WILLIAM H. BEAMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
MARILYN A. BEAMAN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this divorce appeal, the former husband challenges the financial provisions of a judgment dissolving a 21-year marriage. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment except for two provisions: one requiring the husband to maintain a life insurance policy naming the wife as irrevocable beneficiary, and another restricting the husband's visitation rights with minor children based on undefined "acts of immorality."
The life insurance requirement is reversed because it constitutes an attempt to provide alimony after death without evidence of the wife's need. The visitation limitation is reversed as overly broad and unenforceable due to the undefined and subjective nature of "acts of immorality." All other provisions of the judgment are affirmed.
[1] A court may not order a former spouse to maintain a life insurance policy naming the other spouse as irrevocable beneficiary without evidence of need for post-death alimo…
[2] A limitation on visitation rights that is overly broad and uncertain in its definition is incapable of enforcement.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it would appear to be an attempt by the trial court to provide alimony after death without evidence of need by the wife”
Establishes the court's rationale for reversing the life insurance requirement
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliam and Marilyn Beaman were married for 21 years. The trial court granted custody of three minor children to the wife and awarded the husband reas…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
PEARSON, TILLMAN, Retired, Associate Judge.
William H. Beaman, the former husband, appeals a final judgment dissolving his marriage of 21 years to Marilyn A. Beaman. The husband was the petitioner in the trial court and the points on appeal claim error in the financial provisions of the judgment, except for one provision in the award to the husband of visitation rights with the minor children which is discussed below. We affirm the judgment except as to the provision requiring the husband to maintain a life insurance policy with the wife to be the irrevocable beneficiary, and except as to a limitation upon visitation rights.
The judgment provides:
“The husband shall maintain in full force and effect, and at his own expense, that certain Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,-000.00) life insurance policy presently in effect upon his own life, naming the wife irrevocable beneficiary thereon.”
We reverse that part of the judgment, as it would appear to be an attempt by the trial court to provide alimony after death without evidence of need by the wife. See Dutton v. Dutton, 379 So. 2d 111 (Fla.3d DCA 1979) and cases cited therein at page 112.
The judgment grants the custody of the three minor children of the parties to the wife with: “.. . reasonable visitation granted to the husband, provided that no act of immorality shall occur during such visitation at the residence of the husband”. We hold that this limitation on visitation is overly broad and so uncertain as to be incapable of enforcement. The definition of “act of immorality” varies so greatly from culture to culture and from person to person that it could only be enforced upon the innate moral standards of the sitting judge. See Hackley, II v. Hackley, 380 So. 3d 446 (Fla.5th DCA 1979).
There is no doubt that the limitation was placed in the judgment because of a commendable desire on the part of the trial judge to protect the children from a possible unwholesome and improper exposure to conditions which might be damaging to them. We reject the limitation because it might result in a prejudgment of the situation which the trial judge felt might develop. In addition, it is established law that custody and visitation rights may be changed whenever it is shown that children are exposed to situations which are potentially damaging to them. See Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 365 So. 2d 185 (Fla.3d DCA 1978), Young v. Young, 305 So. 2d 92 (Fla.1st DCA 1974) and Niles v. Niles, 299 So. 2d 162 (Fla.2d DCA 1974). As written the limitation would require such a hearing in order for it to be enforced.
Appellant’s remaining points on appeal do not present reversible error under the holdings in Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1976), and Storer v. Storer, 353 So. 2d 152 (Fla.3d DCA 1978).
Accordingly, the final judgment is amended by striking therefrom the paragraph (above quoted) providing for the maintenance of a life insurance policy and by striking therefrom the limitation upon the husband’s visitation rights (above quoted). As amended, the final judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hunter v. Hunter, 540 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…ype of mental health expert the court deems appropriate. These deficiencies mandate remand for clarification of the conditions under which appellant may regain visitation. See Wheeler v. Wheeler, 501 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Beaman v. Beaman, 393 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Appellant also challenges the trial court’s failure to order additional reductions in his child-support obligation and to make retroactive the order terminating his obligation to pay the children’s medical expenses. We find no a…
-
Gregg v. Gregg, 474 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…idity of life insurance provisions in dissolution judgments. These cases seemed to imply that the provisions would be permissible if the evidence in the record showed a justification or need for an award of alimony after death. See Beaman v. Beaman, 393 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Weinschel v. Weinschel, 379 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 390 [*268] So. 2d 827 (Fla.1980); Dutton v. Dutton, 379 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Patrick v. Patrick, 358 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Watterson v. Watt…
-
Dukes v. Griffin, 230 So. 3d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…lines of.requiring that orders be specific and unambiguous when they impose time-sharing limitations. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hunter, 540 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 501 So. 2d 729, 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Beaman v. Beaman, 393 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). These older cases do . not hold that final judgments modifying time-sharing arrangements must include court-specified steps for dissatisfied parents to regain more favorable terms.…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976)
- Storer v. Storer, 353 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Young v. Young, 305 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Dutton v. Dutton, 379 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Niles v. Niles, 299 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 365 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)