ROBERT LARRY CROW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1980-11-17
No. SS-321
MILLS, C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.
392 So. 2d 919 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1980) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Holding

The court held that the appellant's conviction for trafficking in stolen property was constitutional and that his due process rights were not violated by the delay in filing the information.


Headnotes

[1] Dealing in private contractual rights, such as royalty rights and/or services, is not preempted by federal copyright law.

[2] A defendant waives the right to complain about a delayed prosecution if they voluntarily waive their right to a continuance.

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Facts & Procedural History

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in stolen property, specifically royalty rights and/or services of singers. He argued that the State's pros…

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Opinion of the Court
THOMPSON, Judge.

THOMPSON, Judge.

The appellant was charged with trafficking in stolen property, which consisted of the “royalty rights and/or services” of several popular singers. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted and he now appeals his conviction. We affirm.

The appellant initially argues that the State’s prosecution of this case was unconstitutional because the activity of dealing in “bootlegged” tape recordings is controlled exclusively by federal copyright laws. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-118, 301, 501-510. However, the appellant was not charged with engaging in “bootleg” activities. Instead, he was charged with dealing in stolen royalty rights and/or services, which belonged to various performers, not under federal copyright law, but under various private contracts. These private contractual rights constitute property, see § 812.012(3)(b), Fla.Stat., that are not within the ambit of the federal copyright law.

The appellant also argues that because the State failed to file an information until 149 days after his arrest, his right to due process was abrogated. However, the appellant failed to move for a continuance chargeable to the State. See Mulryan v. Judge, Division “C” Circuit Court of Okaloosa County, 350 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State ex rel. Wright v. Yawn, 320 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. den. 334 So. 2d 609 (Fla.1976). Instead, the appellant filed a written document with the court, wherein he stated that he waived his right to move for a continuance, “notwithstanding that his attorney has advised him that he should move to continue the cause until he has had the opportunity to properly prepare the case for trial.” Accordingly, the appellant cannot properly complain on this appeal that his right to due process has been denied, since his waiver of his right to a continuance was clearly not coerced. See Sumbry v. State, 310 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).

We have considered the other points raised by the appellant and find them to be without merit. Therefore, the judgment of conviction is affirmed in its entirety.

MILLS, C. J., and McCORD, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Crow v. Louie L. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224 (11th Cir. 1983)
    …involved in the case was the copyright of CBS (and not the physical tape itself), the Copyright Act precludes Florida from prosecuting him and renders his conviction void. The state trial and appellate courts rejected this claim. See Crow v. State, 392 So. 2d 919 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980), aff’d, 399 So. 2d 1141 (Fla.1981). Having exhausted his state remedies, Crow is properly before this court. Section 301 of the Act controls our decision. It states: On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable right…
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