WILLIE FREDRICK SIMPKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the removal of the victim from her bedroom to her living room during a sexual battery did not constitute kidnapping under the statute.
Appellant was convicted of burglary, sexual battery, and kidnapping. The victim was awakened, assaulted, and then moved from her bedroom to her living…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Kidnapping Statute Construction cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, convicted of the offenses of burglary of a dwelling, sexual battery by the use of force and violence likely to cause serious personal injury, and kidnapping, seeks reversal of the kidnapping conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support that charge. We agree and reverse.
The victim testified that she was awakened in her apartment to find appellant in her bedroom, at which point she was physically assaulted by appellant. Appellant then pulled her from the bedroom into the living room, where he had forcible sexual intercourse with her. We hold that appellant’s removal of the victim from the bedroom to the living room during the course of this criminal episode did not constitute the separate offense of kidnapping within the meaning of the statute, Section 787.01, Florida Statutes. The same result was reached by this court in Friend v. State, 385 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), under facts even stronger than those presented here. We adopt the same reasoning as did the court in the Friend case, and find that the circumstances with respect to the “confining, abducting, or imprisoning” (Section 787.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes) were “with-put independent significance,” and that these actions were “not materially different from the restraint necessarily involved” in the commission of the sexual battery offense. (Id. at 697)
While we do not rule out a conviction of kidnapping as an incident to a sexual battery, we do conclude that the confinement or imprisonment here is essentially indistinguishable from the acts constituting the sexual battery itself, and further, that the mere removal of the victim from the bedroom to the living room of her own apartment, without more, did not constitute an abduction within the meaning of the statute.
The conviction and sentence for kidnapping is REVERSED.
LARRY G. SMITH and THOMPSON, JJ., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Associate Judge (Ret.), concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
-
Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983)…rom access to a door — again, in the office and in the kitchen — through which she might have escaped. Hence, each made the sexual battery substantially easier to commit and substantially reduced the danger of detection. Compare, Simpkins v. State, [395 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA1981) ] (mere forced movement from bedroom to living room to accomplish sexual battery not kidnapping). The fact that relatively short distances were involved makes no difference. 399 So. 2d at 21-22 (citations omitted, footnote omitte…1 / 3
-
Sorey v. State, 419 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…onstitutes kidnapping, even applying the most stringent interpretation of Florida’s kidnapping statute. See Harkins v. State, 380 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), and its progeny, Carron v. State, 414 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Simpkins v. State, 395 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Friend v. State, 385 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); compare Gilley v. State, 412 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Faison v. State, 399 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). In Harkins, the court held that tying the victim to the bed wher…
-
Kirtsey v. State, 511 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)…ction. (Emphasis added). Faison. See also, Brinson v. State, 483 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1335 (Fla.1986); Chaney v. State, 464 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 479 So. 2d 118 (Fla.1985); Simpkins v. State, 395 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The confinement and movement in this case were limited to the interior of the restaurant. While these acts were not inherent in the offense of robbery (b), and arguably may have made the attempted robbery easier to commit (c),…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Friend v. State, 385 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)