THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
KIMBERLY SUSAN LANXON, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed a suppression ruling in which the trial court excluded cocaine found during a warrantless airport search. The Third District affirmed, holding that the defendant's consent to search was involuntary because the officer's accusatory statements about narcotics and threat to contact a narcotics unit at her destination were coercive.
The court held that the defendant's consent was not voluntary. The officer's accusatory statements and threat to contact a narcotics unit at her destination were coercive, and the state failed to satisfy its burden of establishing free and voluntary consent under the totality of circumstances.
[1] Consent to a search is not voluntary when obtained through coercive statements by law enforcement, such as accusing a defendant of committing a crime.
[2] A law enforcement officer's statement that he believes a suspect's luggage contains narcotics and that he will contact a narcotics unit at the suspect's destination can b…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Consideration of the totality of the circumstances... compels the conclusion that defendant's consent was not voluntary.”
Establishes the analytical framework and the court's ultimate conclusion regarding consent validity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Titus approached defendant Lanxon at Miami International Airport while she was waiting in the check-in line. After she produced identification…
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BASKIN, Judge.
We affirm the trial court’s suppression of evidence seized from defendant Lanxon at Miami International Airport without a warrant or probable cause to believe a crime had been committed predicated upon our finding that no valid consent to search was obtained.
The record discloses that Officer Titus asked defendant Lanxon, who was standing in line waiting to check in, if he could speak to her. She agreed but said she had to make her plane. After she produced identification, the officer asked her about a suitcase she said belonged to her and inquired whether she objected to his going through her luggage. She replied: “Yes. I want to check my luggage.” The officer testified that he stated:
‘Okay, that’s fine. I cannot look into your luggage without your permission and in your presence. However, I believe that either your suitcase or the other suitcase’ — and I pointed to the one that was next to Mr. Ralph Gettis — ‘and/or both contain narcotics and I want to inform you that I cannot prevent you from checking your luggage. However, I will contact a Narcotics Unit at your destination and request that a narcotics detection dog sniff your luggage.’
At that time, defendant replied: “Jesus Christ, go ahead and search it, then.” A subsequent search of defendant’s suitcase revealed no drugs. The officer then inquired if he could search her briefcase, saying: “You don’t have to allow me to if you don’t wish to.” She replied: “If you have to search it.” Inside a package described by defendant Lanxon as containing bearings, the officer found cocaine.
Consideration of the totality of the circumstances, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1975); Nelson v. State, 376 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Taylor v. State, 355 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Ferrara v. State, 319 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), compels the conclusion that defendant’s consent was not voluntary. Statements accusing a defendant of having committed a crime have been held to be coercive. Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1980); Ferrara v. State, supra. Under the circumstances of this case, the officer’s statements that he believed her suitcase contained narcotics and that he would contact a narcotics unit at her destination were intended to coerce defendant into giving her consent. The officer accomplished his purpose, but under these circumstances defendant’s consent cannot be said to meet the standards for voluntary relinquishment of rights. The state failed to satisfy its burden of establishing free and voluntary consent, Norman v. State, supra; Bailey v. State, supra. We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Rouse v. State, 643 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…hat he suspected marijuana was inside the trunk, and consent was only obtained after officer said he would wait as long as it took to determine whether drugs were present, and that he would call in a canine unit to sniff for drugs); State v. Lanxon, 393 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (where officer approached defendant at airport and told her that he suspected her luggage contained drugs, and that if she did not consent to have the luggage searched, he would notify the narcotics unit and a canine team would sn…
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Monroe v. State, 578 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…doubt on the voluntariness of May’s consent. See Nelson v. State, 376 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Seuss v. State, 370 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). This, in addition to the officers’ coercive, [*849] threatening methods (see State v. Lanxon, 393 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)) and May’s lack of authority to consent to the search (see United States v. Falcon, 766 F. 2d 1469 (10th Cir.1985)), leads us to conclude that May’s consent to search was not voluntary. The only way the search may be validated th…
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Haight v. State, 640 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…nnot conclude, however, that appellant entered a valid consent under the facts of this case. Consent must be a knowing and intentional relinquishment of a known right. See Hunt v. Estate of Hunt, 475 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); State v. Lanxon, 393 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Although Haight apparently was willing to pay an amount required by statute, we cannot construe her consent to pay "whatever restitution the Court would deem appropriate" as a knowing agreement to pay more than the law permits.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (U.S. 1968)
- Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1980)
- Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975)
- Taylor v. State, 355 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Ferrara v. State, 319 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)
- Nelson v. State, 376 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)