JAMES MERRILL AND MARTHA MERRILL, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
JOSEPH G. PACKARD, RANDLE EASTERN AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES
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The court affirmed summary judgment holding that an ambulance attendants' errors and omissions insurance policy did not cover injuries from a vehicle collision because the policy excluded bodily injury arising from the operation of any automobile, and an ambulance constitutes an automobile under ordinary meaning of that term.
The court held that the errors and omissions policy did not provide coverage because of the automobile operation exclusion clause. An ambulance, being a self-propelled wheeled vehicle designed for transportation of persons on streets and roadways, unambiguously falls within the generic and ordinary meaning of the term automobile absent evidence that it was designed or used other than as an automobile.
[1] An errors and omissions policy covering professional malpractice of ambulance attendants does not provide coverage for bodily injury arising out of the operation of an am…
[2] An ambulance, designed for the transportation of persons on streets and roadways, falls within the ordinary meaning of the term "automobile" absent evidence that it was d…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an ambulance, being, inter alia, a self-propelled wheeled vehicle designed for the transportation of persons on streets and roadways... unambiguously falls within the generic and ordinary meaning of the term automobile absent record evidence that the ambulance was designed to be used, and used, other than as an automobile”
Establishes the court's holding that an ambulance qualifies as an automobile under the policy exclusion
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMr. Merrill was injured as a passenger in a Randle Eastern ambulance that collided with another vehicle. Randle Eastern had obtained an errors and omi…
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DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
We affirm the summary judgment which found that an Ambulance Attendants Errors and Omissions Policy issued by Jefferson Insurance Company, insuring Randle Eastern Ambulance Service and its employees, did not cover injuries suffered by Mr. Merrill arising from a collision between a Randle Eastern ambulance in which Merrill was a passenger and another vehicle. We hold that (1) the errors and omissions policy obtained by Randle Eastern, pursuant to a contract with Dade County, to cover professional malpractice of its ambulance attendants (as distinct from a separate automobile liability insurance policy obtained from another insurer to cover negligent operation of Randle Eastern’s vehicles and which policy, in fact, covered the accident in which Mr. Merrill was injured) did not, due to a clause excluding coverage for bodily injury arising out of the operation of any automobile operated by Randle Eastern, provide coverage to the Merrills; and (2) an ambulance, being, inter alia, a self-propelled wheeled vehicle designed for the transportation of persons on streets and roadways, see Loftus v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Company, 314 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Seaford v. Nationwide Mutual Insur ance Company, 253 N.C. 719, 117 S.E. 2d 733 (1961); Annot., Accident Insurance “Automobile” — “Car,”38 A.L.R.2d 867 (1954); see also Annot., Uninsured Motorist Provision— “Automobile,” 65 A.L.R.3d 851 (1975), unambiguously falls within the generic and ordinary meaning of the term automobile absent record evidence that the ambulance was designed to be used, and used, other than as an automobile, compare Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 235 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970) (a “jeep,” hand-built by the insured for use in roaming the pasture lands of a farm, but without the capacity to be legally and safely driven on public highways, is not an automobile) or absent other policy definitions which mandate a contrary conclusion, compare Hodges v. National Union Indemnity Company, 249 So. 2d 679 (Fla.1971) (a Chevrolet El Camino, indisputably used to haul business-related materials, as “truck type not used in business or for commercial purposes”).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Turner Hodges v. Nat'l Union Indem. Co., 249 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1971)
- Martin v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
- Loftus v. Pa. Life Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)