STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WILSON JAMES MOSS, A/K/A JAMES WILSON MOSS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida appeals a trial court's discharge of a criminal defendant based on denial of speedy trial, arguing that the defendant's express written waiver of speedy trial rights—both statutory and constitutional—was valid and indefinite in duration. The court holds that such an express waiver is enforceable and can only be reinitiated by the defendant's demand for trial, withdrawal of the waiver, or other clear assertion of rights.
The court holds that a clear express waiver of speedy trial rights for an indefinite period is sufficient to waive the defendant's speedy trial rights under state and federal constitutions and applicable statutes and rules. Such waived rights can only be reinstituted by the defendant filing a demand for speedy trial, withdrawing the waiver, or making some other clear assertion of constitutional speedy trial rights.
[1] An express written waiver of speedy trial rights is sufficient to waive those rights for an indefinite period under state and federal constitutions, statutes, and rules o…
[2] A defendant who expressly waives speedy trial rights for an indefinite period may re-acquire those rights by filing a demand for a speedy trial.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold this clear waiver was sufficient to waive for an indefinite period of time the defendant's speedy trial rights under article I, section 16, of the Constitution of the State of Florida, under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution, under section 918.015, Florida Statutes (1972), and under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.”
This establishes the court's holding that an express written waiver can waive speedy trial rights indefinitely across all sources of protection.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was prosecuted criminally and moved for two continuances, which were granted. Additionally, the defendant filed a separate written waive…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Express Waiver cases and more on FLexlaw
COWART, Judge.
After the defendant in a criminal prosecution had twice moved for continuances, which were granted, the trial court granted his discharge on the ground that he had been denied a speedy trial.
The defense continuances only impliedly waived the defendant’s right under the speedy trial rule but not his constitutional speedy trial rights, Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980), State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971).
Defendant’s contention, apparently accepted by the trial court, is that while his continuances and waivers waived his speedy trial rights under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, his constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable time1 was violated by delay in bringing him to trial. However, in this case, in addition to his two successful motions for continuances, one of which contained an express waiver of “his right to a speedy trial,” the defendant filed a separate written waiver of speedy trial in which he expressly waived
his right to a speedy trial as provided by the State and Federal Constitutions, the Laws of Florida, Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and other applicable provisions.
We hold this clear waiver was sufficient to waive for an indefinite period of time2 the defendant’s speedy trial rights under article I, section 16, of the Constitution of the State of Florida, under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution, under section 918.015, Florida Statutes (1972), and under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.
When an accused expressly waives his speedy trial rule rights for an indefinite period of time he can re-acquire certain speedy trial rule rights in the same manner as when he has, by seeking and obtaining a continuance, impliedly waived his rule rights; i. e., by filing a demand for a speedy trial, which commences the running of a 60 day period under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(2) or by filing a non-meritorious motion for a discharge the denial of which will commence the running of a 90 day period under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(3). See Butterworth and Cullen. Similarly, when constitutional speedy trial rights are waived for an indefinite period of time those rights can be reinstated by a demand for a speedy trial, a withdrawal of the waiver, or some other clear assertion of constitutional speedy trial rights. In such event, the accused will again be entitled to trial within a reasonable time measured from such assertion. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The order of discharge is reversed, appellee’s motion for discharge is denied,3 and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. -
ORFINGER and COBB, JJ., concur. . See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).
. As distinguished from an extension for a fixed or determinable time period by order of the court upon stipulation under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(2).
. This opinion, when final, will constitute a denial of appellee’s motion for discharge and, under Butterworth and Cullen, will commence the running of a new ninety day period within which appellee must be brought to trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(3).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. McCRERY, 429 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…er denying the defendants’ motion for discharge thus triggering the provisions of Rule 3.191(d)(3) and commencing the running of a new ninety-day period within which defendants must be brought to trial. Butterworth v. Fluellen, supra; State v. Moss, 395 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Blankenship, 422 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1982). The defendants not being entitled to discharge under the Speedy Trial Rule and not having asserted a violation of their constitutional right to speedy trial, the order…
-
Akins v. State, 462 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…U.S. Const, amend. V; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. . See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla.1980); Fulk v. State, 417 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); State v. Moss, 395 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). . See, e.g., West v. State, 149 Fla. 436, 6 So. 2d 7 (1942); Torrence v. State, 440 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Wilson v. State, 383 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Carter v. State, 380 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), cert.…
-
Donnell Rogers v. The Honorable Richard B. Keating, 411 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…ed for a speedy trial discharge. This motion was denied on December 10, 1980.- This denial began the running of a new, 90-day speedy trial period. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(3); Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968, 970 (Fla.1980); State v. Moss, 395 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The 90 [*232] days extended to March 10, 1981. On February 15, 1981, the date set for trial, the state moved to continue the cause on the ground of exceptional circumstance i.e., a necessary state witness was unforeseeably…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Isaac Don Butler & Gerald Nickles v. Honorable Ralph O. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971)
- Honorable Robert A. Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980)