LILLIE B. PAYNE, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DOROTHY PAYNE AND JACYLYN PAYNE, APPELLANTS,
v.
PALM BEACH COUNTY, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1981-04-01
No. 79-1601
ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
395 So. 2d 1267 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1981) Positive Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

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Synopsis

A personal representative of two deceased passengers sued Palm Beach County for wrongful death after their vehicle crashed into a canal at a T-intersection. The court affirmed summary judgment for the County, holding that adequate warning signs were provided and that decisions to extend pavement or install guard rails constitute protected policy-level decisions under sovereign immunity.


Holding

The County did not breach a duty to warn because the placement of signs met more than minimal State requirements. Decisions regarding whether to extend a road or build a guard rail are classic policy-level decisions protected by sovereign immunity and remain outside the scope of negligence liability.


Headnotes

[1] A county satisfies its duty to warn motorists of an intersection when it erects legally compliant and visible traffic control signs.

[2] Decisions regarding whether to extend a road or construct a guardrail are planning-level policy decisions protected by sovereign immunity.

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Key Quotes

“Whether to extend a road or build a guard rail are classic examples of the type of planning level policy decisions which remain in the protected sphere of sovereign immunity.”

Establishes that infrastructure and safety improvement decisions are protected governmental functions immune from negligence liability.

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Facts & Procedural History

Two deceased daughters were passengers in an automobile traveling north on Sam Senter Road toward a T-intersection with Airport Road, beyond which lay…

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Opinion of the Court
MOORE, Judge.

MOORE, Judge.

The plaintiff, as personal representative of the estates of her deceased daughters, appeals an adverse summary judgment in appellee’s favor in a wrongful death action. We affirm.

The undisputed facts show that the deceased daughters were passengers in an automobile which was traveling in a northerly direction on Sam Senter Road. Sam Senter Road ends at its intersection with Airport Road which runs east and west. Paralleling Airport Road on the north is a canal. Upon approaching the “T” intersection, the driver apparently failed to see, or heed, signs of the approaching intersection. Approximately 1165 feet south of the intersection were two signs, one indicating “Stop Ahead” and the other indicating a speed limit of 25 miles per hour. At approximately 210 feet south of the intersection there was a sign indicating a “T" intersection ahead, and finally, a “STOP” sign was located 42 feet south of the intersection. The signs were visible and readily observable, and met State requirements for traffic control devices. Notwithstanding the visibility of the signs and that the vehicle was being driven during daylight hours, the vehicle went through the intersection, came to rest totally submerged in the canal, and the passengers drowned.

The appellant contends that the County was guilty of negligence by failing to warn motorists that Sam Senter Road did not continue north of Airport Road and by failing to continue the pavement northerly. She also argues that the County had a duty to erect a guard rail in front of the canal to stop vehicles whose drivers fail to see the stop sign.

As to the first of appellant’s contentions, the undisputed facts clearly show that the duty to warn was met with the placement of signs meeting more than the minimal requirements of the “State Manual for Traffic Control Devices”. As to the second contention that the County should have extended the pavement or erected a guard rail, we are controlled by Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.1979). Whether to extend a road or build a guard rail are classic examples of the type of planning level policy decisions which remain in the protected sphere of sovereign immunity. See also, Ferla v. Metropolitan Dade County, 374 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979).

The final summary judgment is affirmed.

ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Dep't OF Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982)
    …nal in character. Banta v. Rosier, 399 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), held that allegations concerning an improperly designed intersection pled matters which were within the judgmental, planning level of decision making. Payne v. Palm Beach County, 395 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), held that the failure to extend a road and the construction of a guardrail are classic examples of the type of judgmental, planning-level decisions within the protected sphere of sovereign immunity. Romine v. Metropolitan Dade C…
    1 / 2
  • …its that it is responsible for maintenance and safety of the highway and has performed active maintenance operations, yet it urges that under Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.1979) and Payne v. Palm Beach County, 395 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), it is immune from liability for failure to warn of the dangerous condition of the crossing. It argues here, as it unsuccessfully did before the trial court on its motion for summary judgment, that its decision not to place extra…
  • Banta v. Rosier, 399 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
    …tate a cause of action; that is, to allege negligence on the part of the government in an operational level decision or conduct. Commercial Carrier. See also City of Tamarac v. Garchar, 398 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Payne v. Palm Beach County, 395 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); A. L. Lewis Elementary School v. Metropolitan Dade City, 376 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Ferla v. Metropolitan Dade County, 374 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). REVERSED AND REMANDED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and SHARP, JJ., c…

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