CHARLES R. PEEK, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
HARVEY T. STEVENS AND INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANTS
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Court reversed a zero verdict in a personal injury case and remanded for new trial because the jury failed to award at least diagnostic medical expenses that were admittedly caused by the accident.
A plaintiff is entitled to recover at least diagnostic medical expenses reasonably incurred as a result of an admitted accident, and a zero verdict must be reversed when the jury fails to award such expenses.
[1] When a defendant admits liability in a personal injury case, a jury verdict awarding zero damages must be reversed if the plaintiff proved medical expenses directly cause…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the plaintiff is entitled to at least his diagnostic medical expenses which are reasonably incurred”
Court citing Ridenour v. Sharek to establish that diagnostic medical expenses must be awarded when proven to result from the accident.
Plaintiff Peek was injured in an accident caused by defendant Stevens. The defendant admitted liability, and the jury was instructed accordingly. Plai…
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DAUKSCH, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment in a personal injury case where the jury returned a zero verdict and the court denied a motion for new trial. There is a definite controversy as to whether all of the medical expenses which were incurred by plaintiff were incurred as a result of the accident. There is no question that at least the diagnostic medical bills were directly related to the accident. Of course we have no way of knowing why the jury refused to award any amount to the plaintiff. It cannot be on account of lack of liability because the defendant admitted liability and the jury was so instructed. It cannot be because no injuries were proved because, as we said in Ridenour v. Sharek, 388 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), the plaintiff is entitled to at least his diagnostic medical expenses which are reasonably incurred.
Because the jury was obviously misled or failed to understand that at least a portion of the expenses suffered by the plaintiff should have been paid by the defendant, we must assume it was not fully cognizant of its duty as a jury. We cannot make the determination that the plaintiff is entitled to only the diagnostic medical expenses nor can we assess what the damages should be; so in light of the jury’s failure to award at least a portion of the damages it was bound to award, we must require a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ORFINGER and SHARP, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hernandez v. Gonzalez, 124 So. 3d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…for medical examinations and diagnostic testing reasonably necessary to determine whether the subject accident caused the injuries. See Sparks-Book, 699 So. 2d at 768; Blanford v. Polk Cnty., 410 So. 2d 667, 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Peek v. Stevens, 395 So. 2d 617, 617-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Ridenour v. Sharek, 388 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). As such, appellants suggest that this court’s recent decision in Pack v. Geico General Insurance Co., 119 So. 3d 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), supports their reque…
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Martin v. Chapman, 780 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…the jury to return a verdict on an all-or-nothing basis,1 thereby waiving any objection to the fact that the jury accepted the invitation and came back with nothing. Given such waiver, the plaintiffs reliance on our prior opinion in Peek v. Stevens, 395 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) is misplaced. Moreover, Peek is an aberrant case insofar as it purported to rely on our prior opinion in Ridenour. Both cases dealt with established liability followed by zero jury verdicts. Yet, in contravention of our holding…
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Plana v. Sainz, 990 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…ting reasonably necessary to determine whether the subject accident caused the injuries. See Sparks-Book v. Sports Auth., Inc., 699 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Blanford v. Polk County, 410 So. 2d 667, 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Peek v. Stevens, 395 So. 2d 617, 617-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Ridenour v. Sharek, 388 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). However, the Second District in State, Department of Transportation v. Rosario, 782 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), essentially distinguished Sparks-Book when…1 / 2
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ridenour v. Sharek, 388 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)