OLGA K. BUBENIK, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSEPH G. BUBENIK, APPELLEE
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In this dissolution of marriage case, the trial court set aside a property settlement agreement signed by the husband without his own attorney, despite finding no fraud, duress, or impropriety. The appellate court reversed, holding that property settlement agreements between knowing adults cannot be set aside absent fraud, duress, deceit, coercion, or overreaching—not merely because one party lacked independent counsel.
A property settlement agreement between knowing adults cannot be set aside merely because one party did not have independent counsel. The trial court erred in setting aside the agreement where it found no fraud, duress, deceit, coercion, or impropriety. Property settlement agreements may only be set aside when there is proof of fraud, duress, deceit, coercion, or overreaching by the party obtaining the agreement.
[1] A property settlement agreement entered into by knowing adults may not be set aside absent an allegation and proof of fraud, duress, deceit, coercion, or overreaching.
[2] A property settlement agreement cannot be set aside solely on the grounds that one party did not retain independent counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“All of the cases we are aware of require an allegation and proof of either fraud, duress, deceit, coercion, or overreaching on the part of the party obtaining the agreement.”
Establishes the legal standard for voiding property settlement agreements in family law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOlga and Joseph Bubenik were married in 1973. Before filing for dissolution, Olga consulted her attorney William C. Lewis and asked her husband to mee…
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LILES, WOODIE A. (Ret.), Associate Judge.
Olga K. Bubenik and Joseph G. Bubenik were married September 12,1973. Prior to filing the instant petition for dissolution of marriage, Olga K. Bubenik consulted her attorney, William C. Lewis, and requested her husband to give Mr. Lewis a call so that the dissolution and other matters could go forward to resolution. Mr. Bubenik called Mr. Lewis and, by appointment, visited his office. He was shown a copy of a requested property settlement agreement. Mr. Bu-benik made several changes in the agreement, some of which were to the benefit of his wife. He thereupon signed it and the same day a petition for dissolution was filed. When the matter came on before the trial judge for hearing, he specifically found that there was no fraud, deceit, duress, coercion or overreaching on the part of the petitioner or her attorney in arriving at the property settlement agreement and that there was no impropriety in the actions of Mr. Lewis.
However, the trial judge set the agreement aside, holding that the husband did not understand his legal rights and obligations; that he should have had an attorney of his own choosing; and that, by virtue of his attitude during the trial, the husband was in a conciliatory frame of mind in hopes that his wife would reconcile with him.
Having set the property settlement agreement aside, the trial judge went on to find that the husband had a special equity in a parcel of property which had heretofore been agreed upon in the property settlement agreement.
The law is quite clear regarding the setting aside of property agreements when entered into by knowing adults. All of the cases we are aware of require an allegation . and proof of either fraud, duress, deceit, coercion, or overreaching on the part of the party obtaining the agreement. We know of no case where a property settlement agreement can be set aside on the grounds that one of the parties had not retained his or her own counsel at the time of the signing. The husband in the instant case was an airline pilot; he and his wife lived apart from each other at the time of the filing of the petition and had been so residing for some time. The agreement was rather sim-. pie, but the primary factor here is that the court found, and so stated in the final decree, that there was no impropriety on the part of either the wife or her attorney and then, for the reasons stated, set the agreement aside.
We therefore remand and reversé, with directions to the trial judge to enter his order, after appropriate hearing, based upon the principles set forth in the cases of Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla.1962); Pemelman v. Pemelman, 186 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1972); Bailey v. Bailey, 300 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Hicks v. Hicks, 313 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Moss-Jacober v. Moss, 334 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); McGuire v. McGuire, 385 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987)…etitions for review of Casto v. Casto, 458 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), affirming the trial court’s setting aside of a property settlement agreement. We find apparent conflict with Cowen v. Cowen, 95 So. 2d 584 (Fla.1957), and Bubenik v. Bubenik, 392 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and address the requirements of postnuptial agreements in dissolution proceedings. In approving the district court decision, we reaffirm our prior decisions…
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Petracca v. Luca R. Petracca, 706 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…that such a holding would be inconsistent with its previous holdings that a "complaining spouse need not have legal counsel for a valid agreement.” Casto, 508 So. 2d at 334; see also Cowert v. Cowen, 95 So. 2d 584 (Fla.1957), and Bubenik v. Bubenik, 392 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), neither of which were disapproved in Casto. 508 So. 2d at 334. . Cf. Seiffert v. Seiffert, 702 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (inequity in property distribution, coupled with fact that agreement was drawn by adverse spouse and n…
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McMAHAN v. Myrtes McMAHAN, 567 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (all reciting that tremendous emotional strain at the time of signing of separation agreement is not sufficient ground to set aside the agreement); Bockoven v. Bockoven, 444 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), and Bubenik v. Bubenik, 392 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (fact that appellants were unrepresented by attorneys at the time the separation agreements were executed was not sufficient ground for setting the documents aside); Casto and Brighton v. Brighton, 517 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- del Vecchio v. del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962)
- Annabelle G. Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1972)
- Bailey v. Bailey, 300 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Pemelman v. Pemelman, 186 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Ellen-Sue Moss-Jacober v. Moss, 334 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Hicks v. Hicks, 313 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- McGUIRE v. McGUIRE, 385 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)