WILLIE BYRON HARRIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Willie Harris was arrested in connection with two robberies and gave incriminating statements to police. This appeal concerns whether statements made in the second interrogation should have been suppressed because Harris equivocally requested an attorney after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, and police continued questioning him anyway.
The court held that the statements must be suppressed and the conviction reversed. The court interpreted Harris's statement as a request for counsel to be present before questioning, and even if construed as a timing question, the detective's response was at least misleading. Either way, Harris's constitutional rights were not sufficiently protected under Miranda.
[1] A suspect's request for an attorney, even if phrased as a question about timing, must be honored by law enforcement.
[2] Law enforcement must cease interrogation once a suspect invokes their right to counsel.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.”
Establishes the bright-line Miranda rule that interrogation must immediately cease upon assertion of right to counsel
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarris was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights at the time of arrest and again at the police station, where he and two detectives initialed a r…
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HERSEY, Judge.
The record implicates appellant in two robberies. Separate incriminating statements were given by him as to each robbery. This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress statements made as to one of those robberies. Because of the grounds upon which we reverse, it is not necessary to consider the possible interrelationships between either the substantive or the procedural aspects of the two crimes, except those specifically mentioned here.
Appellant was advised of his Miranda rights at the time of his arrest. Subsequently, at the police station, Miranda rights were again reviewed and appellant and two detectives initialed a “rights” card.
During the course of interrogation concerning the latter of the two robberies the following colloquy between appellant and a detective occurred:
Q If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you free of charge, do you understand? A Yeah. Q If you decide to answer my questions now you can stop answering any time you want, do you understand? A Yes. Q Do you fully understand each of your rights. A Yes, I do. Q Do you wish to answer questions at this time? A Well, I want to ask a question first. Q Okay. A Uh, is I want an attorney. Could I have one now? Q Not right this minute, no. That means the court will appoint you an attorney at a later date. A Oh. Might be a week from now, two? Q Possibly, yes. A Okay. No significant discussion concerning appellant’s rights took place between the time of this exchange and appellant’s interrogation later the same day by another detective concerning the earlier robbery. The incriminating statements made during this second interview were the subject of the motion to suppress, denial of which occasioned the present appeal.
We interpret the conversation quoted earlier as a request that counsel be present before any questioning take place. But even if the language be construed as a question as to timing, the response given by the detective was at least misleading.
In either event we would be compelled to conclude that appellant’s constitutional rights had not been sufficiently protected. The mandate of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) is clear:
If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning: If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent. We have previously held that questioning cannot continue after assertion by an accused of his or her right to counsel. Wakeman v. State, 281 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). The prohibition applies where the assertion is made by indirection or suggestion, as well as in the case of direct, positive assertion. Singleton v. State, 344 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
For these reasons we reverse the conviction and remand for new trial with instructions that the motion to suppress be granted.
BERANEK, J., and SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, concur.
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State v. Padron, 425 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…82), are equally inappo-site. Once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, further custodial interrogation is prohibited. Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378; Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; Harris v. State, 396 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). See also United States v. Hinckley, 672 F. 2d 115 (D.C.Cir.1982). For the reasons previously advanced, the order granting the motion to suppress physical evidence is reversed, the order granting the motion to suppress statement…
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Luman v. State, 447 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…the continued interrogation concerned a different crime than the one for which Luman was arrested and initially interrogated? Two of our sister courts have held that an accused’s statements should be suppressed in this context. In Harris v. State, 396 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), an accused was arrested on robbery charges and advised of his Miranda rights. He asked for an attorney, but was told one could not be appointed for a number of days. The questioning stopped, but later the same day he was asked a…
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Isaac-Ramirez v. State, 450 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…ilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. [*1237] Upon this appeal he urges that some of his statements to the police were obtained in violation of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. See Harris v. State, 396 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). In addition, he urges error in the admission into evidence of allegedly prejudicial photographs of the victim. See §§ 90.401-.4Ó3, Fla.Stat. (1981). We have carefully examined the record in the light of each of these contentio…
Authorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Singleton v. State, 344 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Free Bond, Inc. v. Comaza Int'l, Inc., 281 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)