JUAN VINALES, ANTONIO LUIS ALVAREZ, AND JOSE FERNANDEZ DE CASTRO, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld convictions for bookmaking against a constitutional challenge to the temporary, non-paying appointment of two Miami police officers as state attorney investigators. The Court held that article II, section 5(a) of the Florida Constitution does not prohibit temporary dual office-holding without additional remuneration for law enforcement purposes.
The Court held that the temporary appointments of the police officers as state attorney investigators did not violate the constitutional prohibition against dual office-holding. The constitutional provision targets the accumulation of offices for private benefit and does not apply to temporary appointments for law enforcement purposes without additional remuneration.
[1] A temporary, non-paying appointment of a municipal police officer as an investigator for a state attorney does not violate the constitutional prohibition against dual off…
[2] When a constitutional provision is susceptible to multiple meanings, the legislature's interpretation is conclusive.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“that section does not apply to temporary appointment for law enforcement purposes where no additional remuneration is paid to the police officer.”
Establishes the core holding that temporary, non-paying dual appointments for law enforcement do not violate the constitutional prohibition.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwo City of Miami police officers (Brockmeier and Sparrow) were temporarily appointed as investigators for the State Attorney of the 11th Judicial Cir…
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McDONALD, Justice.
This is a direct appeal from the Third District Court of Appeal, 374 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), in which the appellants’ convictions for bookmaking were affirmed. The district court initially and directly construed article II, section 5(a) of the Florida Constitution; we have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. (1972).
The question before the Court is whether a temporary nonpaying appointment of two City of Miami police officers as investigators of the State Attorney for the 11th Judicial Circuit for the purpose of completing a valid investigation violated the article II, section 5(a) prohibition against dual office holding.* We hold that it did not and adopt the following language from the district court opinion:
[T]hat section does not apply to temporary appointment for law enforcement purposes where no additional remuneration is paid to the police officer. We think that it is clear that the constitutional language is directed toward an accumulation of officers [sic] for the private benefit of the officeholder. Even though the broad prohibition advanced by the defendants could possibly be read into the Florida Constitution, we find that nothing in the wording of the prohibition so dictates. Where a constitutional provision is susceptible to more than one meaning, the meaning adopted by the legislature is conclusive. See Greater Loretta Improvement Association v. State ex rel. Boone, 234 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1970). In the present instance, the legislature, by the enactment of Section 27.-251, Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), has chosen specifically to authorize the appointment of municipal police officers for some purposes as investigators for the state attorney. Although this statute was enacted subsequent to the matters presently before us, the legislature has thus construed the applicable section of our state constitution as one which does not prohibit dual office holding on a temporary basis without remuneration for the purpose of criminal investigation.
Inasmuch as both the legislative interpretation and sound reason support the view that the temporary appointments of Officers Brockmeier and Sparrow do not violate the constitutional prohibition against dual office holding, we hold that no error has been shown in their execution of the applications for orders authorizing the wiretaps.
Id. at 572.
The convictions are affirmed.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ENGLAND and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. *
Art. II, § 5(a), Fla.Const. No person holding any office of emolument under any foreign government, or civil office of emolument under the United States or any other state, shall hold any office of honor or of emolument under the government of this state. No person shall hold at the same time more than one office under the government of the state and the counties and municipalities therein, except that a notary public or military officer may hold another office, and any officer may be a member of a constitution revision commission, constitutional convention, or statutory body having only advisory powers.
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Fla. Soc'y OF Ophthalmology v. Fla. Optometric Ass'n, 489 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 1986)…principle more emphatically when we held that such established constructions of constitutional provi [*1121] sions are “presumptively correct unless manifestly erroneous.” State v. Kaufman, 430 So. 2d 904, 907 (Fla.1983). See also Vinales v. State, 394 So. 2d 993, 994 (Fla.1981); Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654, 671 (Fla.1980). The record discloses unequivocally that both the governor and the legislature have consistently construed article III, section 8(a) as affording the executive fifteen days to veto…
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State v. Kaufman, 430 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1983)…her of these, they claim, fulfills the constitutional requirement of reading by title. We agree. A contemporaneous construction of a constitutional provision by the legislature is presumptively correct unless manifestly erroneous. Vinales v. State, 394 So. 2d 993 (Fla.1981); Brown v. Firestone, 382 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1980); Greater Loretta Improvement Association v. State ex rel. Boone, 234 So. 2d 665 (Fla.1970). The obvious purpose of reading a bill’s title is to inform the legislators and the public as to wha…
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Grant v. State, 474 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…d that he received no remuneration for serving in this position. Grant’s contention is without merit because such a position is not an “office of emolument” within the meaning of Article II, Section 5(a), Florida Constitution. Cf. Vinales v. State, 394 So. 2d 993 (Fla.1981). Grant makes other arguments we find meritless. AFFIRMED. NIMMONS, J., and PEARSON, TILLMAN (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State ex rel. Arthur T. Boone, 234 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1970)
- Vinales v. State, 374 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)