DEAUVILLE CORPORATION, A DELAWARE CORPORATION,
v.
IVY T. BLOUNT, AS TRUSTEE; DEAUVILLE CORPORATION, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, V. IVY T. BLOUNT, AS TRUSTEE AND CHARLES A. CARROLL; DEAUVILLE CORPORATION, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, V. IVY T. BLOUNT, AS TRUSTEE, AND FRANK O. PRUITT
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld a trial court's award of receiver and attorney fees to a receiver appointed for Deauville Corporation, despite the fact that the receivership itself had been previously quashed. The court held that even where a receivership is erroneously appointed, the court may award fees for valuable services rendered when those services benefited the corporation.
A trial court has discretion to award receiver and attorney fees even when the receivership itself was erroneously appointed, provided the receiver and attorneys rendered valuable services that benefited the corporation. The court upheld the award as proper and found the amount was supported by ample, mostly uncontradicted evidence.
“Courts generally are vested with large discretion in determining who shall pay the cost and expenses of receiver-ships. The court may assess the costs of a receivership against the fund or property in receivership or against the applicant for the receivership, or it may apportion them among the parties, depending upon circumstances.”
Establishes the foundational principle that courts have broad discretion in allocating receivership costs based on the circumstances of the case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA receiver was appointed for Deauville Corporation. In a prior appeal, this Court quashed the receivership order but left open the possibility of awar…
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This appeal relates to the propriety of an award of fees to a receiver and the attorneys for the receiver.
A receiver was appointed for the Deauville Corporation. Upon review to this court we held in Deauville Corporation v. Blount, 157 Fla. 753, 26 So. (2nd) 884:
“It is our view that the opinion and judgment if this Court dated April 16, 1946, was determinative of the cause and the *287only order to be entered in the lower court was one of dismissal. Therefore the petition for interlocutory certiorari is hereby granted and the order dated May 20, 1946, as entered below is hereby quashed, without prejudice to the entry of appropriate orders for the payment of costs and expenses lawfully incurred to date hereof.”
In the meantime the receiver and his attorneys had rendered varied and substantial services for the corporation for which the lower court made an award and ordered same to be paid by the corporation.
It is urged that the award should not have been made and also that if proper the amount decreed was excessive.
The rule is well established in this state that the cost in equity cases does not always fall upon the loser as a matter of course. A general rule, supported by good authority, is stated in 45 Am. Jur., Sec. 290, Page 224:
“Courts generally are vested with large discretion in determining who shall pay the cost and expenses of receiver-ships. The court may assess the costs of a receivership against the fund or property in receivership or against the applicant for the receivership, or it may apportion them among the parties, depending upon circumstances.”
Application of the rule would be otherwise in cases where the court appoints a receiver without jurisdiction. Here the court had jurisdiction on both parties and subject matter, but simply erroneously exercised same.
In this case the chancellor was confronted with a situation where the receiver and his attorneys had rendered a valuable service which redounded to the financial benefit of the corporation in receivership. In other words, the factual situation presented a ease to support a decree against the corporation in receivership.
As to the amount being excessive, we are unwilling to put the chancellor in error because there is ample evidence, mostly uncontradicted, to sustain the amount of the decree.
Affirmed.
THOMAS, C. J. CHAPMAN, J., and JACKSON, Associate Justice, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Voyle C. Johnson v. Kruglak, 246 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)….” We have reviewed the fee awarded and do not find that the trial judge abused his judicial discretion or that the fee for the receiver was grossly excessive. See Lewis v. Gramil Corp., Fla.1957, 94 So. 2d 174; and Deauville Corporation v. Blount, 160 Fla. 286, 34 So. 2d 537 (1948). ACCOUNTANT’S FEE One of appellants’ points raises the question of the amount allowed to the accountant for the receiver. The brief states that the Supreme Court has set the criteria for evaluating such fees in Lewis v. Grami…
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Flagler Ctr. Bldg. Loan Corp. v. Chem. Realty Corp., 363 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…oper as a charge against the mortgaged property and are a part of the expenses of foreclosure which are included in a final judgment and must be paid in order to redeem the mortgaged property. See the general rule in Deauville Corporation v. Blount, 160 Fla. 286, 34 So. 2d 537 (1948), with regard to the large discretion vested in the trial court in such matters. [*350] The third point presented by Flagler Center urges that the final judgment improperly added amounts to the mortgage debt in adjudging the amo…
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Barredo v. Skyfreight, Inc., 430 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…FERGUSON, Judge. The courts are generally vested with considerable discretion in determining who shall pay the cost and expenses of receiverships. Deauville Corporation v. Blount, 160 Fla. 286, 34 So. 2d 537 (1948). But, where the court had previously determined that defendant’s reprehensible conduct created the necessity for the appointment of receiver, a finding clearly supported by the record, it constituted an abuse of that discretion…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wechsler v. Novak, 157 Fla. 703 (Fla. 1946)
- Deauville Corp. v. IVY T. Blount, 157 Fla. 753 (Fla. 1946)