded. The trial court awarded a fee of 50 per cent of the recovery, or approximately $51,000. It is undisputed that the estate of the decedent would have been totally without assets but for the lawsuit against U. S. Home Corporation. The trial court determined this was a reasonable fee based upon evidence of 500 hours of work by Attorney Hirsch, a complex lawsuit involving novel questions, a total absence of assets in the estate and the numerous other factors contained in the canons governing reasonable fees. The expert testimony from attorneys on the subject was that the fee could range from $25,000 to “$50,000 as a minimum.” The attorney who testified to the $50,000 figure was of the opinion that this fee was reasonable based on either quantum meruit or on a contingency basis. We conclude that appellant has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion or error by the trial court in the determination of this attorney’s fee. In re Estate of McCune, 223 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969), and In re Estate of DuVal, 174 So. 2d 580 (Fla.2d DCA 1965).

Appellant also asserts error in the trial court’s determination as to the priorities of claims pursuant to Section 733.707, Florida Statutes (1979). Specifically, the trial court found that the claim of Victory Construction against the estate was a class 7 priority, rather than a class 1 priority under the statute. We find no error in this regard and affirm.

AFFIRMED.

ANSTEAD and HERSEY, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • In re The Est. OF Morris Simon v. Palmer, 402 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
    …32,000.00 would be appropriate for Palmer in this case. An award of attorney’s fees with respect to services rendered in connection with an estate is not to be overturned without a showing of abuse on the part of the trial court. Estate of Granger, 391 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (no abuse where complex lawsuit involved novel questions); Estate of McCune, 223 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). Though the trial judge correctly determined that he was not bound by the testimony of the expert witness as to the…
  • In re Est. OF Camille P. Bryan, 576 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
    …neys.2 In re Estate of Wylie, [*347] 342 So. 2d 996 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). A trial court’s determination of the reasonableness or necessity of fees will not be overturned on appeal, unless there is an abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Granger, 391 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); In re Estate of McCune, 223 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). It is contended that it was error to include the house in the original inventory because the bank knew that record title was held by Reed Bryan III, and that it was er…

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