STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
G. D. M., A JUVENILE, APPELLEE

Fla. | 1981-02-26
No. 58762
SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
394 So. 2d 1017 Florida Supreme Court (1981) Caution
Cited by 7 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a reckless driving charge against a juvenile, holding that the legislature has absolute discretion to determine which offenses fall under juvenile court jurisdiction and that inclusion of reckless driving as a juvenile traffic offense does not violate due process or equal protection.


Holding

The legislature has absolute discretion to determine whether an individual charged with a particular crime is entitled to the benefit of the juvenile justice system. Neither substantive due process nor equal protection are violated by the legislature's decision to include or exclude a particular traffic offense from juvenile court jurisdiction.


Headnotes

[1] The legislature has absolute discretion to determine whether an individual charged with a particular crime is entitled to the benefit of the juvenile justice system.

[2] Due process and equal protection are not violated by the legislature's decision to include or exclude a particular traffic offense within the jurisdiction of the juvenile…

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Key Quotes

“The legislature has absolute discretion to determine whether an individual charged with a particular crime is entitled to the benefit of the juvenile justice system.”

Establishes the controlling legal principle that legislative classification decisions regarding juvenile court jurisdiction are within legislative discretion.

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Facts & Procedural History

G.D.M., a juvenile, was charged with reckless driving in violation of Florida Statute 316.192. The trial judge dismissed the information, finding that…

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Opinion of the Court
ENGLAND, Justice.

ENGLAND, Justice.

By direct appeal from the county court for Broward County, the state asks us to reverse an order dismissing an information against G.D.M., a juvenile, in which the trial judge found that section 39.01, Florida Statutes (1979), is:

violative of due process of law in failing to exclude from the definition of “juvenile traffic offense”, [s/c] reckless driving, pursuant to Florida Statute 316.192, thereby unlawfully depriving the juvenile court of jurisdiction of that offense, in contravention to the purposes of the juvenile court set forth in Florida Statute 39.001... .* An order clarifying the original order of dismissal also recites that the statute violates substantive due process and equal protection of the laws under the federal and state constitutions.

The trial court’s order and G.D. M.’s arguments here are premised on a right to treatment as a juvenile under Florida’s juvenile justice laws. That premise is erroneous. The legislature has absolute discretion to determine whether an individual charged with a particular crime is entitled to the benefit of the juvenile justice system. State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla.1980); Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573 (Fla.1975). Neither substantive due process nor equal protection are denied G.D.M. by the legislature’s decision to include or exclude a particular traffic offense within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

The order of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. *

Section 39.02, Florida Statutes (1979), provides in relevant part that the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction of all traffic offenses expressly excluded from the definition of “juvenile traffic offense,” section 39.01(21)(a)-(e), Florida Statutes (1979). Thus, by not excluding “reckless driving” in violation of section 316.-192, Florida Statutes (1979), from the definition of “juvenile traffic offense,” the legislature has decided, albeit in a roundabout fashion, to leave intact the jurisdiction of that offense to the county court.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Earvin Smith v. State, 211 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
    …te, 630 So. 2d 528, 531 (Fla. 1993)7 (quoting State v. Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 1984)), but the right is granted “only to the extent provided by our legislature.” State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1363 (Fla. 1980). See also State v. G.D.M., 394 So. 2d 1017, 1018 (Fla. 1981); Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1975). In Johnson, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a portion of Chapter 39, contending that the statute violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the United…
  • State v. A.N.F., 413 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
    …er Chapter 39, fall back under the general jurisdiction of the circuit court, and are subject to prosecution therein. AFFIRMED. ORFINGER and COWART, JJ., concur. . See §§ 39.11(l)(a)2, 39.11(l)(c), 39.12(2), Fla. Stat. (1981). . State v. G.D.M., 394 So. 2d 1017 (Fla.1981); State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla.1980).…
  • J.R.S. v. State, 483 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
    …me. Art. I, § 15(b), Fla. Const. “Therefore, a child has the right to be treated as a juvenile delinquent only to the extent provided by our legislature.” Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1363. See also Lisak v. State, 433 So. 2d 487 (Fla.1983); State v. G.D.M., 394 So. 2d 1017 (Fla.1981); Hayes v. State, 425 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Recognizing that the legislature has the final word in this matter, appellant urges us to examine the history behind the statutes and find a legislative intent to protect juveniles conv…

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