LEON HOLSTON, PETITIONER,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENT
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The Florida First District Court of Appeal held that the Parole and Probation Commission violated Chapter 947, Florida Statutes by setting an inmate's presumptive parole release date as "life" rather than establishing a specific, objective date. The court ordered the Commission to set a defined and particular binding presumptive parole release date within 45 days.
The court held that "life" does not constitute a proper presumptive parole release date under Chapter 947. The statute mandates a binding presumptive parole release date defined as "a statement or formula...that specifies the time (as day, month and year)," and "life" fails to meet this requirement. The Commission must establish a defined and particular binding presumptive parole release date, though that date may extend far beyond the sentence term or even beyond normal life expectancy if warranted by criminal history.
[1] The Florida Parole and Probation Commission must establish a binding presumptive parole release date, not a general term like "life."
[2] The term "date" in the context of parole release refers to a specific point in time, including a day, month, and year.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An inmate entitled to such consideration is entitled to a binding presumptive parole release date as mandated by clear legislative language.”
Establishes the statutory entitlement of eligible inmates to receive a specific presumptive parole release date
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLeon Holston was entitled to consideration for parole under Chapter 947, Florida Statutes. The Florida Parole and Probation Commission set his presump…
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[*1111] WENTWORTH, Judge.
Petitioner asserts that the Florida Parole and Probation Commission failed to establish a proper presumptive parole release date as mandated by Chapter 947, Florida Statutes, when it set petitioner’s release date at “life.” We agree.
The commission is not, of course, a sentencing court. It is charged with the responsibility of making sensitive decisions as to when release on parole is appropriate, based on objective parole criteria. An inmate entitled to such consideration is entitled to a binding presumptive parole release date as mandated by clear legislative language. Battis v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 386 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). “Date” is defined as “a statement or formula affixed (as to a piece of writing, inscription or coin) that specifies the time (as day, month and year) .... The point of time at which a transaction or event takes place or is appointed to take place; a given point of time.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) (1967), at p. 576. We conclude that “life” is not an objective “date” either as defined in common usage or as required by context in Chapter 947.
By its own rule, the commission may establish a presumptive parole release date falling far beyond the sentence term imposed by the trial court. Rule 23-19.-02(2)(e), Florida Administrative Code. Thus, a release date so distant as to be beyond a life expectancy may be proper for an inmate currently incarcerated if his criminal history so warrants. Such a date would appear to be within the legislative intent as expressed in the Objective Parole Guidelines Act.1
The Florida Parole and Probation Commission is directed to establish for petitioner a defined and particular binding presumptive parole release date within 45 days, if such has not already been established.
McCORD and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur. . The Commission has made no showing of a rational basis for using “life” rather than a particular date, other than counsel’s assertion that “nothing in Florida law posits a specific condition which requires a specific date for parole .... ” The law does, however, mandate a “date,” and, in the absence of evidence of an intent to use the term in an unusual sense, no express legislative definition should be required for an apparently unambiguous word.
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Peters v. State, 984 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2008)…hearings). The granting of parole is a function of the executive branch that is exercised only after the defendant has been convicted and sentenced. Marsh v. Garwood, 65 So. 2d 15, 21 (Fla.1953); see also Holston v. Fla. Parole & Probation Comm’n, 394 So. 2d 1110, 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (“The commission is not, of course, a sentencing court.”). Moreover, the authority to grant parole is vested solely in the Parole Commission. Owens v. State, 308 So. 2d 171, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); see also § 947.13(1)(a),…
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Moats v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 419 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…at the hearing examiner shall inform the Commission if “new information, either favorable or detrimental,” was discovered at the interview which might affect the presumptive parole release date. . Holston v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 394 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). . Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 393 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), appeal after remand, 361 So. 2d 199. . We do…
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Wright v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 420 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…post facto violation in using the guidelines in effect on the date of the interview. Wright’s contention that the Commission usurped judicial intent in setting his PPRD is likewise without merit. Holston v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 394 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). AFFIRMED. ERVIN and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.…
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- Battis v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 386 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)