JUDY MCCLAIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Judy McClain appeals her conviction for direct criminal contempt after refusing to identify a police officer who allegedly sexually assaulted her, asserting the trial court lacked proper grounds to compel her testimony. The court reversed, finding the trial court abused its discretion in holding her in contempt when the sought-after information was not clearly relevant to witness credibility or the pending case.
The trial court abused its discretion in finding McClain in contempt. The court lacked proper grounds to compel the answer because: (1) the information did not clearly affect McClain's credibility as a witness in Overton's trial, and (2) questions about an alleged assault in a different jurisdiction (Hillsborough County) were not pertinent to the Pinellas County assault investigation.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by holding a witness in contempt for refusing to answer questions that do not demonstrably affect her credibility.
[2] Inquiries into collateral matters are permissible only when they tend to affect the credibility of a witness.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The rules which should govern the trial court in exercising its discretion in allowing or disallowing inquiries into collateral matters to affect credibility do not authorize any question to be put for the sole purpose of disgracing the witness. The court should disallow all inquiries into collateral matters which do not tend to affect credibility.”
Establishes the governing legal standard that inquiries into collateral matters are only permitted when they directly affect witness credibility, not merely to discredit or disgrace a witness.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcClain was charged with a misdemeanor assault alongside her fiancé Overton, who faced aggravated assault charges. During preparation for Overton's tr…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Judy McClain appeals from an order of the trial court finding her in direct criminal contempt. We find that the court abused its discretion and reverse.
McClain and her fiance, Mr. Overton, were both charged in Pinellas County in connection with an assault against two men. McClain entered a plea to a misdemeanor charge arising out of the incident. Overton was to stand trial on a charge of aggravated assault.
In the case against Overton, McClain was listed as a witness for the state and for the defendant. The state asked to depose McClain, and the defense made her available; however, the state refused to allow Overton to be present during the deposition. The defense objected and moved for a ruling. While the court was considering the matter, the state filed a subpoena for investigation. Under the subpoena, the judge allowed the state to talk to McClain without her counsel being present.
It appears from the record that at some point McClain informed the state that prior to the assault for which she and her fiance were charged, she thought that one of the victims had exposed his sexual organs to her. The state then questioned McClain about an alleged sexual assault against her by a police officer which had occurred the year before. The record does not reveal how the state became aware of this previous alleged assault. McClain refused to identify the officer who had made the assault because of threats against her and her family. The court found that this did not constitute legal cause not to answer and found McClain in direct criminal contempt.
The state attorney argues that he is entitled to the information regarding this 1979 assault as it relates to McClain’s credibility. However, the record does not indicate how this information could be used to impeach McClain under sections 90.608-610, Florida Statutes (1979).
Inquiries into collateral matters should only be allowed when they affect the credibility of the witness. The court in Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 576, 26 So. 713, 722 (1899), stated:
The rules which should govern the trial court in exercising its discretion in allowing or disallowing inquiries into collateral matters to affect credibility do not authorize any question to be put for the sole purpose of disgracing the witness. The court should disallow all inquiries into collateral matters which do not tend to affect credibility.
We agree with that view.
As there has been no demonstration here that the information sought to be elicited from McClain does affect her credibility, we find that the trial court has abused its discretion.
In holding McClain in contempt, the court seemed to indicate that the answers to the questions propounded by the assistant state attorney for Pinellas County, which McClain refused to answer, might be pertinent to an investigation of a criminal offense of some sort. The questions asked of McClain would not be pertinent to an investigation of the merits of the Pinellas County assault charge against Overton, nor should they properly be part of an investigation into the alleged assault by a police officer in Hillsborough County which had allegedly occurred one year previously. Hillsborough County constitutes another jurisdiction, and the state attorney’s office of that county would be the proper authority to determine whether or not to pursue that alleged offense.
We find that neither of the grounds given by the court for its attempt to compel an answer is valid. The trial court has abused its discretion, and we reverse the order finding McClain in contempt.
BOARDMAN, Acting C. J., and OTT, J., concur.
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Zonald Watson Weatherford v. State, 561 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…Evidence § 608.1 (2d ed. 1984). We reject the state’s sole argument in response, that defense counsel opened the door to these improper questions. The trial court erred in overruling defense counsel’s objection to this inquiry. Cf. McLain v. State, 395 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). The dissent’s characterization of our holding in this case as indulging “a fascination with trial technique and gamesmanship, at the expense of additional emotional and psychological trauma for the child victim” misses the point…
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O'Neil v. Gilbert, 625 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…aging the witness’s character and thus, the acceptability of her testimony. Nelson v. State, 99 Fla. 1032, 128 So. 1 (1930); Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. at 547, 26 So. at 713; Weatherford v. State, 561 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); McClain v. State, 395 So. 2d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); see Loper v. Allstate Ins. Co., 616 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Dempsey v. Shell Oil Co., 589 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); see also Breedlove v. State, 580 So. 2d 605, 609 (Fla.1991) (“Evidence of bias may be inadmi…
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Reeves v. State, 711 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…affic offense served only to embarrass the only defense witness and discredit him. The brother’s incarceration after - an arrest for a traffic offense was merely a collateral matter which did not tend to affect his credibility. See McClain v. State, 395 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (court should disallow all inquiry into collateral matters not tending to affect credibility and put forth for sole purpose of disgracing witness). We reject the State’s argument that the prosecutor’s eliciting this evidence was…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wallace v. State, 26 So. 713 (Fla. 1899)