PAUL STANLEY SNOW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a sexual battery conviction because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing to determine whether the prosecution's failure to disclose the complaining witness's old boyfriend's full name was prejudicial to the defendant. The court found that under the circumstances, where the witness's credibility was already impaired by her admitted intoxication, a proper prejudice analysis was required before denying the mistrial motion.
The trial court erred by denying the mistrial motion without holding a hearing to determine the degree of prejudice resulting from the withheld information. The court should have at least considered ordering a continuance if prejudice was found, particularly given that the witness's credibility was already seriously impaired by her admitted intoxication, making the prejudicial effect of concealing the evidence on the issue of consent quite probable.
[1] A court must ascertain the prejudice resulting from a discovery violation before denying a motion for mistrial.
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by summarily denying a motion for mistrial based on a discovery violation without conducting a hearing on prejudice.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We reverse the conviction because the court failed to ascertain whether a violation of discovery requirements, which was the basis of the motion, was prejudicial.”
Establishes the core holding that the trial court's failure to conduct a prejudice analysis was reversible error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe complaining witness met appellant Snow at a bar while intoxicated, drank with him, left to see an old boyfriend named Bill, went to Bill's home wh…
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OTT, Judge.
A jury found appellant guilty of sexual battery after the court denied a defense motion for mistrial. We reverse the conviction because the court failed to ascertain whether a violation of discovery requirements, which was the basis of the motion, was prejudicial.
At her pretrial deposition the complaining witness admitted that she was under the influence of alcohol and drugs the night she met appellant in a bar. She further admitted that after she had talked with appellant and drunk the drink he bought her, she had met an old boyfriend and had gone to his nearby home with him after several more drinks. There they drank some more, smoked marijuana and had sexual intercourse. On her way home she again encountered appellant and the acts occurred which are the subject of this prosecution-voluntary acts according to appellant, but coerced according to the complaining witness.
When quizzed about the identity of her old boyfriend, the witness professed to remember only that his given name was Bill. At trial, however, she gave his full name and testified that she had supplied that information to the State Attorney several days before trial. Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, on the grounds that he had filed a proper demand for all evidence and witnesses known to the state which might negate appellant’s guilt or the credibility of the state’s witness, to which the state had responded that it had no such evidence, and that the state had never updated that response when it learned Bill’s complete name. The prosecutor denied having ever received the information, and the court summarily denied the motion.
We think that the facts of this case made it particularly essential that the court conduct a hearing to determine the degree of prejudice resulting from the withheld information. Whether the complaining witness did or did not give the name to the prosecutor before trial is not determinative of whether or not appellant was prejudiced. If appellant was prejudiced by the withholding of the information, the court could at least have ordered a continuance in the interest of fairness and justice. State v. Banks, 349 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The evidence was such that the credibility of the complaining witness had been seriously impaired by her admission that she was quite intoxicated at the time in question. Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788 (Fla.1979). Under those circumstances, the prejudicial effect of concealing evidence upon the issue of consent seems quite probable. The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the court below for a new trial.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and RYDER, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Miller v. State, 435 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…wed cross-examination on the circumstances surrounding the change so the jury could evaluate the officer’s credibility. The trial court clearly did everything required by Richardson. See also White v. State, 403 So. 2d 331 (Fla.1981); Snow v. State, 391 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Neimeyer v. State, 378 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. How well the officer could see into the apartment is irrelevant- to how well the appellant c…
Authorities Cited
- Delbert Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1976)
- State v. Alykhan Banks, 349 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)