STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
PATRICK WILSON HUDSON, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1981-04-24
No. 80-1936
SCHEB, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
397 So. 2d 426 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1981) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Florida appeals the dismissal of a sexual battery charge against Hudson. The court reversed the dismissal, holding that the victim's testimony about threats, physical force, and her submission out of fear established a prima facie case sufficient to proceed to trial.


Holding

Yes. The court held that the undisputed facts—including the defendant's threats, physical force (grabbing, attempting to remove clothing, dragging), and the victim's testimony that she submitted out of fear—established a prima facie case of sexual battery. The case presents jury questions regarding consent, force, resistance, and fear that must be decided by a jury, not dismissed as a matter of law.


Headnotes

[1] A motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) should be granted only when the undisputed facts fail to establish a prima facie case of guilt.

[2] When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the state and should…

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Key Quotes

“the function of a dismissal under rule 3.190(c)(4) is to eliminate only those cases in which the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt”

Establishes the proper standard for reviewing motions to dismiss, requiring courts to view facts favorably to the prosecution.

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Facts & Procedural History

The victim, a 27-year-old woman hitchhiking to an apartment, accepted a ride from Hudson, whom she did not know. Instead of driving her to her destina…

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Opinion of the Court
GRIMES, Judge.

GRIMES, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a charge of sexual battery.

The state charged appellee with committing sexual battery in the course of which he used physical force and violence not likely to cause serious personal injury in violation of section 794.011(5), Florida Statutes (1979). He filed a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) and predicated it upon the facts set forth in the deposition of the victim. Following a hearing, the court granted the motion.

According to her deposition, the victim, a twenty-seven year old woman, was hitchhiking to the Carousel Apartments to go swimming with some friends. She was wearing a sundress over a bathing suit. Appellee, with whom she was not acquainted, offered to give her a ride to her destination. Instead, he drove her to a dead-end cul-de-sac where he began to make advances. He tried to kiss her and made several unsuccessful efforts to pull her skirt up. He told her that she had better let him have his way or he would hurt her. As a ruse to ward him off, she told him she had an apartment at the Carousel Apartments and that it would be safer if they went there.

The victim further testified that instead of going to the apartments appellee drove to a more lonely area. There he started grabbing her and unsuccessfully tried to pull down her bikini pants. At his command, she got out of the car. He then dragged her around the car and told her to lie down. He threatened to hurt her again, and his voice shook as if he was in a state of agitation. She tried to talk him out of his objective, but when he refused to be dissuaded, she lay down. Without a struggle, she submitted to intercourse which, she said, hurt “a little bit.” At no time did appellee exhibit or refer to a weapon. Upon her release, she went to the Carousel Apartments where she immediately called the police.

At the outset it is well to remember that the function of a dismissal under rule 3.190(c)(4) is to eliminate only those cases in which the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt. Therefore, in passing upon a motion to dismiss, the court should view the facts in the light most favorable to the state. State v. Davis, 243 So. 2d 587 (Fla.1971). The court should not weigh the evidence or determine its credibility. State v. Bryant, 373 So. 2d 708 (Fla.3d DCA 1979). If reasonable men could find guilt, a jury question results, and the motion to dismiss should be denied. State v. Hires, 372 So. 2d 183 (Fla.2d DCA 1979).

As in prosecutions under the old rape statutes, the state must prove the use of physical force which overcomes the will of the victim in order to convict a defendant of sexual battery under section 794.011(5). Admittedly, the only evidence in this case of physical force which appellee applied directly to the victim prior to intercourse consisted of his grabbing at her, seeking to pull off her wearing apparel, and dragging her around the ear. Yet, the victim testified that more than once appellee threatened to hurt her. She emphasized that she only submitted out of fear for her safety after failing in her efforts to talk him out of his objective.

The supreme court has held that when, a man obtains intercourse with a woman by such an array of physical force that she dare not resist, he is guilty even though he lays no hands on her. Flowers v. State, 152 Fla. 649, 12 So. 2d 772 (1943); Green v. State, 135 Fla. 17, 184 So. 504 (1938). Resistance is a relative term and must be considered under the circumstances of each case. Thomas v. State, 167 So. 2d 309 (Fla.1964). Questions of consent, force, resistance and fear are particularly within the province of the jury to determine. Berezovsky v. State, 335 So. 2d 592 (Fla.3d DCA 1976), rev'd in part on other grounds, 350 So. 2d 80 (Fla.1977).

From a review of the facts reflected by the victim’s deposition and in view of the standards set out above, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that appellee was entitled to discharge. We reverse the order of dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings.

SCHEB, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Clyatt, 976 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
    …idence to prove the victim’s lack of consent in this battery case. Additionally, we agree with our sister court that “[q]uestions of consent, force, resistance and fear are particularly within the province of the jury to determine.” State v. Hudson, 397 So. 2d 426, 428 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Generally, the test for admissibility of evidence is its relevance. See § 90.402, Fla. Stat. (2007) (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided by law.”). Because the State’s evidence is clearly relevant to th…
  • State v. Amaro, 436 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
    …lt, a jury question exists and the motion should be denied. The facts are to be reviewed by the court in the light most favorable to the state and only where they do not establish such a prima facie case should dismissal be granted. State v. Hudson, 397 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). In dismissing the third degree murder charge, the conclusion of the trial court was that the appellees’ participation in the underlying drug felony had come to an end prior to the killing of Detective Rauft. The appellees argued…
  • Owens v. State, 438 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
    …PER CURIAM. The defendant’s convictions are affirmed. See Tejeda-Bermudez v. State, 427 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); State v. Hudson, 397 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); McKnight v. State, 319 So. 2d 647 (Fla.3d DCA 1975). The state has conceded to an error in the sentencing documents which resulted in a minimum mandatory three-year sentence for the conviction of rape without use or threatened…

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