BARBARA LOU MCINTOSH, APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS F. MCINTOSH, APPELLEE
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Wife appeals a divorce judgment awarding husband a special equity in 80 acres of jointly-held property where the marital home was built. The court reversed, holding that the husband's physical construction of the home did not constitute a special contribution warranting a special equity because providing a marital home is a normal duty of the working spouse while the other performs homemaker duties.
The court held that the husband did not establish a special equity justifying an award of the wife's one-half interest in the marital homestead and remaining acreage. The normal duty of a working spouse is to provide a marital home, and the husband was able to undertake physical construction only because his wife maintained the household and performed child-rearing responsibilities, which do not constitute contributions beyond normal marital duties sufficient to create a special equity.
[1] Record title is the starting point for determining property division between spouses in dissolution cases.
[2] A spouse may establish a special equity in real property through contributions of funds, property, or services made over and above the performance of normal marital dutie…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“is a vested interest which a spouse acquires because of contribution of funds, property, or services made over and above the performance of normal marital duties.”
Defines the legal standard for establishing a special equity in marital property
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1970, the husband's parents transferred 80 acres to the husband and wife as joint tenants, reserving life estates for themselves. The husband physi…
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PER CURIAM.
The wife appeals a final judgment of dissolution awarding the husband a special equity in 80 acres of land, deeded to the parties by the husband’s parents, on which rests the marital home built by the husband. We find that the award was erroneous and remand the case for reconsideration.
In 1970, the husband’s parents transferred 80 acres to the husband and wife jointly, reserving life estates for themselves. The deed was duly executed and recorded. Over a two-year period the husband physically built a home on 10 of the 80 acres; the wife helped draw the floor plans. Throughout the 26-year marriage the wife remained the homemaker and did not contribute financially to the construction or maintenance of the home. According to the husband, the reason for initially taking title jointly was for survivorship purposes. Regarding the transfer of the 80 acres, the husband’s mother testified: “She was his wife, and naturally, she’d be around too, you know, but as for her getting the property by herself, no.”
Record title is the starting point for determining a property division between spouses in dissolution cases. Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla.1976). However, a spouse may establish in the realty a special equity which “is a vested interest which a spouse acquires because of contribution of funds, property, or services made over and above the performance of normal marital duties.” Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949, 952 (Fla.1980). Nonetheless, there is a qualification: When property held as a tenancy by the entirety is improved from funds generated by a working spouse while the other spouse performs the job of homemaker, a special equity in such property does not necessarily arise.
In Duncan, the court determined the issue of what spousal contributions established a special equity. In that case the efforts of the husband in constructing improvements on property did not constitute a special equity although the husband participated in the construction by laying bricks, digging trenches, preparing blueprints, hiring the carpenter and bricklaying contractors, overseeing the work, buying and hauling building materials to the job site and spending his personal money on the home. The supreme court concluded that the property was part of the accumulated marital assets and was acquired by the husband and wife with funds earned during the course of their marriage.
Between the working spouse and a homemaker, it is the normal duty of the working spouse to provide a marital home. Here, the husband chose to physically build the home and was free to do so because his wife maintained the household and performed child-rearing responsibilities. Thus, there is insufficient evidence of a special contribution by the husband justifying an imposition of a special equity on the wife’s one-half of the marital homestead and remaining acreage. Additionally, the wife’s economic status is not such that the award to the husband can be justified as lump sum alimony. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla.1980).
Recognizing that final judgments in dissolution eases encompass awards which are interdependent, we reverse and remand for reconsideration of the final judgment in light of this opinion, Duncan v. Duncan and Canakaris v. Canakaris.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., BOOTH and SHAW, JJ., concur. . We do not decide how nonretroactivity of Ball might require reversal here because this issue was not raised. See generally, Wright v. Wright, 388 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
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Smith v. Smith, 418 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…d the wife a forty percent interest.” Appellant argues that the award of a special equity under these circumstances was erroneous under the principle outlined in Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980), and interpreted in McIntosh v. McIntosh, 393 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Appellee contends that the special equity was appropriately awarded in recognition of husband’s extraordinary contribution to the acquisition of the home, relying on several authorities of which Tommaney v. Tommaney, 405 So. 2d…1 / 2
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McINTOSH v. McINTOSH, 432 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…terest as a tenant in common to 40 acres of real property, the proceeds from a settlement of an automobile accident claim, the proceeds from an income tax refund, and certain household goods. The wife’s sole issue on appeal in McIntosh v. McIntosh, 393 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) was whether the lower court erred in awarding to the husband a special equity in 80 acres of land, on which rested the marital home. No issue was raised urging that the lower court erred in not granting the wife the marital home…1 / 2
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Strickland v. Strickland, 494 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…operty held as tenants by the entirety will not arise when the property is acquired from funds generated by a working spouse while the other spouse performed normal household and child-rearing responsibilities. Id. at 952. In McIntosh v. McIntosh, 393 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the court considered the basic principles of special equity as enunciated in Ball, and noted that a special equity does not generally arise where the funding for the property is derived from the income of one spouse while the ot…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Shannon v. State, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976)
- Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)
- Wright v. Wright, 388 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)