PEACOCK FRUIT AND CATTLE CORPORATION & COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE CO., APPELLANTS,
v.
CLARENCE E. PRESCOTT, APPELLEE
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An employer and its workers' compensation carrier appealed a deputy's award of workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained in 1974, challenging the statute of limitations application, liability allocation among multiple carriers, and the compensation rate used. The court affirmed the deputy's findings on statute of limitations and liability allocation but reversed on the compensation rate, holding that the rate in effect at the time of the 1974 accident ($80/week maximum) should apply, not the later rate.
The court affirmed the deputy's decisions on points one and two regarding statute of limitations and liability allocation, but held that the compensation rate must be determined by the statute in effect at the time of the accident. For the 1974 injury, the maximum weekly compensation rate of $80.00 (from the 1973 statute governing 1973-1975 injuries) should apply, not the higher $126.00 rate from 1979.
[1] The weekly rate of compensation is a substantive legal matter determined by the statute in effect at the time of the accident.
[2] Statutory provisions governing disability compensation apply to injuries suffered within the specific date ranges defined by the statute.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The weekly rate of compensation to be awarded is a matter of substantive law fixed by the statute in effect at the time of the accident.”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that the compensation rate is determined by the statute applicable at the time of the accident, not when maximum medical improvement is reached.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceClarence Prescott sustained work-related injuries in 1974 and was involved in additional accidents resulting in a total 60% permanent partial disabili…
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WENTWORTH, Judge.
The employer/carrier appeals urging that the deputy erred in failing to apply the statute of limitations to the injuries sustained in 1974, in holding Commercial Union responsible for a 28% permanent partial disability (from a total 60% award against three carriers for separate accidents, on authority of Tolvanen v. Eastern Air Lines, 287 So. 2d 299 (Fla.1973)) on a wage earning capacity loss basis, and in awarding compensation at the rate of $126.00 per week for the disability attributable to the 1974 injuries.
After careful consideration of the record and arguments presented we find no error with respect to Points I & and II and affirm. However, there is merit in appellant’s third point above stated, controverting application of the compensation rate in effect at the time of the last of the several accidents from which claimant reached maximum medical improvement in 1979.
In pertinent part, Section 440.-12(3), Florida Statutes (1978), states: “The provisions of this section as amended effective July 1, 1973, shall govern with respect to disability due to injuries suffered after June 30,1973 and prior to January 1,1975.” Section 440.12(2), Florida Statutes (1973), governing appellant’s accident, provides that compensation shall not exceed $80.00 per week. The weekly rate of compensation to be awarded is a matter of substantive law fixed by the statute in effect at the time of the accident. Sullivan v. Mayo, 121 So. 2d 424 (Fla.1960), Walker and LaBerge, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So. 2d 239 (Fla.1977). We conclude appellee’s reliance upon the provisions of Section 440.15(5)(c) is inappropriate. In view of the determination of a common date of maximum medical improvement the deputy in this case as in Tolvanen, supra, did not apply merger principles controlling preexisting permanent conditions and “did not, of course, make an apportionment within the contemplation of F.S. Section 440.02(19), F.S.A., which was not applicable.” Tolvanen, supra at 301.
The order is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SHIVERS, J., and LILES, WOODIE A. (Ret.), Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Walker & LaBERGE, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1977)
- Sullivan v. Mayo, 121 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1960)
- Tolvanen v. E. AIR Lines & Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 287 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1973)