CHARLES HENRY PEEK, PETITIONER,
v.
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, AS SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 3d DCA | 1981-02-10
No. 80-2271
Before BARKDULL, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
393 So. 2d 1175 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1981) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Petitioner challenges his conviction and sentence for felony petit theft, arguing he was never formally charged with that offense but only with strong-armed robbery. The court upheld the sentence, holding that a defendant convicted of petit theft as a lesser-included offense can be sentenced as felony petit theft under Florida's habitual offender statute when proper notice of enhanced sentencing intent is given.


Holding

A defendant may be sentenced for felony petit theft upon conviction of that lesser-included offense when the original charge activates circuit court jurisdiction, the defendant receives adequate notice of the State's intent to seek enhanced sentencing, and the defendant receives proper hearing and proof of prior convictions as required by law.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant convicted of a lesser included offense may be sentenced for that offense even if the charging document did not specifically allege the elements of the enhance…

[2] Legislative intent to enhance penalties for repeat offenders for petit theft is effectuated by allowing sentencing for felony petit theft upon conviction of the lesser of…

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Key Quotes

“Clearly, in enacting Section 812.-014(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1980) and its predecessor, Section 812.021(3), Florida Statutes (1977), the Legislature intended that a three-time offender of the petit theft statute should have his sentence enhanced to that of felony petit larceny and that he should be sentenced therefor.”

Establishes the legislative intent behind the habitual offender statute that the court relied upon to uphold the sentence.

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Facts & Procedural History

Petitioner was charged with strong-armed robbery but requested and received a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of petit theft, for whic…

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Opinion of the Court
BARKDULL, Judge.

BARKDULL, Judge.

Petitioner, in his petition for habeas corpus, contends he is being illegally incarcerated in that he has been sentenced and is serving a sentence for a crime of which he was never charged or convicted.

Petitioner has been sentenced to five years in the State penitentiary, pursuant to Section 812.014(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1980), for felony petit theft. He was originally charged with strong-armed robbery. The charging document did not allege any prior petit theft convictions. However, the State did notify petitioner before trial that it would seek enhancement of his sentence pursuant to Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1980), whether his conviction was a misdemeanor or a felony based upon his record of eleven prior felony convictions and three misdemeanor convictions. At trial on the robbery charge, the petitioner requested a jury charge on the lesser included offense of petit theft. He was convicted of petit theft. In all, three sentencing hearings were held. At the second hearing, the State announced its intention to seek enhancement of his conviction for petit theft, pursuant to Section 812.-014(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1980), enhancing the crime to a felony in the third degree. After the third hearing, he was sentenced for felony petit theft. Petitioner contends that felony petit theft is not a lesser included offense of the crime of strong-armed robbery and thus, under the holding of State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d 315 (Fla.1978), unless he is charged with the substantive offense of felony petit larceny and convicted thereof he cannot be sentenced for that offense.

A careful reading of State v. Harris, supra, does not support that rationale. In State v. Harris, supra, the defendant was charged with the substantive offense of felony petit larceny (which charge was necessary to activate the jurisdiction of the circuit court, so as to permit sentencing in excess of one year), and the question to be decided was whether or not the jury should be made aware of the defendant’s prior convictions and be permitted to make a specific finding thereon. The supreme court held it was not and that upon the third conviction for petit larceny the trial court would determine the historical fact of prior convictions and questions regarding identity following the procedures employed under Section 775.084, Florida Statutes.

Clearly, in enacting Section 812.-014(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1980) and its predecessor, Section 812.021(3), Florida Statutes (1977), the Legislature intended that a three-time offender of the petit theft statute should have his sentence enhanced to that of felony petit larceny and that he should be sentenced therefor. In the instant case, the petitioner was properly charged with a felony which activated the jurisdiction of the circuit court; he was advised of the State’s intent to seek an enhanced sentence if he was convicted. Now having been convicted of the lesser offense of petit larceny, he now hopes to frustrate the legislative intent by taking the position that not having been formally charged with the offense of petit larceny he cannot now be sentenced for that offense. He does not allege he has been denied due process by not having notice or a proper hearing and proof of his prior convictions, as mandated by State v. Harris, supra. To accept the petitioner’s contention would totally frustrate the Legislature in its attempt to enhance the penalty of the chronic offender. The petitioner’s record in this case shows, beyond a question of a doubt, that he is the type of individual the Legislature intended to punish by an enhanced penalty. If we accept the petitioner’s position it would appear that in order to effectuate clear legislative intent it would be necessary for the State to charge, in the alternative, the crime of felony petit larceny in those situations where a jury might properly find guilt of the lesser offense of petit larceny to merit sentencing for felony petit larceny. To require the State to so speculate in its charging document would appear not to be advisable.

Therefore, finding no basis for relief, we deny this petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Habeas corpus denied.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Phillips v. State, 438 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …4 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Dicaprio v. State, 352 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 679 (Fla.1977); Boley v. State, 273 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), cert. denied, 287 So. 2d 668 (Fla.1973); but cf. Peek v. Wainwright, 393 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). We do not reach the other points urged on this appeal. The judgment and sentence are VACATED. We take note from the state’s brief that the same question is presented in several other appeals from the Duval County circuit court.…
  • State v. Crocker, 519 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
    …. We do not agree, however, that prior thefts must be alleged in the charging document and proved in all instances before an accused may be found guilty of felony petit theft. Rather, we agree with our sister court’s statement in Peek v. Wainwright, 393 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), that if such a procedure were required, the state would have to charge the crime of felony petit theft, in the alternative, in every case that a jury could find the defendant guilty of petit theft as a lesser included offense of…
  • Smith v. State, 771 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
    …that it was unnecessary to either plead or prove at trial the prior convictions, but that after the adjudication for petit theft, the prosecutor could then present to the trial judge a record of the prior convictions. See, e.g., Peek v. Wainwright, 393 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Peek discussed the earlier case of State v. Harris, 356 So. 2d 315 (Fla.1978) which had held that felony petit theft was a substantive charge, but that in order to preserve a defendant’s due process rights, the jury was not to be…

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