JOHN MASCI, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A 17-year-old defendant challenged his prosecution as an adult under Florida's discretionary waiver statute. The court affirmed that the state attorney properly charged him as an adult, holding that the statutory requirement of two prior delinquent acts was satisfied even though both acts arose from a single criminal episode and neither resulted in formal adjudication.
The court held that the statute's requirement of two prior delinquent acts was satisfied because: (1) the statutory language requires only that the child have been 'found' to have committed delinquent acts, not that formal adjudications have been entered; and (2) burglary and larceny constitute two distinct delinquent acts even when arising from the same criminal episode, as the statute contains no requirement that such acts arise from separate criminal episodes.
[1] A state attorney may file an information against a 16 or 17-year-old defendant if the public interest requires adult sanctions, even if the defendant has not been previou…
[2] The statutory requirement that a child have been 'found' to have committed delinquent acts does not necessitate an actual adjudication of delinquency.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the terms of the statute apply to this situation and reject both of the appellant's arguments to the contrary”
Establishes the court's holding that the statute's requirements for adult prosecution were satisfied
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMasci was 17 years old when charged as an adult by the state attorney. As a juvenile, he had previously been found to have committed burglary and larc…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Judicial Interpretation Of Statutes cases and more on FLexlaw
[*985] SCHWARTZ, Judge.
The sole point on appeal challenges the determination below that the defendant, Masci, who was 17 years of age, was properly charged as an adult by the state attorney under Section 39.04(2)(e)4, Fla.Stat. (1979), which provides:
4. With respect to any child who at the time of commission of the alleged offense was 16 or 17 years of age, [the state attorney may] file an information when in his judgment and discretion the public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed. Upon motion of the child, the case shall be transferred for adjudicatory proceedings as a child pursuant to s. 39.09(1) if it is shown by the child that he had not previously been found to have committed two delinquent acts, one of which involved an offense classified under Florida law as a felony. [e. s.]
As a juvenile, Masci had been previously found guilty of burglary and larceny arising out of the same incident — breaking into a structure and stealing property from inside — but had not been adjudicated delinquent as a result of that conduct. We agree with the trial court that the terms of the statute apply to this situation and reject both of the appellant’s arguments to the contrary:
1. Sections 39.09(3) and 39.10(2), Fla.Stat. (1979) provide for a two-step process in the disposition of delinquency proceedings under which, after the juvenile has first been found to have committed a delinquent act, he may or may not then be actually adjudicated delinquent. The condition of Sec. 39.04(2)(e) that the child have been “found” guilty of acts of delinquency therefore plainly does not also require that actual adjudications have been entered, as Masci contends. Compare Section 39.-09(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1979), which, in contrast, specifically refers to the consequences of the child’s having been “previously adjudicated delinquent.”
2. The previous burglary and larceny constituted two distinct crimes or delinquent acts — one of breaking in, the other of stealing — even though they arose out of the same series of events. Estevez v. State, 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla.1975). There is nothing in Section 39.04(2)(e)4 which supports the appellant’s position that the two acts of delinquency must arise from separate criminal episodes!1! Our insertion of such a requirement would amount to an impermissible judicial rewriting of the legislative mandate. 10 Fla.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 170 (1979), and cases cited.
Since the defendant’s criminal prosecution as an adult was thus authorized by Sec. 39.04, see State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla.1980), the judgment under review is
Affirmed.
. The defendant’s reliance on Shead v. State, 367 So. 2d 264, 266-67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), which dealt with the habitual offender statute, is misplaced. Both the determinative language and the legislative purpose of the two provisions are entirely different.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
R. A. B. v. State, 399 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…not harmless. See, e. g., § 39.032(2)(d)4, Fla. Stat. (1980) (prior adjudication taken into account in detention decision); § 39.-09(2)(c)7c, Fla.Stat. (1980) (prior adjudication taken into account in waiver determination); see also Masci v. State, 397 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Accordingly, the finding that R. A. B. committed the delinquent acts charged is affirmed, and the order adjudicating him delinquent is reversed. The cause is remanded to the trial court for a new determination whether to withhol…
-
Parker v. State, 410 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…the outset, we recognize that the state attorney has initial discretion to determine whether to proceed against a child in excess of sixteen years of age as an adult, pursuant to Section 39.04(2)(e)(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978). Masci v. State, 397 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). However, as the statute plainly provides, upon motion by the child, the case shall be transferred for juvenile adjudication if it is shown that the child has not previously been found to have committed two delinquent acts, one of…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1980)
- Ciro Estevez v. State, 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1975)
- Shead v. State, 367 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)