JAMES T. PITTMAN AND DEBORAH J. PITTMAN, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE CO., A FOREIGN CORPORATION AND CHICAGO INSURANCE CO., A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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Pittmans sued their insurance carriers for coverage of injuries sustained when a motorcycle was struck by a sheriff's car, claiming the sheriff was covered as a county officer under the policies. The court affirmed summary judgment holding that despite policy language appearing to cover county officers, parol evidence established that the county and insurers never intended to cover the sheriff's department, and the Pittmans were not third-party beneficiaries entitled to invoke the parol evidence rule.
No. Although the policy language appears to cover county officers generally, parol evidence is admissible to show the true intent of the contracting parties, and the sheriff was not covered because both the county and insurers explicitly agreed not to cover the sheriff's department. The Pittmans, as non-signatories never intended to be beneficiaries, cannot invoke the parol evidence rule to enforce contract terms that the actual parties did not intend.
[1] Parol evidence is admissible to show that a party claiming to be a third-party beneficiary was not intended as such by the contracting parties.
[2] A stranger to a contract cannot invoke the parol evidence rule.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“if we should accept appellants' argument, we would in effect be holding that a person, claiming to be a third-party beneficiary but never intended as such by the parties, could obtain benefits which the parties never intended to sell or purchase and which were not paid for”
The court's rationale for why parol evidence could be introduced despite clear policy language, emphasizing that third parties cannot enforce contract terms the actual parties did not intend
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePittman was injured when his motorcycle was struck by an Orange County sheriff's car responding to an emergency call. The county purchased insurance p…
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FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.
Appellants appeal a judgment after a jury trial holding that insurance coverage does not exist. We affirm.
Pittman was injured when the motorcycle he was riding was struck by an Orange County sheriff’s car responding to an emergency call. Appellants contend the policies in question issued to Orange County and the county commissioners also covered the sheriff. Both parties agree that when purchased, it was the intention of the county commission not to cover the sheriff’s department and the department was specifically exempted from coverage by the language of the purchase proposal submitted by the county commissioners. The language of the policies, as delivered, did not specifically exempt the sheriff’s department.
Appellants contend that the language of the insurance policies is clear and unambiguous and parol evidence cannot be introduced to vary the plain meaning of them. Appellants point out that the Providence policy is to cover:
(b) Any elected or appointed official or employee of the named insured with respect to a non-owned automobile of the named insured ...;
and that under the Chicago policy: “any officer ... of the named insured, while acting in his capacity as such....” is covered. Appellants reason that the sheriff, being a county officer, article VIII, § 1(d), Florida Constitution, and an elected official, is, therefore, clearly within the coverage.
Normally a contract will be construed according to its clear and unambiguous terms. Cueto v. John Allmand Boats, Inc., 334 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 290 (1976). The language used in a contract is the best evidence of the intent of the parties. Home Developers Company of St. Petersburg v. Bursani, 178 So. 2d 113 (Fla.1965).
However, if we should accept appellants’ argument, we would in effect be holding that a person, claiming to be a third-party beneficiary but never intended as such by the parties, could obtain benefits which the parties never intended to sell or purchase and which were not paid for. The parties to the insurance agreement all acknowledge that the county did not intend to buy and the companies did not intend to sell coverage on the sheriff’s vehicles. A third-party beneficiary is a stranger to the contract. DiCamillo v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 122 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960). The parol evidence rule may be invoked by any party to such contract or their privies, but cannot be invoked by a stranger to such contract. Palmer v. R. S. Evans Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So. 2d 635 (Fla.1955). See J. N. Roof v. Chattanooga Wood Split Pulley Co., 36 Fla. 284, 18 So. 597 (1895); 3 Corbin on Contracts, 572-78 (1960).
Upon introduction of parol evidence of the intent of the parties, it became apparent that appellants were not even third-party beneficiaries. The trial judge correctly permitted the introduction of parol evidence.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, C. J., and COBB, J., concur.
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United States v. S. Atl. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 606 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…1359 (Fla. 1st DCA1986). However, the trial court abused its discretion by considering parol evidence of PCA’s intent regarding supposedly ambiguous language in a contract to which they are not a party. See Pittman v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA1981) (“A third-party beneficiary is a stranger to the contract. The parol evidence rule may be invoked by any party to such contract or their privies, but cannot be invoked by a stranger to such contract.” Id. at 224 (citations omitted…
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Manner v. Goldstein Prof'l Ass'n, 436 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…eement between her and her husband, the counterdefendant attorney (a stranger to the agreement) cannot invoke the parol evidence rule. Palmer v. R.S. Evans Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So. 2d 635 (Fla.1955); Pittman v. Providence Washington Insurance Co., 394 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). See J.N. Roof v. Chattanooga Wood Split Pulley Co., 36 Fla. 284, 18 So. 597 (1895).…
Authorities Cited
- Palmer v. Evans, 81 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1955)
- Home Dev. Co. OF ST. Petersburg, Inc. v. Bursani, 178 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1965)
- Roof v. Chattanooga Wood Split Pulley Co., 36 Fla. 284 (Fla. 1895)
- Vincent DI Camillo & the Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 122 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- Cueto v. John Allmand Boats, Inc., 334 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)